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The "balancing test" is a new way to decide cases. It directs a judge to eschew the
application of formal rules in deciding a case, and instead to balance the competing
interests of the litigants (or the competing interests of society more generally), and to
give judgment for the side with the weightier interests.' The test, by all measures, has
become the enfant terrible of modern judging. A relative newcomer to American juris-
prudence, it has already invaded dozens of areas of law, and its rapid growth in popu-
larity is a cause for both wonder and concern. It is a cause for wonder because the test
arguably represents a wholly new way of settling legal disputes, and it most certainly
represents a new way of writing about them once they are decided. This is a cause for
concern because the test wrecks the doctrinal furniture; it unsettles, and indeed over-
throws, the systems of rules worked out by generations of previous judges. This may be
a positive development, but only if we are satisfied that the newcomer is legitimate.
In its most elementary form, the balancing test directs a judge to balance the interests
of the plaintiff against the interests of the defendant, and to give judgment for the
litigant with the weightier interests. The simple structure of this method is perhaps its
greatest virtue. 2 The judge is encouraged to step out from behind the intricate lattice of
formal rule-based reasoning, and to confront squarely the real concerns of the parties
to the litigation. In a more sophisticated version of the test, a judge weighs not only the
circumstances of the individual litigants, but also the broader societal interests they
represent. Thus, for example, in determining whether a particular police intrusion has
violated the fourth amendment's injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the judge may balance the state's interest in public health and safety against the interest
of individuals generally in personal privacy. 3 This sort of balance retains the test's essential
simplicity, but takes into account the broader societal concerns that inform any judge's
work. in this more sophisticated form, the balancing test has seen an explosion in
popukirity.
The test made a splashy debut in the late 1950s and early 1960s in a series of United
States Supreme Court decisions regarding the first amendment rights of free speech
and association. 4 The Court has since introduced the balancing test into its analysis of
'There are actually many different types of balancing tests, and I will examine the distinctions
between them in detail later in this Article.
2 See Luizzi, Balancing of Interests in Courts, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 373, 376 (1980). See also infra text
accompanying notes 226-34.
E.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-06 (1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 210-14 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968).
E.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 020, 845 (1961) (plurality opinion); Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203, 261 (1961) (Black, 1., dissenting) (characterizing majority opinion as balancing test);
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S.
399, 414 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
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other constitutional provisions,' and the states have followed this expansion in their own
constitutional jurisprudence.' The balancing test has also become a method of statutory
construction, 7
 and a method for settling disputes when no statute or constitutional
provision is implicated. 8
 When judges have not created the test on their own, they have
sometimes been directed to do so by federal and state legislatures." By last year, courts
had decided cases in over forty substantive areas on balancing test grounds. Its relatively
recent appearance and rapid growth mark the balancing test as one of the most significant
developments in judging practice in the twentieth century. It is time for a general
evaluation.
The test has in the past engendered occasional flurries of critical interest. When the
Supreme Court introduced the test to first amendment analysis in the late 1950s, some
commentators asked whether it. was a good thing for first amendment liberties, 1 " and
subsequent appearances of the test in new areas of law have generated additional
comment." These studies, however, have largely been confined to the question of
whether the test promotes or damages the rights described under particular provisions
of the federal constitution, although some scholars have examined the test across a
substantial part of constitutional adjudication.' 2
 These are movements in the right di-
rection, but our accumulation of experience with the test, both inside and outside the
federal constitution, underscores the need for an even more comprehensive evaluation.
This Article has two aims. The primary aim is to describe and explain the phenom-
enon: to understand the structure of the balancing test, the nature of its challenge to
3 E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (freedom of religion); Cleveland Bd. of
Edw. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (fourteenth amendment due process); Mackey v.
Montryin, 443 U.S. 1, 10-19, (1979) (same); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)
(same); Sosna v. Iowa, 410 U.S. 393, 406 (1975) (fourteenth amendment equal protection); Raymond
Mon». Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-44 (1978) (commerce clause); Great Ml. & Pat. Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-72 (1976) (same); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc,, 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970) (same).
"E.g., Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 110 A.D.2d 35, 38, 505
N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (1986) (search and seizure); State v. Bass, 320 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Iowa 1982)
(speedy trial); People v. Bloyd, 416 Mich. 538, 550 & 11.10, 331 N.W.2cl 447, 453 & 11.10 (1982)
(search and seizure); Appeal of Portsmouth Trust Co., 120 N.H. 753, 757-58, 423 A.2(1 603, 605-
06 (1980) (due process); Can Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2c1 416, 410 (Minn. 1979)
(commerce clause); New jersey v. Szima, 70 NJ. 196, 201, 358 A.2d 773, 776 (1976) (speedy trial);
Commonwealth v. Lee, 460 Pa. 374, 379, 333 A.2d 773, 776 (1975) (speedy trial).
7 See infra notes 151-00 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 161-84 and accompanying text.
1 " See, e.g., Frantz, The First Amendrnent in the Balance, 71 YALE	 1424, 1449 (1962). Professor
Franiz argued that "the 'balancing' (est. does not permit the first amendment to perform its function
as a c(instituti(mal limitation. It virtually converts that amendment into its opposite. A prohibition
against abridgement has become a license to abridge." Id. See also Mendelson, The First Amendment
and Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1964).
" Some recent examples include Redish & Marshall, Adjudicator) Independence and the Value of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 470-74 (1986) (balancing clue process claims under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments); Note, "Balancing on the Brink of the Chasm:" The Exigent Circum-
stances Exception and the Fourth Amendment's Categorical Balancing Test- in State v. Welsh, 1983 Wis. L.
REv, 1023 (fourth amendment); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REV. 62, 62-71 (1982)
(commerce clause).
12 See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE Li. 943 (1987); Henkin,
InfUllibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1978).
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more traditional forms of legal reasoning, and the causes of its increasing popularity.
The second aim is normative: to evaluate whether the test is a proper method of judging
cases.
The balancing test represents a direct challenge to traditional rule-based reasoning.
It proceeds on a set of assumptions about judging quite different from those long a part
of American jurisprudence. Part I of this Article explores the nature of that challenge.
There are actually several types of balancing tests, some more hostile than others to the
old canons of judicial behavior. The challenge is important because the test is now a
significant part of American judging. It has become tremendously popular over the past
thirty years, and Part II traces that rise in popularity. This particular transformation in
judging practice has been supported by a sturdy combination of precedent and modern
thought, and its foundations are strong enough that the test is likely to grow in popularity
for years to come.
This development would not be too alarming if the test were an unambiguous
advance in the art and practice of judging. But it is not, and Part III of the Article
explores the relative merits of balancing as a method of deciding cases. The balancing
test is based on an attractive metaphor — the weighing of interests upon a scale of
justice. It appears to describe with considerable candor how judges actually decide cases,
and to be malleable enough in its operation so that all the special circumstances of
particular cases may be taken into account. These are all colorable advantages, but the
metaphor of the balance collapses when pressed into service as a method of deciding
cases, and the test is more difficult to apply than it first appears. Serious questions can
also be raised about whether the test endangers those fundamental liberties it is called
upon to interpret, and whether the test unwisely blurs the separation of powers between
the legislative and judicial branches. Its most serious flaws, however, are jurisprudential.
The test fails to ensure that like cases will be treated alike, and it gives inadequate
guidance about what future actions are permitted to the citizenry. On the basis of these
difficulties I conclude that continued use of the test is ill-advised.
Part IV of the Article sets out my prescriptions, which follow straightforwardly from
this evaluation: the test should not be expanded to new areas of law, and it should be
withdrawn from areas that it currently dominates. In this last part I make some sugges-
tions on how these prescriptions might be implemented.
I. THE BALANCING TEST AND ITS TRADITIONAL RIVAL
There are many ways to decide a case. An English judge of the twelfth century
might have given judgment for the winner of a trial by battle, or for one who succeeded
in the ordeal of the hot iron." In later centuries, oaths were given to prove a case, and
the winner imperiled his soul if he lied." In American practice of the late twentieth
century, however, the options are more limited, and certainly less colorful. A judgment
must be rendered and written justification given. Permissible forms of judgment and its
rationalization are confined within a narrow range. But within that narrow range, the
balancing test. represents an important departure from traditional practice. To see that,
it will help to begin by reviewing the traditional form of legal argument and opinion-
writing, namely, the rule-based syllogism.
13 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 598-600 (2d ed. 1923): S.F.C.
rdiusom, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAIN 38-39,406-08 (2d ed. 1981).





A. The Rule-Based Syllogism
As a matter of formal logic, every opinion may he characterized as beginning with
the major premise, if X, then 1', where X stands for one or more legal facts — the
existence of a valid will,. a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
and so on — and Y for a disposition of the case — judgment for plaintiff, or judgment
affirmed. For example: "If there is an enforceable contract, then Patience prevails." A
statement that the legal fact exists serves as the minor premise: "The court finds that
there was in fact an enforceable contract between Patience and Demetrius." The conclu-
sion, the disposition of the case, then follows in syllogistic form: "Judgment for Patience
(with costs)."
Viewed from this formal perspective, the legal opinion fleshes out, or elaborates, a
syllogism. Legal argument, in turn, concentrates on two projects. The first is to formulate
the major premise, that is, to frame the issue of the case. Which legal fact is determi-
native? Does the case turn on the existence of a valid vAl or whether a fraud occurred
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities? The second project is to ascertain
the minor premise, that is, to determine whether the appropriate legal fact does or does
not exist.
Few legal arguments, of course, are quite so simple. Generally, the minor premise
refracts into a series of supporting arguments. Whether there is a valid will, for example,
depends on whether oral wills or holographs are recognized, and if not, whether the
document in question satisfies all of the formal requirements of an attested will.
Whether there has been a securities fraud depends on the arcane learning of whether
there has been a "purchase" or "sale" of a "security," whether the actions involved
constitute a "fraud," and if so, whether they can be shown to have been "in connection
with" such "purchase" or "sale."'" But this additional complication does not threaten the
underlying logic of legal argument. It is possible, in theory, to recast the full argument
of an opinion into a group of related, syllogisms, each nested inside the other, the
conclusion for each interior argument or syllogism serving as a premise for a broader
syllogism. Thus:
1.1: If there is a valid contract., Patience prevails.
2.1: If there is consideration, there is a valid contract.
3.1: If value passed from Patience to Demetrius, there is consideration.
3.2: Value passed from Patience to Demetrius.
3.3: There is consideration.
2.2: There is consideration. (front conclusion 3.3)
2.3: There is a valid contract.
1.2: There is a valid contract. (from conclusion 2.3)
1.3: Patience prevails.
Even this more complicated example over-simplifies the normal course of legal argument,
and logical problems lurk among its premises and conclusions. 17
 But no matter how
15 C.W. TitomisoN, -1-11E LAW OF Wit..t..s 47-53, 129-78 (2d ed. 1916); T.L. ATKINSON, HAND-
BOOK OF 'ITIE LAW OF Wli.t.s 291-367 (2c1 ed, 1953).
16 	1-1AzEN, Tut: LAW or SECURITIES 12,i;oniavrioN 438-512 (1985).
17 Notice that milior premises 1.1, 2,1, and 3.1 state necessary, but not sulficient, C)urid1t 11105
for: Prudence's success, valid contracts, and consideration, respectively. The example assumes that.
114) other good arguments can he made that Patience loses despne the existence of a contract or
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complex the legal argument becomes, it traditionally has been thought possible to cast
it in syllogistic form. Even if a court has not rendered its opinion in such form, we often
take it to be the mark of a "good" opinion that it can be recast successfully in logical
form.
This way of thinking about the nature of legal argument. has obvious connections
with the postulate that the law is, or should be, rational. Since the Enlightenment we
have sought to rationalize our institutions, as well as our methods of inquiry, by subjecting
them to the rigors of logic. Whether this Enlightenment project has run its course and
should be abandoned is an important question for the twentieth century, but it is hardly
surprising, given this history, that we should suppose that good law requires rationality,
and that rationality can best be assured by subjecting its operations to the rigors of logic.
This logical, rule-based understanding of legal argument also has obvious connec-
tions with the history of common law pleading.I 8 The ancient art of common law pleading
sought to reduce a legal dispute to a single question of fact, the sort of question which
might properly be posed to an assize, or later, a modern jury. 19 Syllogistic reasoning
performed an important role in this system, for it provided the mechanism by which
the case decision could be derived from the issue of fact isolated by the pleadings. By
way of nested syllogisms, the resolved issue of fact is connected, logically and formally,
to the disposition of the case. In the example given above, for instance, the nested
syllogisms connect a single issue of fact — whether value passed from Patience to
Demetrius — to the disposition of the case — Patience prevails. The syllogism, grounded
on theories about what good law requires and on its peculiar usefulness in connection
with the history of pleading, has flourished as the preferred mode of legal argument
and opinion-writing.
The operation of any syllogism, however, requires propositions. And in the world
of legal argument, those propositions are supplied by black-letter rules. Black-letter rules
set. the terms of the argument: they determine which premises are possible and which
are not; they determine how, if at all, some premises will refract into subsidiary argu-
ments.2° It is thus proper, though perhaps a bit redundant, to describe our traditional
method of' legal reasoning as the working out of rule-based syllogisms.
This rule-based vision of legal argument and decision making is connected with
more general thinking about the nature of law. It is traditional to characterize the law
as a corpus of rules by which the social group is governed, 2 ' or, in more modern terms,
to characterize the law as the process of applying a body of rules to the actions of men
and women. 22 In either case, rules lie at the center of the law, and their manipulation at
the center of legal process.
consideration. For example, it assumes away any argument that Patience forged Demetrius' name
on the contract, or that the contract terms were unconscionable.
IN S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw 42-44 (2d ed. 1981); 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, Supra note 13, at 604-19; 1-1.J. STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING 150-52
(2d ed. 1901).
'" 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 617-18.
20 Black-letter rules constrain the terms of argument, though it is an open issue whether they
constrain the judge's decision. See Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions from Below the Bench, 49 CALIF.
L. REV. 831,832-35 (1961).
2 ' See, e.g., J.C. GRAY, THE: NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW § 191 (1909) ("The Law or the State
or of any organized body of man is composed of the rules which the courts ... lay down for the
determination of legal rights and duties.").
22 The notion of law as process has now become ubiquitous. Lief 14, Carter, in his book on legal
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These notions of law and legal process have defined the judge's work. Over sixty
years ago, Roscoe Pound set out a classic model of deciding cases, a model grounded
firmly on a rule-based, syllogistic view of' law and legal process. The judge, said Dean
Pound, is engaged in the following business:
(I) Finding the facts, i.e., ascertaining the state of facts to which legal precepts
are to be applied in order to reach a determination; (2) finding the law, i.e.,
ascertaining the legal precept or precepts applicable to the facts found; (3)
interpreting the precept or precepts to be applied, i.e., ascertaining their
meaning by genuine interpretation, and (4) applying the precept or precepts
so found and interpreted to the case al Itand. 23
Steps (2) and (3) of Dean Pound's formulation — finding and interpreting the law —
determine both the structure and substantive content of the final legal argument. That
is, an exegesis of the rules helps to determine the syllogism's major premises. Step (4)
completes the syllogism, and the judge renders the decision.
It is true that twentieth century legal philosophy is marked by discomfort with this
picture of judging. We have wondered whether it overemphasizes the centrality of rules.
We have doubted whether law-finding and fact-finding are really as distinct as the
formula indicates, whether the order of the process is properly described or whether
the process actually occurs at al1. 21
 But despite our misgivings, it is clear that this picture
of judicial process represents a working orthodoxy among lawyers and judges. It is
reflected in the way lawyers present their cases to the courts, and in the way judges write
their opinions. In case after reported case, judges dutifully find the facts, discuss the
law, and apply the law to the facts.
One remarkable aspect of traditional legal reasoning, and one which will help us to
distinguish the balancing test, is its tendency to make legal judgment turn on definitional
questions. A litigant's liability, or her legal rights, often depend on matters of classifica-
tion: Is this document a "valid will"? Was the sale of stock "fraudulent"? For each relevant
term a set of definitional requirements marks out what will count as a "valid will" or a
"fraudulent" sale. To decide a case, a judge examines whether the action or document
at issue qualifies as a member of a pre-determined, legally relevant classification.
Sonic sets of definitional requirements are obviously !Dore rigid than others. For
example, deciding whether a document is a "valid will" may be easier than deciding
whether a sale of securities is "fraudulent," because the conditions attached to the phrase
"valid will" — testamentary capacity, signature, two witnesses — are better settled than
the conditions defining what sorts of behavior count as "securities fraud." 25
 This feature
is often described in terms of "formalism." Those legal concepts whose definitional
reasoning, states the proposition succinctly, and with as much assurance about its self evidence, as
is typical today. "Thus far I have deliberately used the word 'law' and the phrase 'legal process'
interchangeably. Law is indeed a process, not a collection of rules." L. CARTER, REASON IN LAW 3
(2d ed. 1984).
23 Pound, The Judicial Process in Action, 1 N.V.L. FORUM 11, 11 (1955) (reordering and changing
slightly a list that appeared thirty years earlier in Pound, The Them); of Judicial Decision, 36 HARy.
L. REV. 940 (1923)).
24
 Many of the attacks came from the "realist" school of jurisprudence, and continue to this
day in modified form by adherents of the Critical Legal Studies movement.
25 Compare T.E. ATKINSON, supra note 15, at 291-367 with T.L. 11.47.EN, supra mite 16, at 438–
5 I 2.
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requirements are more rigid, and the areas of law in which they occur, are sometimes
said to be "formalistic." 26 Similarly, a judge who treats concepts as having strict defini-
tional content is also said to be "formalistic" (and the tone of this pronouncement is
seldom laudatory). Whatever the level of formalism, however, the structure of most legal
inquiry remains the same. It involves asking whether the action or document at issue
qualifies as a member of a pre-determinéd, legally relevant classification.
B. The Balancing Test
The structure of the balancing test is quite different. It is arranged around neither
a single question of fact, nor a single definitional issue, but rather around two or more
sets of facts or interests, each set pointing to a different outcome in the case. The winning
litigant is not determined by placing actions into legally relevant categories, but rather
by the court determining which side's interests or facts are weightier.
The best way to introduce the methods and operations of balancing test analysis is
to examine the test in action. I have chosen three cases Which seem particularly useful
for focusing on the similarities, as well as the differences, among cases that self-con-
sciously utilize "balancing tests." Their analysis will lay the groundwork for the taxonomy
of balancing 1 will then develop.
1. Three Case Studies
One of the earliest examples of a balancing test can be found in the 1947 United
States Supreme Court decision of Gulf Oil Carp. v. Gilbert. 27 In Gilbert the Court sustained
a district court's decision to dismiss an action on the grounds of forum non conveniens,
the principle that, for reasons of judicial policy, "a court may resist imposition upon its
jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue stat-
ute."28 The Court was first concerned with whether the forum non conveniens doctrine
was available to federal courts under any circumstances. On this point the Court held
that the existence of jurisdiction and venue "assumes that the court, having the parties
before it, will apply all the applicable law, including, in those cases where it is appropriate,
its discretionary judgment as to whether the suit should be entertained." 29
Once the Court determined that the doctrine was available, justice Jackson described
how it should be applied. "Wisely," he said, "it has not been attempted to catalogue the
circumstances which will justify or require either grant or denial of remedy."" By this
statement, we should note, the Court moved the analysis away from traditional rule-
based reasoning, which would be constructed upon just such a "catalogue of circum-
stances," that is, upon defined sets of conditions that would require the grant or denial
of a forum non conveniens motion.
Rather, the decision in these cases "leaves much to the discretion of the court to
which plaintiff resorts," 31 and this discretionary judgment is a matter of balance. It
26 See, e.g., Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HAM'. L. REv. 489, 489 (1975)
("the insistent formalism of the law of wills is mistaken and needless").
22 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
28 Id. at 507.
22 Id. at 506.






involves weighing the litigants' private interests — the relative ease of access to sources
of proof, the availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses, the cost of
obtaining the attendance of willing witnesses, the possibility (and necessity) of viewing
the premises, and so forth — along with public interests — the impact of the case on
congested court dockets, the local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home, the interest in diversity cases being held in a forum familiar with the state law
that must govern the case, and so fo rth"
The Court thus set out a series of factors to weigh, each of which, when analyzed,
may point to one court or another as the appropriate forum for litigation. The court's
next step, presumably, is to tally the results to determine which forum is suggested by
the most factors. This sort of evaluation — listing the factors which impinge on the
decision, and analyzing each factor in order to determine which way it points in making
a final decision — lies at the heart of balancing test analysis."
The district court in Gilbert engaged in just this form of analysis, holding that the
factors pointing away from the plaintiff's chosen forum were strong enough to overcome
the presumption in his favor, and therefore granted the defendant's motion for dis-
missal." The Supreme Court reviewed the district court's work and found it reasonable
enough that it could not be considered an abuse of discretim0 6
The next example of a balancing test represents a slightly different method of
balancing, and also plays an important role in the history of the test. The case is Barenblatt
e. United States, and it represents one of the first times that a Supreme Court majority
used explicit balancing analysis to construe the United States Constitution."' Lloyd Bar-
enblatt was a psychology instructor at Vassar College when the House Committee on
Un-American Activities subpoenaed him as a witness in 1954. During his appearance
before the Subcommittee, he objected generally to the Subcommittee's right to ask him
questions about his religious and political beliefs, and in particular refused to answer
live questions, including, "Are you now a member of the Communist Party?" and Have
you ever been a member of the Communist Party?"" For his recalcitrance he was cited
for contempt of Congress, convicted of a misdemeanor, sentenced to six months im-
prisonment, and fined $250.' 9
 A series of appeals led him twice to the Supreme Court;
its second decision is of interest to us here.
" Id.
" Id. at 508-09.
34 In the case of forum non conveniens analysis, however, the scales are tipped in favor of the
plaintiff. Justice Jackson states that, "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely he disturbed." id. at 508. Thus, after evaluating each of
the factors, one presumably holds for the plaintiff, denying the defendant's motion to dismiss,
unless the factors pointing to an alternative forum greatly outnumber, or strongly outweigh, the
factors pointing to the plaintiff's chosen forum. This might be called the "greedy butcher's" version
of the balancing test, but it is a balance nonetheless.
35
 Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F. Supp. 291. 294-95 (S.D.N.V. 1945).
36 330 U.S. at 512. See fthf? Koster v. Lumbertnens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947)
(companion case to Gilbert; balancing conveniences in a shareholder's derivative suit).
37 360 U.S. 109 (1959). Barenblatt was billowed in short order by Konigsberg v. State liar, 366
U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); and Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961), Together these cases marked a decisive introduction of balancing
test analysis to a constitutional provision, in this case, the first amendment. See Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1424 (1962).
38 360 U.S. at 114.
39 Id. at 115.
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Barenblatt contended that the Subcommittee could not compel his testimony because
it was not authorized to ask the questions it did, because he was not adequately apprised
of the pertinency of the Subcommitee's questions to the subject matter of its inquiry,
and because the questions he refused to answer infringed rights protected by the first
amendment." It was only Barenblatt's third claim — that the congressional inquiry
infringed his first amendment rights — that involved the Court in explicit balancing.
The Court began by noting that, "Nile power [of Congress] and the right of
resistance to it are to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions.'" For
us, this remark has a double significance..First, we may take the comment that judgment
should not be based on "abstractions" as a suggestion that rules, in standard rule form,
are not the appropriate means by which to decide such a case. This statement thus
performs the same function as the Gilbert court's statement that forum non eonveniens
doctrine "wisely" had not been reduced to a set of rules which would demand the grant
or denial of the motion. As a general matter, the statement that rules are inappropriate
to a decision often constitutes a court's first step toward adopting the balancing test.
Second, the Court's opening statement evidences an interest in confining its decision to
the circumstances of the particular case before it, its "concrete" facts. This is confirmed
later in the opinion when the Court states, "[o]ur function, at this point, is purely one
of constitutional adjudication in the particular case and upon the particular record before
us, not to pass judgment upon the general wisdom or efficacy of the activities of this
Committee."42 This urge to confine the decision "to the facts" also presages the intro-
duction of a balancing test.
The Barenblatt Court noted that a claim concerning the right to resist congressional
interrogation, based on the first amendment, cannot always be sustained." When it can
be sustained is a matter of balance. "Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar
governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the
courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circum-
stances shown." 44
 The Court seemed to indicate that the private interests, the individual's
rights of association and petition guaranteed by the first amendment, vary little from
case to case. Thus, the Court stated that "Nile critical element is the existence of, and
the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from
an unwilling witness."" The Court noted that the public interest must be "compelling"
in order to overcome the individual's constitutional rights."
The Court then analyzed the public interest, which involved Congress's interest in
questioning citizens on the subjects of the Subcommittee hearings. Finding that the
Subcommittee's investigation was related to valid legislative purposes, and that its inves-
tigatory power could not be restricted simply because the hearing could be shown to be
for "exposure" purposes only, the Court concluded that "the balance between the indi-
vidual and the governmental interests here at stake must be struck in favor of the latter,
4° Id. at 116.
4 ' Id. at 112.
42 1d. at 125.
45 Id. at 126.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 126-27 (quoting Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957)).
45 Id, at 127.
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and that therefore the provisions of the First Amendment have not been offended" by
the Subcommittee's actions or by Barenblatt's conviction for contempt of Congress. 47
We put aside the question of whether the Court struck the balance correctly," and
focus instead on the structure of its analysis. Barenblatt's use of balancing shares with the
Gilbert opinion the fundamental structure of balancing tests: a delineation of factors to
be considered and a call for weighing those factors in reaching the judgment. It differs
from Gilbert, however, in the number and the nature of the factors to be weighed. In
Gilbert, the Court listed several factors, each one of which could point toward one legal
result or the other. In Barenblatt, the factors were fewer. There was, on the individual's
side, the first amendment: freedom of association, and perhaps of speech, and the right
to petition the government for redress. There was, on the government's side, its interest
in having its questions answered. The first interest points to reversing the defendant's
conviction; the second interest points to affirmance. Unlike Gilbert, the Court did not
check each factor to determine which way it pointed —Barenblatt involved a stark weighing
of one interest against another.
The factors to be balanced in balancing test analysis vary in content and number
from test to test, Sonic tests, as in Gilbert, involve an undifferentiated list of factors, each
one of which may point one way or the other in making the final decision; judgment is
more or less a matter of counting the factors on each side of the balance. Some balancing
tests, like that found in Barenblatt, are more simply structured, pitting two clearly antag-
onistic social policies (or constitutional restraints) against each other; judgment is less a
matter of counting and more a matter of, well, judgment. Regardless of their differences,
however, they share the juxtaposition of interests or factors (whether they be two or ten
in number), and the process of evaluating those interests or factors head to head in
order to determine which will prevail.
A third example of the test commies from Delaware v. Prime, a 1979 Supreme Court
decision on the permissibility of random highway stops to check for drunk drivers."
The Court began with the premise that a random vehicle stop constitutes a seizure, and
thus, under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution, must be
"reasonable." Reasonableness, in turn, is a matter of balance: the "permissibility of a
particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.""
The Court then analyzed the interests involved and the weights to be assigned to
those interests. This analysis was informed, but not determined, by past decisions. 51 How
serious was the intrusion on individual rights? Quite serious. Indeed, little else is so
serious in the relation between an individual and his government than a stop by one of
its armed officers. 52 But Delaware's interest was important, too. The state had a strong
" Id. at 134.
Cf: Justice Black's dissent, id, at 144 (Black, J., dissenting).
49 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
5° Id, at 654.
As Justice White, writing for the majority, stated, "although nut dispositive, these decisions
undoubtedly provide guidance in balancing the public interest against the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests implicated by the practice of spot checks such as occurred in this case." Id.
at 656-57.
54 See id. at 657.
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interest in preventing carriage on the highways, caused in part by intoxicated drivers."
What swung the Court was the state's lack of legitimate interest in the particular procedure
of spot checks. This sort of stop, the Court found, did not capture enough drunk
drivers." Consequently, "[t]he marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting
from a system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every vehicle
on the roach to a seizure ... at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials." 55
The Court's holding followed: random stops, made without articulable suspicion by the
police officers involved, are unreasonable under the fourth amendment and are, there-
fore, unconstitutional. 56
Just as in Gilbert and Barenblatt, the Court in Prouse first enumerated the factors
which it must consider, and then evaluated those factors. Like Barenblatt, the balance in
Prouse was simply structured: pitting the individual's interest (fourth amendment rights)
against the state's interest (health and safety of its citizenry). Like Barenblail, we know at
the outset which factors will weigh in which party's favor. Unlike either the Gilbert or
the Barenblatt Courts, however, the Prouse Court did not limit its holding to the facts of
the case. Prouse ends with the statement of a rule — random highway spot checks to
catch drunk drivers are unconstitutional — which presumably applies to all such spot
checks, no matter which state or individuals are involved." Thus, the balancing test can
be used for more than one purpose: first, as in Gilbert and Barenblatt, to decide the case
at hand and only the case at hand; and second, as in Pro use, to generate a rule, applicable
to all like cases in the future.
in all three cases, however, the basic structure of the central argument is the same.
Three steps are involved — announcing the factors to be balanced, weighing those
factors, and announcing the victor. Other courts have replicated this mode of reasoning,
or something like it, in thousands of cases.
2. A Taxonomy of Balancing
It will help, before proceeding any further, to set out with some care exactly what
we mean by "balancing test," and to impose some order on the ways in which the test
varies from application to application. The balancing test is based on the metaphor of
the scales. The language used in the test — the "weighing" and "balancing" of elements
— as well as the basic structure of the lest — balancing elements "against" each other,
or placing elements on one side" and on the "other" — are clearly derived from the
metaphor of the two pan scale. It is a powerful metaphor, so powerful that judicial talk
of "weighing" and "balancing" is ubiquitous. Courts often speak loosely of "weighing"
one consideration or another. To distinguish these highly informal cases of balancing,
we will restrict the term "balancing test" to those cases in which the scales serve as the
central metaphor, and which explicitly: I) set a balance by describing the elements to be
weighed and the legal effect of the outcome; 2) discuss those elements; and 3) declare
the winner based on the results of the weighing procedure.
"See id. at 658.
54 Id. at 659.
55 Id. at 661.
56 Id. at 663.
57 We will have more to say about this difference in a moment. See infra text accompanying
notes 63-70.
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Normally, a court that has reasoned in this fashion will describe its own work as
constituting a "balancing test," but a number of courts have engaged in all three steps
without. doing so." Explicit use of the label is not required. What is required is the court's
use of the analytical steps outlined above. The definition of "balancing test" proposed
here excludes all informal talk about "balancing" or "weighing" considerations. As we
will see later, only when courts make balancing an explicit method of deciding cases,
only when they make it a test, does it become an interesting juridical phenomenon. 59
The form and structure of balancing tests are far from uniform despite their
underlying similarities. We have already seen, in three examples from Supreme Court
practice, that balancing tests vary in the number and nature of the elements to be
weighed. One can draw a more important distinction, however, according to the purposes
for which the balance has been struck. At least three such purposes exist. First, one can
balance to ascertain the facts of a particular case. Second, one can balance to create a
rule of law, as in Delaware v. Prouse. Third, one can balance solely for the purpose of
deciding the case at hand, that is, to get a result, as in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert and Bamiblatt
v. United States. We will refer to these balances as fact-balancing, rule-balancing, and
result-balancing, respectively.° They each present different challenges to traditional legal
reasoning.
a. Fact-Balancing
In balancing to ascertain the facts of a particular case, judges and juries weigh the
evidence presented to determine whether legally significant states of affairs exist: did
the purported testator sign the will in the presence of two witnesses? What statements
did the defendant make about the stock to the plaintiffs? Balancing of this sort turns on
the probative value of the evidence introduced, and the relevant standards for judgment
arc veracity and credibility. Weights are "assigned" to each piece of evidence depending
on the extent to which it is thought to represent accurately the world outside the
CUII rtroom. 6 '
Some recent examples from the United States Supreme Court include Kuhlman v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436, 497-48, 452-54 (198(1) (reach of habeas corpus statutes determined by balancing
interests; no use of label "balancing test"); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 71-73 (1986)
(balance of interests regarding reversal of conviction for grand jury improprieties; no use of label
"balancing test"); Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-56 (1985) (due process balancing; no
use of label); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984) (fourth amendment balancing; no
use of label).
5" See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
6° Other writers have proposed some of these same distinctions, but the nomenclature has
varied. What I have called "rule-balancing," others have called "definidonal" balancing; what I have
called "result-balancing," others have called "ad hoc" balancing. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, .supra note 12,
at 948. Professor Henkin, in Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing. 78 CoLum. L. REv. 1(122
(1978), offers a slightly different distinction when he speaks of "interpretative balancing" versus
"balancing-as-doctrine." Id. at 1023-28. There are still other ways of dividing the world of balancing.
Vincent Luizzi distinguishes what we might call "guided" and "unguided" balances, depending
whether the test leaves the court lice to consider any interests it believes pertinent. Luizzi, supra
note 2, at 377-85.
61
 Professor Wigmore devotes a chapter of his treatise on evidence to "Quantitative (or, Syn-
thetic) Rules," rules that require "in specified situations, that a certain quantity of' evidential material
be provided." 3 H. WIC:MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS' Al' COMMON LAW § 2030 (1904); 7 Winslow:,
Ev I Dt'NCE § 2030 (Chadbourne rev. 1978). He describes systems in which "lit' some purposes, the
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In a quite informal way, balancing to find facts goes on all the time. In discussing
evidentiary matters, courts use the verbs "weigh" and "balance" a great deal. It is rarer,
however, for a court to describe its or a jury's work as involving all three steps we have
isolated as crucial to the balancing test, and rarer still for a court to label its method a
"balancing test." 62
 Nonetheless, "fact-balancing" in the strict sense does sometimes occur,
and any reasonable taxonomy of "balancing tests" should include it. When it does appear,
however, it presents very little challenge to traditional rule-based reasoning. There are
many ways to describe the finding of facts, but in the case of conflicting evidence, one
can hardly improve on a court's report that it has "weighed" the evidence involved, or
"balanced" the testimony on each side. Issues of credibility and veracity are described
by the metaphor of balancing as ably as by any other metaphor.
b. Rule-Balancing
The second type of balancing test is more problematic. Its purpose is to determine
a rule of law. We recall that the Supreme Court, in Delaware u. Prouse, concluded its
balancing analysis with a rule — that random highway stops to capture drunk drivers
violate the federal constitution.° The Court intended this rule to apply not only to the
case at hand, but also to all future similar cases. In this form of the test, courts typically
weigh the cogency of the parties' doctrinal arguments or consider broader policy argu-
ments in an effort to choose among competing formulations of an appropriate rule of
law.
Our interest in this brand of balancing test varies with the nature of the elements
to be weighed. For example, courts might weigh the strength of the parties' doctrinal
arguments. That is, courts may be called upon to examine the arguments that a particular
black-letter rule is appropriate or should be interpreted in a particular way, or that a
proposed rule necessarily follows from earlier rules. In this sort of balance, the decision
turns on fairly traditional considerations of legal persuasiveness. The relevant standards
for judgment are primarily rhetorical. The court considers matters of logic and style, as
well as the practical consequences of its choice, in determining which rule of law is "the
better reasoned.""
As in the case of balancing to find facts, this sort of rule-balancing goes on all the
time at an informal level. Judges often speak of "weighing" the plaintiff's arguments
weight to be given to each witness' testimony was measured and represented in numerical values,
even by counting halves and quarters of a witness." Id. at § 2032. Such systems, as he points out,
were not well received in the common law courts, but they certainly represent an interesting attempt
to quantify the weight of testimonial evidence.
62
 Because this sort of analysis goes on primarily at the trial court level, it does so beyond the
range of a national reporter system that reports appellate decisions. Fact-balancing may well occur
more frequently than the reporters indicate. Even so, balancing language does sometime appear.
See Covington v. State, 386 A.2d 336, 340 (Md. 1978) (Eldridge, j., dissenting) (quoting from trial
transcript of prior case: "It is a question of balancing the testimony of what 1 heard from these
witnesses as against his [testimony]").
63
 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
" This sort of balance is most obvious when a court is faced with a case of first impression for
its own jurisdiction, but as to which sister jurisdictions have adopted different rules. The court is
likely to review the arguments for both rules, and then decide that one of them is the "better
reasoned" or "better in principle." See, e.g. Adrian v. Rabinowitz, 116 N.L. 586, 186 A. 29 (1936)
("American" v. "English" rule regarding landlord's duty to put new tenant in physical possession
of leased property).
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against the defendant's. More rarely does a court engage explicitly in the three steps
here defined as part of a balancing test; and more rarely still does a court use the label.
This variant of the test simply translates into balancing language the quite ordinary work
of judging legal argument, and thus forms no direct challenge to traditional legal
reasoning. When a court speaks of "balancing" the "weights" of competing legal argu-
ments, it merely acts in the way we could also describe as deciding which litigant has
"made the better case."
Rule-balancing becomes more troublesome if the elements to be balanced are interests
rather than arguments. This is the form of rule-balancing the Supreme Court used in
Delaware v. Prouse, when it weighed the state's interest in safe highways against its citizens'
interest in personal privacy." 5
 Through: that balance the Court arrived at a rule prohib-
iting certain forms of police activity. The interests placed into balance can vary rather
dramatically from case to case, from the most concrete — the personal interests of this
plaintiff against the personal interests of this defendant — to the most abstract — the
societal interest in health and safety against the societal interest in free speech.°
At the higher levels of abstraction, this mode of analysis has a familiar ring. It is
what. passes for "policy analysis" in most of our courtrooms, and, indeed, in most of our
law school classrooms. Even so, balancing interests to construct a rule of law constitutes
a special challenge to traditional legal reasoning. The point requires some explanation,
because at first blush balancing interests in order to get a rule appears to operate safely
within traditional notions of legal process. That is, the method can be understood as a
useful tool in the service of Dean Pound's second assignment for judges, namely, finding
law. 67
 That this goal is achieved by balancing interests seems completely unexceptional.
But this method of creating a rule represents a substantive departure from historical
methods of judicial rule-making. Traditionally, when a court found no rule of law to
cover the case at hand it turned to similar rules, in similar cases, and argued by analogy,"s
or it attempted to determine a new rule by logical derivation from prior rules, In short,
the materials out of which courts constructed new rules were other legal rules, and the
tools of construction were deductive or inductive logic, more or less formally applied.
In balancing interests to construct a new rule of law, however, the primary resources are
not prior laws and logic, but the interests of the parties to the litigation or the interests
of groups they are deemed to represent. To those interests the court applies neither
induction nor deductiOn, but the mechanism of balancing.
This method of creating new legal:rules has become so common that we no longer
feel its antipathy with older practice, but when the method was first proposed early in
this century, the challenge was obvious.'`' In a legal world thought properly to be
dominated by rules and logic, it was heresy to suggest a method of judicial lawmaking
,n See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
66
 The problems engendered by the malleability of interest analysis are taken up in Part III,
infra.
" Pound, The Judicial Process in Action, .1 N.Y.L. FORUM 11, 11 (1955). See supra text accom-
panying note 23. -
b8 See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 31-50 (1921) (discussing the
methods and problems of analogical reasoning, there called "the method of philosophy"); 2 J.
AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 1036-50 (4th ed. 1873) (discussing analogical reasoning).
"9 See Gilmore, The Age of Anxiety;
 84 YALE L.J. 1022,1032-33 (1975) (Cardozo's confession in
The Nature of the Judicial. Process that judges sometimes "made law" by weighing social interests "was
widely regarded as a legal version of hard-core pornography.")
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which turned its face against rules and logic and suggested in their place interests and
balancing. In the older ways of thinking, interests and balancing were a part of politics,
not of the law, and its intrusion was cause for alarm. Today we are less worried by the,
"political" aspect of judicial lawmaking, and are thus less offended by the use of interests
and balancing in deriving new rules of law. But our accession to the change does not
obliterate its significance. Balancing interests to get a rule challenges the proposition
that the law consists in rules logically derived and applied.
The challenge almost escapes notice. NOt only have we become inured to the prop-
osition that judicial lawmaking has "political" content, but the challenge, when presented,
is short-lived. After all, the product of this sort of balance is a rule, in standard rule
form. Once created, courts may apply, distinguish, and modify the new rule in just the
same manner as a rule created in more traditional ways.'" We work with the rule in
future cases without necessarily referring to the circumstances of its birth. But short-
lived or not, the challenge to traditional reasoning remains.
c. Result-Balancing
The third major type of balancing is distinguished, like the others, by its aim. In
this variation, the product of balancing is neither a statement of fact nor a rule of law,
but the disposition of the case, a legal result. In this connection we recall Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert 71 and Barenblatt v. United States. 72 In Gilbert the Court used a balancing analysis
to determine whether the forum non conveniens motion of a particular party in a particular
case should have been granted." Similarly, in Barenblatt, the Court used a balancing
analysis to determine whether Llo.yd Barenblatt was properly fined arid sentenced to jail
for contempt of Congress:71 In both cases, the Court confined its decision to the case
before it. The point of the balancing was to generate a result in the case at bar only.
The line between result-balancing on the one hand and rule-balancing on the other
is sometimes hazy, and will often depend on the court's own statements about what it
has done. The preliminary discussions may look the same in both sorts of balances: a
court may state that it has balanced the state's interest against the individual's interests.
If it goes on to explain that out of that balance it has created a rule governing the type
of case at issue — as in Delaware v. Prouse75 — the court has engaged in rule-balancing.
lf, however, it states that its decision affects only the case at bar — as in Barenblatt v. United
States — the court has engaged in result-balancing. The court may not be clear about
which it has done, and thus others, often future courts, must decide what happened.
The classification of the balancing court's work as rule-balancing or result-balancing,
whether settled by the balancing court itself or by others who follow afterward, will have
dramatic effects on the future development of the area of law at issue. The "rule of
7" But see Aleinikoff, , supra note 12, at 979-81 ("definitional" balances — what I call "rule-
balancing" — arc often unstable, and can be "undermined by new interests or different weights
for previously considered interests"). Professor Aleinikolf states that "[blalances are 'definitional'
only if the Court wants to stop thinking about the question." Id. at 981.
7 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gilbert.
" 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Barenblatt.
" Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
74 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 134.
75 See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rule in Pro use.
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decision" in a rule-balancing case is a rule of law, in traditional rule form, and future
courts will apply that. traditional rule. The "rule of decision" in a result-balancing case
is the balancing lest itself and future courts will strike new balances each time the issue
arises. 76
Result-balancing presents a serious challenge to the canons of traditional legal
reasoning, and a more insistent challenge than the one presented by rule-balancing.
Traditional, rule-based reasoning tends to make the disposition of a case turn either on
the existence of a physical fact (e.g., did the defendant say the shares of stock were "a
perfectly sound investment?") or on a question of definition or classification (e.g., does
the defendant's statement that the shares were "a perfectly sound investment" constitute
"fraud"?). hi traditional reasoning, courts resolve such issues by examining what actually
occurred, within the constraints of the rules of evidence, or by examining the meaning
of a word. Result-balancing replaces all of that with a balance of interests. The disposition
of the case no longer turns on the existence of a physical fact or on the meaning of a
word, but on an evaluation of individual or social values.
As in the case of rule-balancing, this substitution leads to the complaint that the
process renders legal' decision making "political" or, perhaps, "legislative,"" When a
court balances interests, if even to decide solely the case at hand, it arguably introduces
considerations inappropriate for judicial use. The courts, one might say, have no business
weighing social interests. The complaint, as before, rests on a certain intellectual position.
To take the complaint seriously, one must believe that it is had for judges to turn from
an investigation of worldly facts and word meanings, and to focus instead on social and
political concerns. Views on this issue have changed over time, and consequently views
on the propriety of result-balancing have also changed. But the challenge remains,
regardless of whether one applauds the development.
This challenge, such as it is, becomes insistent in result-balancing. Once the method
is introduced into an area of law, it asserts its presence again and again, in every future
case of the same type. Thus the rule of law, in such an area, is to balance. Whenever the
question arises, no flatter how often, a balance must be struck.Th
7" The "result" reached in result-balancing need riot be the actual dispositiml of the case. That
is, to qualify as result-balancing, a courts decision need not state that "plaintiff will prevail if X
interests outweigh }' interests," Rather, it is enough that the result of the balance he any proposition,
which, given the opinion's structure, determines the disposition. As we noted earlier, one niay
characterize a legal opinion as a group of nested syllogisms, the outermost one of which (the
dispimitive syllogism) begins with the major premise: If' X, then judgment far plaintiff X itself may be
a balancing test, the court saying, fur example, that "if plaintiff's interests outweigh tlefrndani's interests
then judgment Jim plaintiff." Or it may not, The diapositive syllogism may turn instead on at standard
legal proposition — the creation of a valid will, for example, or the purchase or sale of securities
— but the standard legal proposition is determined by balancing. Thus a court might say, "if the
search was reasonable, then judgment of the lower court must be affirmed; the search is reasonable if the state's
interest in law enforcement outweighs the defendant's privacy interest." Because of' the logical structure of
the opinion, the result of the balancing test determines the disposition of the case just as surely as
the entire case had turned on one grand balance. Because any opinion contains a number of
syllogisms, each nested within the other, and because each syllogism depends on legal propositions
potentially determinable by balancing, the test can appear in any number of places, more or less
deeply embedded in an opinion's legal structure, and still affect the disposition of the case.
n See infra text accompanying notes 299-304.
'" Although rule-balancing and result-balancing create similar challenges to traditio nal reason-
ing, result-balancing is by far the uto•e insistent. We recall that rule-balancing tends to hide the
challenge. Once the "offending" balance is struck and the rule created, the balance is forgotten.
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Result-balancing offends traditional notions of legal process in another way. Courts
explicitly limit their decision to the peculiar circumstances of the case before them. The
results of such a balance are ad hoc, and indeed, this feature has led some commentators
to call this version of the test "ad-hoc balancing."" Such a decision, one might say, is
unprincipled. No doubt this appellation is warranted, but some doubt exists, of course,
about whether this is a bad thing.
There is a long history of dispute concerning the extent to which a court may
properly consider the peculiarities of the parties or their situations in rendering a
decision." The concept of the "rule of law," bolstered by Western democratic political
theories, seems to require that laws apply as generally as possible: to all citizens, and as
a second best, to classes of citizens, and in no case to citizens as individuals."' There is
thus a resistance to drawing legal distinctions between persons beyond those which are
absolutely necessary. This reticence is demonstrated, for example, by the extent to which
laws intended to apply to one person or corporate body are disguised in language which
speaks of classes and general principles. Illinois laws meant to provide specially for the
city of Chicago, for example, are drafted to cover "any municipality with a population
of 500,000 or more."" The federal tax laws are filled with special goodies cast in general
terms."s The drive for laws of general applicability cuts against exceptions for the special
case. The judge should make distinctions on only well-established grounds and avoid
making new ones. There is, however, a contrary drive. A court wishes to do the right
thing in the individual case. This is, in a fundamental sense, the court's job. And this
drive may suggest that exceptions may be appropriate in the special case.
This is an old debate, settled first one way and then the other as the winds of
jurisprudence shift from age to age. But two things are clear: 1) the "ad hoc" decision
generally, and result-balancing specifically, take their stand on the side of the special
case and against the general rule; and 2) this stand is not the one taken by what I have
The rule takes on a precedential life of its own, and there need not be any further reference to
the balance which gave it life, Result-balancing, in contrast, is harder to ignore.
"See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 948. 1 have avoided this label, and used instead "result-
balancing," in order to maintain a consistent nomenclature distinguishing variants of the test by
their respective aims, i.e., to find facts, to determine rules, and to arrive at legal results.
8U See generally EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS (R. Newman, ed. 1973) (historical and
comparative study of equity's place in legal systems); see also Newman, Introduction, in id. at 17 ("The
difficulties which have been encountered throughout history in integrating equity and law stem in
the last analysis from the presence in the law of goals which are in direct and perennial conflict;
the goal of certainty and the goal of individual justice.").
8 ' See R. LucE, LEGist.ATIvE PROBLEMS 532-617 (1935) (extended treatment of special legislation
— its history and its evils — and calls for reform).
82 See,.e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, para. 8-1-15 (1985); id. ch. 24, para. 11.102-1 ; id. ch. 24,
para. 11-35-1.
"Special rules for depreciation, for example, are available for any project:
[i.lf it is a sports and entertainment facility which —
(i) is to be used by both a National Hockey League team and a National Basketball
Association team;
(ii) is to be constructed on a platform utilizing air rights over land acquired by a
State authority and identified as Site 13 in a report dated May 30, 1984, prepared for
a State urban development corporation ....
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 204(a)(l)(F), 100 Stat. 1, 64. A little ink and paper
might have been saved if the drafters had just named the facility outright. Generally speaking, the
transition rules of the new tax act raise this homely art to breathtaking heights.
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called "traditional legal reasoning." "Ad hoc" decision making, of course, is hardly
confined to the world of balancing," but the ad hoc nature of result-balancing, when
combined with its "political" content and its incessant recurrence once introduced into
an area of law, conjures up a potent challenge to older concepts of proper judging.
El. THE BALANCING TEST AND ITS EXPLODING POPULARITY
Beginning with a general definition of the balancing test, Part I developed a simple
taxonomy based on the goals courts seek to achieve by using the test. As noted in Part
I, fact-balancing presents no major challenge to traditional legal reasoning." Conse-
quently, an increase in the use of fact-balancing lacks much juristic interest, except. as it
indicates a broader trend toward adopting the language of "scales" and "balancing" over
older forms of judicial discourse. Rule-balancing" and result-balancing, however, are
much more provocative, because they challenge the status quo ante, and these very forms
of the test have seen a boom in popularity during the past thirty years. By the late 1950s
these tests had appeared in only a handful of cases. By 1985, they had become the
method of decision in over forty areas of constitutional, common law, and statutory
adjudication. Last year alone the test appeared in more than five hundred cases in the
federal and state judicial systems, and the numbers are rising. 87
The growth of the test's popularity, while remarkable, is partly beside the point.
Ultimately, we want to know whether judges should use the test at all, and the frequency
of its use cannot change that evaluation. A bad idea, or a good one, is made no better
or worse because it is popular. What the numbers do add, however, is a sense of urgency.
A. Charting the Numbers
No one who studies the law for very long can escape a sense that the use Of balancing
tests has increased. Quantifying that increase, however, is not so easy. Ideally, one should
like to begin with a reasonable definition of the balancing test, in its rule-balancing and
result-balancing forms, and record its appearances in every case reported from American
courts. Such a project, however, would require examining hundreds of thousands of
cases, and represents a plan of disabling magnitude. Fortunately, one can design less
ambitious projects to establish the numerical increase in the use of the test, without
damaging too severely the reliability of the numbers generated.
The answer lies in the use of computer-aided legal research. One may begin by
addressing the inquiry "balancing test" to each federal and state court library of an
electronic legal data base and count the cases in which the phrase "balancing test"
appears. 1 conducted such a search and the results are tabulated on the accompanying
chart. The chart aggregates the experience of all state courts, in column (2), and all
" Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 187, 612 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1982) (implied builder-
vendor's warranty of fitness for habitation developed on a case-by-case basis); Reynolds v. State,
368 So. 2d 596, 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (whether state eliciting testimony that defendant was
silent after receiving Miranda warnings constitutes a "fundamental error" is determined on a case-
by-case basis); Posey v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 157 W. Va, 285, 292-93,
201 S.E.2d 102, 106 (1973) (in worker's compensation claim, percentage of disability for a given
injury is determined on a case-by-case basis).
05
 And neither does rule-balancing, when the elements to be weighed are legal arguments.
"" Especially when the elements to be weighed are interests.
" Sec the accompanying chart.
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federal courts, in column (3). The chart also separates, in column (4), the experience of
the United States Supreme Court. The trends in all courts are clear."
Obviously, a computer search for the phrase "balancing test" only roughly estimates
the appearance of balancing as a method of legal reasoning. The search captures a few
cases we would not consider examples of balancing, and misses a great many more that
do use the test. On the whole, however, the rough estimates shown by this chart under-
state the actual incidence of balancing. 89
The dramatic growth in judicial references to "balancing test," as demonstrated in
the accompanying chart, primarily documents the dramatic growth in the use of result-
balancing, the form of the test most challenging to traditional legal reasoning. This is
because judges engaged in result-balancing are more likely to label their work a "bal-
ancing test" than when they engage in other sorts of balancing. The legal procedure this
Article describes as rule-balancing, even if dutifully labelled a "balancing test" every time
it is used, by nature appears only occasionally in the cases: the rule is remembered and
cited in future cases; the test that gave it life is not. In the process of result-balancing,
however, the balance is applied again and again to the facts of each new case. In that
context, it is quite natural for judges to speak of applying a particular "test" to the facts
involved, a "test" that involves "balancing." Consequently, most cases which refer to a
"balancing test" involve result-balancing.
" More refined computer searches were possible, and I attempted more complex search re-
quests on a few data bases, but the more complicated searches were either no more informative
than the simpler approach, or generated too many special problems of their own.
89 For example, some courts, in describing the facts of the case, report that a police officer
requested that a motorist suspected of driving while intoxicated take a "balancing test" by walking
a straight line. E.g., Zietz v. Hjelle, 395 N.W.2d 572, 573 (N.D. 1986); Charles v. State, 424 So. 2d
175. 187 (Ala. Grim. App. 1982); State v. Haze, 218 Kan. 60, 63, 542 P.2d 720, 722 (1975). The
chart also includes cases in which a court specifically mentions a "balancing test" in order to reject
its use, and cases in which the test is used in dissent E.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,
405-06 (1975) (majority rejected balancing test); American Fin. Serv. Ass'n v, Federal Trade
Comm'n, 767 F.2d 957, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dissent employed balancing test); Hill v. City of
Houston, 764 F.2d 1156, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1985) (same).
Despite these problems or over-inclusion, a search for the phrase "balancing test" grossly
understates the number of the test's appearances. The reason should be obvious. It is perfectly
possible lOr a court to announce that it has balanced the social interests represented by one litigant
against the social interests represented by the other, to strike the balance, and to declare a winner,
without ever having used the words, "balancing test." Though we would have no trouble describing
such a case as one that had employed the balancing test, it will not appear in the chart.
Estimating the level of understatement, however, is a precarious business. When a court does
not use the phrase, "balancing test," it becomes arguable whether it has "really" used that method
of analysis. Sonic cases are easy. Sometimes a court goes through all the motions without using the
label "balancing test." But sometimes the court is less clear. Not only does it fail to use the label,
but it also fails to delineate the steps 1 have defined as crucial to the test. There are, in short, many
casual references to "balancing." Whether some or all of these should be counted as examples of
the "balancing test" becomes a matter of judgment.
Even if we take a strict view of which cases qualify, and confine ourselves to cases that all but
use the label, we find that the computer search for "balancing test" understates the use of the test
by about half. I arrive at this estimation after conducting a series of searches aimed at capturing
more cases in a few state and federal libraries (balance! PRE/6 interest!, weigh! PRE16 interest!, for
example). I read the cases generated to weed out those not explicitly using the test, and the number
of remaining cases (i.e., good examples of the test) ran from two to three times the number of cases
captured by searching the same library for "balancing test"
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1987 268 236 10 504
1986 299 238 4 535
1985 253 201 13 451
1984 245 166 3 411
1983 189 195 9 384
1982 200 159 4 359
1981 169 157 5 326
1980 174 123 0 297
1979 169 108 3 277
1978 149 110 3 259
1977 99 101 3 200
1976 121 H4 5 205
1975 105 75 I 180
1974 66 50 0 116
1973 55 74 3 129
1972 20 53 1 73
1971 9 23 1 32
1970 4 13 0 17
1969 6 7 0 13
1968 1 4 0 5
1967 4 4 0 8
19(36 3 5 0 8
1965 3 '	 2 0 5
1964 3 3 I 6
1963 1 0 0 1
1962 0 0 0 0
1961 1 7 6 8
1960 0 0 0 0
1959 0 1 I 1
1958 0 0 0 0
1957 0 0 0 0
1956 0 0 0 0
1955 0 0 0 0
Notes on the Columns
The search was BALANCING TEST WI TEST AND DATE = (year]; each column represents a
different LEXIS database:
Column (2) — OMNI 2 database
Column (3) — COURTS database
Column (4) — US database
Column (5) — computed total of columns (2) and (3).
One should not make too much of these numbers, of course. The balancing test,
strictly defined, is hardly ubiquitous. Five hundred. cases each year do not constitute
universal practice, and traditional legal reasoning is still the order of the day. But the
trends indicate that the order may someday be reversed, and that the balancing test will
become the method of choice.
B. The Where and How of Balancing
The dramatic growth in numbers suggests, but does not prove, that the balancing
test has become a growing force in the art of judging. It could be, for example, that the
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balancing test finds a home in only a few areas of law, and that, for reasons unrelated
to the test, those areas of law are litigated with special frequency. 90 If the balancing test
were attached to such active areas of law, but not to areas on decline, an increase in the
incidence of the test would not be evidence that the test had increased in popularity.
The more telling inquiry is to ask whether the balancing test answers more legal questions
than it did before. It most emphatically does.
1. The Range of Balancing
We begin with an examination of state court experience, for it is there that the
balancing test seems to have achieved its widest application. In Illinois, for example, the
balancing test has been used to determine:
- whether a product is unreasonably dangerous: 91
- whether a statute of limitations should be tolled until the plaintiff discovered, or
should have discovered, the cause of action; 92
-
whether doctors have a duty to the general public to warn patients about possible
effects of a particular drug; 95
-
whether a city may require alterations to existing buildings to promote health
and safety: 91
- whether a forum non conveniens motion prevails; 95
-
whether a criminal defendant has been denied a speedy trial: 96
-
whether an Illinois statute places an unreasonable burden on interstate com-
merce;97
- whether retroactive legislation can be enforced; 98
- whether a public employee has been dismissed in a proper manner; 99
- whether documents held by public officials should be released; 100
-
whether a government employee has been dismissed for improper reasons;'U 1
" The winds of litigation shift: today there are substantially fewer suits to enforce marriage
contracts than in the 1800's, but a great many more products liability actions.
91 Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 111. 2d 434, 437-39, 396 N.E.2d 534, 536 (1979).
92 Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 85 III. App. 3d 714, 717, 407 N.E.2d 176, 179 (1980).
93 Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 136 111. App. 3d 945, 953, 483 N.E.2d 906,
912 (1985).
" Rothner v. Chicago, 66 Ill, App. 3d 428, 433-34, 383 N.E.2d 1218, 1222 (1978).
" Wieser v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 98 Ill. 2d 359, 365, 456 N.E.2d 98, 101 (1983); Jones v. Searle
Laboratories, 93 111. 2d 366, 372-73, 444 N.E.2d 157, 160 (1983).
96 Illinois v. Makes, 103 III. App. 3d 232, 235-36, 431 N.E.2d 20, 23 (1981); Illinois v. Boyd,
88 III. App. 3d 825, 842-43, 410 N.E.2d 931, 944 (1980); Illinois v. Woods, 78 III. App. 3d 431,
437, 396 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (1979); Illinois v. Valdery, 65 111. App. 3d 375, 377, 381 N.E.2d 1217,
1219 (1978); Illinois v. Adams, 59 111. App. 3d 590, 593-94, 375 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1978); Illinois
v. Harflinger, 49 III. App. 3d 31, 34, 363 N.E.2d 875, 877 (1977); Illinois v. Sims, 47 111. App. 3d
215, 218, 361 N.E.2d 1153, 1154 (1977); Illinois v. Gooding, 21 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1068, 316 N.E.2d
549, 552 (1974).
97 Illinois v. Neville, 42 III. App. 3d 9, 15, 355 N.E.2d 179, 183-84 (1976).
Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 III. 2d 1, 20, 483 N.E.2d 226, 234 (1985).
99 Maas v. Board of Trustees, 94 Ill. App. 3d 562, 576, 418 N.E.2d 1029, 1040 (1981).
100 Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 III. 2d 107, 118-19, 390 N.E.2d 835, 839 (1979); Oberman v. Byrne,
112 III. App. 3d 155, 165, 445 N.E.2d 374, 382 (1983).
'" Griggs v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 102 Ill. App. 3d 614, 618, 430 N.E.2d 188, 190-91 (1981);
Lupo v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 82 Ill. App. 3d 449, 451, 402 N.E.2d 624, 626 (1980).
May 1988]	 BALANCING TEST	 607
- whether evidence of a criminal defendant's prior convictions can he introduced
at his triah 1 u2
- whether a police roadblock was permissible; 103
- whether a new rule announced by the court should be applied retroa0vely; 104
- whether a particular police search was pertnissible;LOS
-
whether a particular investigative act by the police constitutes a search or sei-
zure; 106
- whether Illinois driver's license suspension procedures violate due process.'"
There are others."
New York appears to provide an even richer vein of balancing analysis. New York
courts have used the test to determine:
-
the level of support payments a father owes for a child born out of wedlock; 109
- whether an estate creditor may force the administrator to set aside a sum of
money to be used to satisfy a potential judgment against the estate; 110
- whether an employee may be fired for a past history of psychiatric treatment;In
- whether shifting a prisoner from building to building violated his right to
counsel; 11
-
whether a foreign divorce decree will he honored in the state of New York; I L3
- whether court records may be disclosed to a person not party to the original
litigation; 1 14
- whether the state may have access to grand jury minutes; 115
- whether an attorney-priest may wear his clerical collar in court; 116
- whether a husband may insist that his wile join his church before supporting
hen"?
- whether a particular church should be extended tax-free Status;
102 Illinois v. Craves, 142 Ill. App. 3d 885, 897, 492 N.E.2d 517, 526 (1986).
103 Illinois v. Bartley, 109 III. 2d 273, 280, 486 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1985).
104 Illinois v, Smith, 95 111. 2d 412, 421, 447 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1983); see also Illinois v. Tisler,
103 Ill. 2d 226, 246-47, 469 N.E.2d 147, 157-58 (1984).
166 Illinois v. Batchelder, 107 111. App. 3d 81, 84, 437 N.E.2d 364, 367 (1982).
106 Illinois v. Long, 99 III, 2d 219, 232, 457 N.E.2d 1252, 1257-58 (1983); Illinois v. Lippert,
89 III. 2d 171, 183-87, 432 N.E,2d 605, 610-12 (1982); Illinois v. Piper, 101 111. App. 3d 296, 303,
427 N.E.2d 1361, 1365 (1981).
1 " Illinois v. Honaker, 127 111. App. 3d 1036, 1038-39, 469 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (1984).
1 " See e.g., Illinois v. Martin, 80 Ill. App. 3d 281, 292, 399 N.E.2d 265, 274 (1979) (whether
an informant's identity should be disclosed to the defendant in a criminal case).
1 ° 9 Ellen N. v. Stuart K., 88 Misc. 2d 280, 286-87, 387 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373 (Fam. Ct. 1976).
"0 1n re Vasquez, 122 Misc. 2d, 479, 484,.471 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (1984) (Sur. Ct.).
111 John B. v. Rockville Centre, 113 A.D.2d 225, 233, 495 N.Y.S.2d 674, 679 (1985).
" 2 Adams v. Meloni, 98 A.D.2d 956, 956, 470 N.Y.S.2d 199, 199-200 (1983) (memorandum
opinion).
"'Guillermo v. Guillermo, 43 Misc. 2d 763, 768-69, 252 N.Y.S.2d 171, 176-78 (Fain. Ct.
1964).
" 4 Church of Scientology v. New York, 61 A.D.2d 942, 943, 403 N.Y.S.2d 224, 226 (1978)
(memorandum opinion),
" 5 /n re District Attorney of Suffolk Co., 86 A.D.2d 294, 298-99, 449 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1007
(1982).
" 6 New York v. Rodriguez, 101 Misc. 2d 536, 544-45, 424 N.Y.S,2d 600, 606 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
117 M.I. v. Al.,. 	 107 Misc. 2d 663, 667, 435 N.Y.S.2d 928, 931 (Fam, Ct. 1981).
11 e New York v. Life Science Church, 113 Misc. 2d 952, 967-68, 450 N.Y.S.2d 664, 675 (Sup.
Ct. 1982).
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- whether a particular zoning variance should be granted;'
- whether a police informant's identity should he disclosed to a criminal defen-
dant; 121'
- whether two criminal counts may be joined in one tria1; 12 '
- whether evidence improperly gathered by police may be admitted at trial; 122
- whether a replevin statute that allows seizure of goods without a hearing is
constitutional: 123
- whether special court procedures for handling juvenile offenders are constitu-
tional; 124
- whether a first time offender should be released from custody; 125
- whether custody of a child should be given over to his natural or adoptive
parents; 126
- whether prison conditions must be improved; 127
- whether a public official can release the names and addresses of government
employees. 1213
As might be expected, California courts do a lot of balancing, as do the
courts of Kansas, Alabama, and Montana, four jurisdictions whose experience
I surveyed with some care. 129 The test's popularity appears to be unaffected by
19 Campus v. Delany, 62 A.D.2d 990, 992, 403 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (1978) (memorandum
opinion).
' 70 New York v. Law, 78 Misc. 2d 897, 900, 358 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
12 ' New York v. Negran, 105 Misc. 2d 492, 493, 432 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349-50 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
' 22 New York v. Wright, 104 Misc. 2d 911, 922, 429 N.Y.S.2d 993, 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
122 Consolidated Edison v. Pearson, 123 Misc. 2d 598, 599, 474 N.Y.S.2d 230, 232 (Civ. Ct.
1984),
124 1n re Edward W., 89 Misc. 2d 570, 574, 392 N.Y.S.2d 208, 212 (Fain. Ct. 1977).
' 25 New York v. Diboll°, 82 Misc. 2d 177, 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (Crim. Ct. 1975).
hi re Daniel C., 115 Misc. 2d 130, 135, 453 N.Y.S.2d 572, 576 (Sur. Ct. 1982).
127 Powlowski v. Wullich, 102 A.D.2d 575, 587, 479 N.Y.S.2d 89, 98 (1984).
122 Goodstein v. Shaw, 119 Misc. 2d 400, 402, 463 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
129 Alabama: See, e.g., Ex parte Stevens, 499 So. 2d 795, 796 (Ala. 1986) (per curiam) (speedy
trial); Ex parte Bland, 441 So. 2d 122, 124 (Ala. 1983) (balancing prisoner's interests in retaining
his "good time" versus the prison official's interests in institutional sakty and correctional goals);
Ex parte Alabama Oxygen Co., 433 So. 2d 1158, 1164-07 (Ala. 1983) (balancing the application of
federal law versus state law).
Montana: See, e.g., Miller v. Catholic Diocese, 728 P.2d 794, 796 (Mont. 1986) (establishment
clause); State v. Kerns, 725 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Mont. 1986) (speedy trial); State v. Chapman, 679
P.2d 1210, 1215 (Mont. 1984) (balancing defendant's interest in preparing his defense versus
government's interest in protecting the flow of informant information).
California: See, e.g., Canaan v. Abdelnour, 40 Cal. 3d 703, 715, 710 P.2d 268, 275, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 475 (1985) (balancing character and magnitude of injuries to first and fourteenth
amendment rights against state interest in promulgating rule in determining constitutionality of
election regulations); Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 360, 703 P.2d 88, 91, 216 Cal. Rptr.
748, 751 (1985) (weighing competing public and private interests in determining whether statutory
presumption of paternity violated due process rights); Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co.,
34 Cal, 3d 378, 382-85, 668 1 2.2d 674, 677-79, 194 Cal. Rptr. 367, 370-72 (1984) (weighing burden
on interstate commerce against state's interest in regulating activity in determining whether state's
antitrust laws applied to football teams); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d
443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978) (existence of' "design defect" and thus strict liability on
product's manufacturer, depends on, inter alia, whether benefits of challenged design outweigh the
risk of danger inherent in such design).
Kansas: See, e.g., Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Conun'n, 239 Kan. 483, 488-89, 720
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distinctions between states large and small, urban and rural, progressive and conserva-
tive.'"
At the risk of losing the reader's attention, i listed seriatim a 'lumber of issues resolved
by the balancing lest in Illinois and New York. I deliberately avoided classifying them
by subject matter, or according to whether they arose as a matter of constitutional law,
statutory law, or common law. These distinctions will be made soon enough, but it is
important to demonstrate, rather than merely to assert, that the balancing test has become
the modus operandi in a stunning variety of cases. Those readers who sought to avoid this
rhetorical ploy by skipping over the lists arc urged to review them. These lists best convey
both the test's popularity and the richness of its applications. The test is no longer
confined, as it may have been in the early I 9t30s, to a handful of legal questions.
It would he misleading, however, to suggest that the test is likely to pop up just
anywhere. The test has conic to dominate some areas of law more rapidly than others.
Federal constitutional law, for example, is an area rich in balancing. The test appeared
early in United States Supreme Court first amendment decisions, and in subsequent
practice, the Court has introduced the test to a number of other constitutional issues."'
Consequently, a great deal of state court balancing is tied to particular provisions of the
Federal constitution, applied to the states by way of the fourteenth amendment, or to
state constitutional provisions analogous to the federal provisions.
This reading of the matter, however, does not do the states justice. They have also
adopted the test in areas wholly unrelated to federal constitutional law. State courts have
used the test to decide issues of tort law, 12 conflicts of law,"" family law,'" civil proce-
dure,"5 estates law,'" taxation, 17 zoning,''''' and public access to documents,'" as well as
P.2d 1063, 1070-71 (1986) (approving balance of parties' interests in setting utility rates); Kansas
v. Galloway, 238 Kan. 100, 106, 708 P.2d 508, 513 (1985) (speedy trial); Kansas v. Pink, 236 Km.
715, 722, 696 P.2d 358, 365 (1985) (balancing factors to determine whether informer's identity
should be disclosed to defendant); Crane v. Mitchell County U.S D. No. 273, 232 Km. 51, 57, 652
1 1.2d 205, 210 (1982) (due process).
l'" This is not surprising. As I will argue later (and as others have argued before) there is no
reason to suspect that using a balancing test necessarily results in more conservative or liberal
decisions than traditional analysis.
131 Professor Aleinikoff has provided the best summary to date of the balancing test's entry
into provision after provision of the federal Constitution. Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 963-72.
There he ably traces the growth of the test in the jurisprudence of the fourth amendment,
procedural due process, the fourteenth amendment, the cominerce clause, the first amendment,
and a miscellany of other provisions,
132 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Cu., 20 Cal. 3d 413. 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239
(1978); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 III. 2d 434, 437-39, 396 N.E.2d 534, 536 (1979); Kirk v.
Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center 136 Ill. App. 3d 945, 953, 483 N.E.2d 906, 912 (1985).
133 Guillermo v. Guillermo, 43 Misc. 2d 763, 768-69, 252 N.Y.S.2d 171, 176-78 (Fain. Ct.
1964).
1 " Ellen N. v, Stuart K., 88 Misc. 2d 280, 286-87, 387 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373 (Finn. Ct. 1976); In
re Daniel C., 115 Mist:, 2d 130, 135, 453 N.Y.S.2d 572, 587 (Sur. Ct. 1982).
"5 Wieser v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 98 M. 2d 359, 365, 456 N.E.2d 98, 101 (1983); Jones v. Searle
Laboratories, 93 III. 2c1 366, 372-73, 444 N.E.2d 157, 160 (1983).
13" tore Vasquez, 122 Misc. 2d 479, 484, 471 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (Sur. Ct. 1984).
137 New York v. Life Science Church, 113 Misc. cld 952, 967-68, 450 N.Y.S.2d 664, 675 (Sup.
Ct. 1982).
II" Campus v. Delany, 62 A.D.2d 990, 992, 403 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (1978).
199 Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 Ill. 2d 107, 118-19, 390 N.E.2d 835, 839 (1979); Oberman v. Byrne,
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issues of legal method and process, such as whether a court decision or statute should
apply retroactively.'" The states, in short, have done much more than simply follow
federal precedent in areas where required to do so, or where analogies to federal
precedent are compelling. They have extended the reach of the test to areas beyond the
confines of federal interest, and are now just as likely to cite their own precedents for
balancing as to cite federal court decisions.
There is no doubt, however, that state court judges often take their lead from their
federal colleagues just as lower federal court judges take their lead from the justices of
the United States Supreme Court. As Barenblatt v. United States illustrates, the Supreme
Court began using a balancing test in first amendment cases during the late 1950s and
early 1960s. Actually, the language of balancing, if not the test itself, appeared in first
amendment cases several years before that time,"' and throughout the immediate post-
war period the Court, or some of its members in concurrence and dissent, began to
recognize interest balancing as a legitimate method of judicial and legislative process. In
particular, justices engaged in balancing to resolve commerce clause disputes, 142
 and
recognized that the balance of competing interests lay behind the work of Congress 143
and administrative agencies. 144 Vague references to interest balancing also appeared in
Supreme Court cases dealing with capital punishment, 145 the division of powers between
the executive and legislative branches, 146
 procedural due process, 1 4 7 and antitrust law) ."
Perhaps the only justification for dating the balancing test's origins in the late 1950s and
early 1960s is that Justice Black, in several dissents, derisively characterized the Court's
first amendment work as a "balancing test" and the epithet stuck.
Nonetheless, by the late 1950s explicit balancing test analysis dominated only a
handful of areas: forum non conveniens motion practice, some commerce clause analysis,
and the newly arrived first amendment jurisprudence. In subsequent years, the Supreme
112 III. App. 3d 155, 165, 445 N.E.2d 374, 382 (1983); Goodstein v. Shaw, 119 Misc. 2d 400, 402,
463 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
'" Salient v. Glenview State Bank, 108 III. 2d 1, 20, 483, N.E.2d 226, 234 (1985); Illinois v.
Graves, 142 Ill. App. 3d 885, 897, 492 N.E.2d 517, 526 (1986):
''' See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 509-10 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 290 (1957); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 524-26 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); SAIA v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562
(1948); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947).
142
 Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186-87 (1950); H.P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 564 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes
Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 443-45 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Freeman v. Hewitt, 329
U.S. 249, 253 (1946); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 547-48 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
13
 T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 479 (1959) (Motor Carrier Act strikes balance);
Carpenters Union, Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1953) (Taft-Hartley Act strikes
balance); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evan, 324 U.S. 652, 678-79 (1945) (Congress balances interests
of U.S. and Phillipines regarding Phillipines' tariff status). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 497 (1947) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strike balance regarding work-product doctrine).
1 " NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (NLRB rules strike balance); United
States v, Rock Island Motor Transit Co„ 340 U.S. 419, 434 (1951) (Interstate Commerce Commission
strikes balance).
146
 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 44 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
we
	 Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609-10 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
14'.
 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
1" Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 121 & n.10 (1948).
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Court used the test to resolve claims concerning the permissibility of searches under the
fourth amendment., 149 the requisites of due process under the fifth amendment,m the
rights to a speedy trial, to confront witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel, as secured
by the sixth amendment,'" and the requisites of due process under the fourteenth
amendment. 152 By sheer force of precedent, lower federal courts have taken up the
charge, and used the test in those areas sanctioned by the Supreme Court. 153
2. The Role of Balancing
The balancing test is most commonly employed as a method of constitutional inter-
pretation, but it has also performed in many other capacities. The test has now become
a method of statutory interpretation. This development is hardly surprising. What is good
for reading a constitution is arguably good for reading statutes, too.
New York courts, for example, have employed the test to interpret statutes govern-
ing the amount of child support payments. The state's Family Court Act provides that
parents support their children "according to their respective means," and directs the
court to consider "all relevant factors" in setting the level of support.'" The statute
establishes five factors to be considered by the courts, including the parents' financial
resources and the child's physical and emotional health. It should be no surprise that
New York courts have come to refer to child support decisions as involving a balancing
test.' 55
Similarly, New York's Mental Hygiene Law requires that no . person in all other
respects qualified and eligible" shall be deprived of any civil right solely because that
person received prior treatments for a mental disability. 156 In Pim B. v. Rockville Centre,
the court read the statute as indicating that a balance must be struck between the
employer's interest in capable employees and society's interest in encouraging treatment
for mental illness. 157 Using this analysis, the court determined that the statute could not
have been intended to preclude an employer police department from dismissing an
employee whose past treatment revealed underlying alcoholism problems, making him
unsuitable for the job.
A more aggressive use of balancing in statutory interpretation comes from Illinois.
That state's general five-year statute of limitations provides that tort actions, as well as
"all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within 5 [five] years
next after the cause accrued."'" Under traditional reasoning a cause of action sounding
"9 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
533 (1967).
15° INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984).
151 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983); Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S.
18, 27 (1981).
152 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). A detailed account of this expansion is
beyond the scope of this Article. The best account appears in Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 963-72.
155 See, e.g., Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1983) (due process analysis carefully
following the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing analysis).
154 N.Y. FAN!. Cr. ACT § 413 (McKinney 1987).
155 See, e.g., Kathy G.J. v. Arnold D., 116 A.D.2d 247, 256, 501 N.Y.S.2d 58, 64 (1986) ('[Al
fair balance must be snuck, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances.").
I" N.Y. MENTAL Hvo. Law § 33.01 (McKinney 1978).
157 113 A.D. 2d 225, 495 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1985).
155 ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 110, para. 13-205 (1985).
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in tort "accrued" when the tort was committed, but Illinois courts have interpreted the
word "accrued" so that in some cases, "accrual" occurs later, when the plaintiff knew or
should have known of his or her right to sue.'" This has come to be known as the
"discovery rule," and whether a court applies it in a particular case is determined by
balancing. The rule applies when the hardship caused to the plaintiff, who had no idea
a cause of action had "accrued" in the traditional sense, outweighs the increased difficulty
of proof caused by "tolling" the statute.L 60 I call this a more aggressive use of balancing
because it introduces a new principle to the statute of limitations — a principle not
suggested in any way by the statutory language. The court was not invited to balance by
a statute that spoke of "factors" or "elements."
In addition, courts sometimes use the balancing test to implement statutes as well as
to interpret them. That is, legislatures have sometimes demanded that courts balance
interests or factors in reaching their decisions. Something of this mandate is evident in
the New York child support statute noted previously, and many other statutes of this
type exist at both the federal and state levels.
A particularly interesting example in federal law comes from criminal sentencing.
Congress has listed the factors a judge must weigh in determining sentences for persons
convicted of federal crimes: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history
and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence imposed, the kinds of
sentences available, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records. 16 t The statute explicitly directs judges to consult this
list when determining the amount of fines to be imposed, 162 the possibility, length,
conditions, and revocation of probation, 163 the imposition and length of imprisonment.'"
and supervised release, 165 and whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecu-
tively. 166
Statutes also direct federal courts to examine a list of factors in setting damage
awards against creditors, bill collectors, and others who violate consumer credit protec-
tion laws, 167 and in selling penalties against those who violate the Clean Air Act require-
ments.'" Federal courts must also consider a list of statutory factors to determine what
remedy shall be available against violators of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act, 16° and to determine whether to punish an alien who has failed to leave the country
after a deportation order. 1 " In short, a wild mix of federal statutes requires judges to
balance.
159 Rozny v. Marriul, 43 111. 2d 54, 70, 250 N.E.2d 656, 664 (1969); Knox College v. Celotex
Corp., 85 III. App. 3d 714, 717, 407 N.•. 2d 176, 179 (1980).
'"" Rozny, 43 III. 2d at 70, 250 N.E.2d at 664; Knox College, 85 III. App. 3d at 717, 407 N.E.2d
at 179.
161 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1982).
1 "2 Id. § 3572(a) (referring to the ['actors of § 3553(a) and adding seven others).
' 6' Id, § 3562(a) (possibility and length of probation); id. § 3563(b) (additional conditions of
probation); id. § 3564(c) (early termination of probation); id. § 3565(a) (revocation of probation).
14 Id. § 3582(a).
1 "5 Id. § 3583(c) (using selected factors from the list at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
§ 3584(b).
' 7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a), 1691(b), 1692k(b), 1693m(b) (1982).
16 ' 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1982).
1 " 15 U.S.C. § 15-1709(a) (1982).
179 8 U.S.C. § 1252(3) (1982). Other examples of statutes which direct courts to balance factors
include: 10 U.S.C. § 906a(c) (1985) (list of factors in determining whether person convicted of
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Many state statutes follow a similar pattern. In Illinois family law, for example, a
statute directs the judge to divide a diYorcing couple's property after "considering all
relevant factors, including ... the duration of the marriage, any obligations and
rights arising from a prior marriage of either party, ... the age, health, station and
needs of each of the parties" and eight other factors, none of which by itself is deter-
minative."' A related statute mandates the analysis of six factors for setting the level of
maintenance payments,' 72 and five factors for setting the level of child support pay-
ments.'" A list of factors is also used to determine the custody of minor children." 4
Illinois courts are also directed to consider sets of enumerated factors, and thus invited
to balance, in a miscellany of other statutory areas, for example, in, setting the level of
damages for violations of the state's "Electronic Fund Transfer Transmission Facility
Act,"'" setting boundaries for public library districts,'" and deciding whether to permit
a minor's name change.' 77
Statutes direct. California judges to consider sets of enumerated factors, and thus
invite the courts to balance, when determining the proper level of child support pay-
ments, 1 " and whether to order premarital counseling for minors who wish to marry.'"
California judges are further directed to consider groups of factors, and are thus invited
to balance, in order to determine whether to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent
client, 18° whether to order a judgment debtor to assign to his or her creditor the debtor's
rights to certain future payments, 181 and whether to order a partition of real or personal
property among co-tenants.'" Similarly, Texas courts are directed to consider statutory
lists of factors, and thus invited to balance, in order to determine the level of child
support payments,'" and to decide whether a particular item constitutes "drug para-
phernalia" under the Texas Controlled Substances Act.' 84
It should be clear that state legislatures, like Congress, have been quite willing to
direct their courts to balance "interests" or "factors" in making their decisions. It is not
espionage in military tribunal shall be sentenced to death); F.R. Cry. P. RULE l9(b) (four factors in
determining whether case should be dismissed for inability to join an indispensihle party). It is
worth noting that Congress has, with great frequency, also directed administrative agencies to
balance or weigh a series of specified factors in reaching their decisions. A recent computer survey
of the United States Code revealed approxiinately 300 instances of this sort of statutory mandate
(Westlaw search of U.S. Code for "consider /p factor;" March 1987). Given this practice, it is perhaps
a small step to direct federal judges to engage in the same sort of inquiry.
171 ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 40, para. 503(c)(1)–(l0) (1985).
172 Id. ch. 40, para. 504.
' 75 Id. ch. 40, para. 505.
'4 Id. ch. 40, para. 602, 602.1. Similar divorce laws can be found in other states. The Illinois
provisions, like many other states', arc derived from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, See
9A U.L.A. 147 (1987). Because that Act uses this "analysis of factors" approach, its adoption in
several states — Arizona, Colorado, Illinois,• Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Wash-
ington — has extended the analysis to those.stafes.
' 75 ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 17, para. 1354(b) (1985).
"" Id. ch. 81, para. 1002-12 (1985),
177 Id. ch. 96, para. 1 (1985).
178 GAL. C1V. CODE § 356 (West 1985).
' 79 /d. § 4101.
"' CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 285.4 (West 1985).
181 Id. § 708.510.
1 " Id. 872.710.
' 63 "FEX. FAM. 'CODE ANN. 1 14.05 (Vernon 1985).
1 " "FEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 447645 (Vernon 1985).
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surprising, therefore, in the face of such statutory mandates, when courts begin to speak
of these issues as involving a "balancing test."
Finally, courts have used the balancing test as a method of common law adjudication.
We have already seen that federal courts apply a balancing test in deciding whether to
grant a motion to dismiss based on a forum non conveniens claim. In such cases the court
interprets no authoritative text, constitutional or statutory, by way of the test. Rather,
the court uses the test to resolve an issue for which no statute provides guidance. Lower
federal courts regularly apply the test in forum non conveniens practice and recently, in a
well-publicized instance, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed the Bhopal disaster litigation in favor of an Indian forum by invoking a
balancing test.I 85
State courts seem to have surpassed the federal courts in their use of the balancing
test in non-statutory areas. Not only do state judges balance in forum non conveniens
cases, 1 fl6
 but they balance in order to determine rights of access to public documents
when no freedom of information act or similar statute is available,'w' whether a product
is unreasonably dangerous and therefore subject to strict liability rules,' 88
 and whether
there exists, in a particular case, a duty to warn about product hazards.'" State courts
have also invoked the test in cases where a statute is involved but does not directly
answer the relevant question, as in deciding whether a zoning variance was properly
granted or withheld. 19°
With literally thousands of balancing test cases spread throughout the federal and
state reporters, this review cannot hope to be exhaustive. It does suggest, however, that
the balancing test, mainly in result-balancing form, performs many functions in Amer-
ican judicial decision making: as a method of constitutional and statutory interpretation,
as a method of analysis required by statute, and as a method of solving common law
disputes when no statute is implicated. It is clear that judges, as well as legislatures, have
found the test an attractive procedure for addressing a wide variety of legal issues. It is
just as clear that this attraction, and the test's growing use, is largely a product of the
post-war years.
C. Why the Test is Popular
1. A Note on the General Form of Explanation
The growing popularity of the balancing test is explained by a sturdy combination
of precedent and modern thought. We begin by giving precedent its due. The impera-
tives of stare decisis encourage the replication of specific verbal formulae and methods of
analysis. Even bad ideas are repeated. It should not surprise us then, in principle, that
any legal concept grows and becomes popular over time.
t85 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
186
 See e.g., Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 40 Conn. Supp. 457, 515 A.2d 390 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1986); Mills v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 511 A.2d 8 (D.C. 1986); Brummett v.
Wepfer Marine, Inc., 111 Ill, 2d 495, 490 N.E.2d 694 (1986); Broukhim v. Hay, 122 A.D.2d 9, 504
N.Y.S.2d 467 (1986).
"7
 Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 Ill. 2d 107, 390 N.E.2d 835 (1979); Oberman v. Byrne, 112 Ill. App.
3d 155, 445 N.E.2d 374 (1983).
'"" Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Ill. 2c1 434, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979).
"" Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 136 Ill. App. 3d 945, 483 N.E.2d 906 (1985).
19"
 Campus v. Delany, 62 A.D.2d 990, 403 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1978).
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The temptation is to skip this most obvious explanation for the growth of a legal
technique or doctrine and to begin the explanation in social and historical terms. Com-
mentators are likely, for example, to explain the growth of strict liability iu tort or the
resurgence of equal protection law as responses to changing economic or social vela-
tions.li" This sort of explanation has its place, but not at the beginning of the analysis.
In matters of legal doctrine we are wise to remember that a particular doctrine, or a
particular verbal formulation of a rule, becomes popular because judges, one by one (or
three by three or nine by nine), decide to use it. And the most common reason for that
decision is stare decisis.
But this explanation, of course, is incomplete. It cannot account for the first creative
act by which a new formulation is born. Furthermore, stare decisis does not explain why
these ground-breaking opinions become precedents. As we all know, only some opinions
are followed in later cases; others are reversed, or distinguished away, or relegated to a
slow death of subsequent anonymity. Filially, stare decisis can explain only why a rule of
law is replicated in cases in the same substantive area where it first appears. It does not
explain why such a technique should come to dominate new areas, as the balancing test
has clone.
The answers to these questions involve the history of legal thought and, loosely
speaking, social history. These are, of course, just the sorts of explanations 1 warned
against earlier, but the warning was against moving too soon to these explanations. We
are safe so long as we remember that they are secondary, that they are best understood
as supplements to the primary explanation of stare decisis. It is - in the further explanation
of that cause, and in exploring its limits, that these other explanations become important.
2. The Birth of the Test
Currently, courts most commonly justify using the balancing test on the basis of
precedent, either in a strict sense — a court finding itself obliged to invoke the test
because a higher court has declared it to be the proper method of analysis — or in a
weaker sense — a court finding itself persuaded by the analogy of other courts' use of
the test in similar cases. Sometimes, however, a court introduces the test without relying
on binding precedent or persuasive analogy, and it is on this phenomenon that we focus
our attention.
When a court introduces a balancing test without relying on precedent or analogy,
it is obviously involved in a creative act: the court creates and applies a method of
decision making that did not appear in prior case law. The details of this creative act
vary from case to case, but a general pattern does emerge. It involves a very special sort
of case analysis.
The court commonly begins by tracing the development of the legal doctrine at
issue, reviewing those cases in which the relevant rules anti exceptions were first intro-
duced. The court then characterizes that doctrinal development as a process, and more
specifically, a process aimed at the balancing of competing social interests. The court
does so even if the prior judges did not characterize their own work in this way. The
Barenblatt case provides a good example. 192 There the Court reviewed prior cases and
191 See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 328-402 (4th ed. 1982); R. HARRIS, THE
QUEST FOR EQUALITY 130-58 (1960); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L.
Rrv, 359,382-85 (1951).
192 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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concluded that, "[w]here First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental
interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown."'"
The Court reached this conclusion even though not all of the prior cases explicitly used
balancing language.
This is a special method of case analysis. Normally, when a court reviews prior cases,
its project is to tease out the holdings of those prior cases and to reconcile them — in
other words, to generate rules in traditional ways. The balance-creating court is engaged
in a different project. When it reviews prior cases, it is engaged in commentary. The court
steps back, as it were, to recharacterize the work of past judges, and to see that work in a
new light.
There is nothing wrong with commentary, per se, but the creation of a balancing test
elevates this commentary into a working rule of law. "In the past," the court might say,
"we have really been balancing interests. In the future we will do so explicitly." 191
 The
court thus transfo rms an interesting suggestion about the nature of doctrinal develop-
ment into doctrine itself.
This transformational step is problematic. It is one thing to describe a process; it is
quite another to make that description a part of the process itself. Statements made about
a process differ logically from statements made in a process. The distinction is important,
and is relevant to a great many areas outside the law. In formal logic, for example, we
are careful to distinguish comments or theories about the nature or limits of logical
systems generally from the statements found in actual arguments or proofs. The differ-
ence is between metalogic and logic. In the philosophy of language we are careful to
distinguish between statements made about language, the kind of statements made by
writers as diverse as Chomsky, Tarski, and Wittgenstein, from statements made in a
language, such as "please pass the salt." The distinction is between metalanguage and
language. The two classes of statements differ logically because they are derived and
justified on different grounds. They are proved true or false, proper or improper, valid
or invalid, with reference to different sets of criteria for truth, propriety, and validity.'95
Because these statements stand on a different logical footing, the movement from one
type of statement to the other requires a tramforrnation from one way of speaking to
another. Much more will be said about this transformation,m" but for now, it is enough
to note its existence and the issue it generates: creating the balancing test involves both
a descriptive aspect ("In the past, courts have really been balancing interests"), and a
prescriptive or operational aspect ("In the future we will explicitly balance interests").
The second statement does not follow from the first.
Not all courts that create balancing tests are so explicit in their reasoning. S.me
courts simply claim, without explanation, that balancing is appropriate for the case at.
hand.t 97
 In such a case it is risky to speculate about what convinced the court to create
195
 Id at 126 (emphasis added).
' 9.1 Cf. id. at 127 ("In light of these [balancing] principles we now consider petitioner's First
Amendment claims.").
195 Accord Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Pun_ REv. 3 (1955) (drawing distinction "between
justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it").
1 " See infra text accompanying notes 235-65.
'" See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950) ("When
particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an
indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which
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the test, though it is fair to suppose that (1) the court relied on other balancing test cases
without referring to them; (2) the court relied on its own unstated analysis of past cases
and determined that they really involve a balance of interests; or (3) the court relied on
some other more general notion about the nature of judging. If the first or second
explanation is right, silence on this point is simply a matter of judicial truancy, or perhaps
incompetence. Judges must make clear the basis of their decisions. It seems clear from
some of these "silent" cases, however, that the third explanation is right: that the court
had in mind a general description of judging — that all judging involves balancing — and
transformed that general description into an explicit method for deciding the case at
hand.igm The point may have seemed so obvious to the court that further explanation
seemed unnecessary.
3. Why Now
The concepts of balancing and judging have been intertwined for thousands of
years. The ancient Egyptians seem to have been the first to make the connection, and
they were followed in their insight by the Greeks and the Romans.'"" Greek goddesses
Themis and Dyke, and the Roman goddess Justicia, all seem to have carried scales. 2 '")
Indeed, the use of a balance is a most attractive metaphor for judging. It is a bit. of a
puzzle, then, why judges waited so long — until the middle of this century — to flesh
out the metaphor and make balancing an explicit means of deciding cases.
The creation and use of a balancing test, however, simply would not have been
possible in earlier times. The lest presumes that one may properly characterize the
development of a line of cases, or the work of the courts generally, as involving a judicial
calculus of interests. That. is, the descriptive claim involved in the test's creation must. be
accepted as true, or at least unobjectionable, before a judge can transform that descrip-
tion into a working rule of law. Here lay the initial hurdle. It was not until the twentieth
century that judging was conceived, as a matter of legal theory, to involve the balance of
competing interests.
Earlier thinking did not permit such a view of the law or the judge's work. For
American legal thought, Blackstone provides a good starting place. His Commentaries on
the Laws of England, and the vision of law upon which that work is based, stands as a
suitable icon for eighteenth century legal thought, and is especially pertinent here
of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances
presented." (no case citations)); Rimy v. Marina, 43 111. 2d 54, 70, 250 N.E.2d 656, 604 (1969)
(balancing introduced without citation to past. cases).
I "I Certainly many scholars believe that all judging involves balancing. See, e.g., Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. Rtiv, 591, 024 (1982) ("Once it is acknowledged that the free
speech interest must give way in some situations) to a competing social interest, acceptance of at
least some form of balancing process is established.") (emphasis in original); lienkin, supra note 12,
at 1024 ("Exercise of judgment, including some balancing of underlying values and interests,
pervades all constitutional interpretation ....''); Benditt, Law and the Balancing of Interests, 3 Soc.
THEORY & PRAc. 321, 336 (1975) ("every situation calling for a decision will involve competing
interests which can be weighed;" also argues that balance of such interests need not be determi-
native).
1•9 Resnick, Managerial judges, 96 [LARY. L. REV. 379, 496 (1982).
200 1d. at 996-48. See also Daube, The Scales of Justice, 63 jump. REV. 109, 113-17 (1951)
(Professor Daube, however, claims that the scales were not original equipment, but a later addition
to Justicia's wardrobe).
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because the American "reception" of English common law and English jurisprudence
largely represents a reception of Blackstone. 20I Blackstone, and thus many early Amer-
ican thinkers, were proponents of natural law. They viewed law as composed of principles
founded on practice and reason, principles more or less unchanging over time. The
judge's role, in this view, was to discover those principles and apply them to the case at
bar. Judicial decisions were not the law, but only evidence of the law, whose existence
inhered in the principles thernselves. 2 "2
 Judges discovered the law, mainly by examining
ancient precedent, and such discovery emphatically did not involve weighing the social
interests, or any other interests, propounded by the litigants. There was in fact no
established vocabulary for this approach, literally no way to think in these terms, It is
thus doubtful whether Blackstone, or any other thinker of that period, would concede,
even at the highest level of' abstraction, that judges were involved in the business of
weighing individual or social interests. 203
This way of thinking about the law and legal process sustained American jurispru-
dence for most of the nineteenth century. But new legal theories developed, and with
them new theories about the proper role of judges. It distorts history only a little to say
that Roscoe Pound is responsible for the balancing test. He argued with considerable
success for an instrumental view of law — law whose whole point was to compromise
competing social interests. 2" It follows, on such a view, that the judge's work must involve
the balance of competing social interests, whether the judge knows it or not.
Other thinkers, of course, were involved, from Jhering in Germany to Corbin and
Llewellyn in the United States. 21' 3
 justices Holmes and Cardozo also played a role, as did
judges Frank and Traynor in later years. 2"° Although these judges and scholars shared
no single view of the nature of law, 2" 7
 they shared a strong belief about what the law was
not: it was not the static collection of rules and principles suggested by the natural law
theorists. The law, rather, was a process (the details of which varied by writer), whose
201
 Martin Golding points out that "an examination of [case] reports from 1787 to 1890 shows
Blackstone to be the most cited writer in the various courts of the United States." Golding, Juris-
prudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America — Major Themes and Developments, 36 J.
LEGAL Eouc. 441, 442 (1986).
202
 This is, of course, a terribly rough sketch of Blackstone's thought and natural law. For more
details the reader is directed to Blackstone himself. 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
63-74 (1st ed. 1765-1769).
20' Gf. Hoeffich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST.
95 (1986).
2" See, e.g., Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943); Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 CoLLIM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
200
 R. VON JHERING, DER ZWEcK IM RECirr (1877) (English translation: IHERING, LAw AS A MEANS
'1'0 AN END (Husik trans. 1913)) (influenced Pound in his jurisprudential work). See. Gilmore, The
Storrs Lectures.' The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J. 1022, 1034-35 (1975) (discussing Corbin's role in
the changing intellectual climate of American jurisprudence). See aLso K. Lt.mr.u.vN, CommoN
LAW TRADITION: DEciDING AprEALs (1960).
206 CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); O. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAw (1963); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL
(1949); Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm of Reason, 7 UTAH L. REV. 157 (1960).
These are only sonic famous names. We might rightly update the list by appending to it the
Association of American Law Schools, Directory of Law Teachers (1986). I imagine that very few in that
book would be offended by the claim that the law is rightly viewed in terms of its social functions.
2°7 justice Cardozo, for example, was highly critical of some major tenets of realist thinking.
See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 124-28 (1921).
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ends lay outside the law itself. Rules and principles were the tools — the means, not the
ends."8
Such a view, whether labeled instrumentalist, realistic or sociological, invites a new
way of thinking about the work of judges. If law is a process, then judges are not so
much keepers of the law — or its "depositories," as Blackstone described them")) — but
active participants in the law-making process. Dean Pound's special contribution was
characterizing the legal process as the compromise of competing social interests.") The
judge's role was thus to compromise or balance those interests. This sort of talk, upon
which the balancing test depends, was inconceivable, or at least lay outside the range of
polite jurisprudence, before the turn of the twentieth century.
Why, then, the delay? Once the description of judging in balance-of-interest terms
became acceptable, it would have been perfectly natural to turn that description of
judging into an operational procedure. Yet decades passed before judges began to create
balancing tests in their written opinions. Why did the test not spring up immediately
after its philosophical foundations were laid? The answer is simple. It is one thing to
deliver a lecture or to write a law review article suggesting a new line of thought; it is
quite another for judges, in their daily work, to take it seriously. When these ideas were
first proposed, they were controversial and dangerous — the work of scholars and
theoretically-minded judges. 2 " The natural law tradition died hard, and it took about
forty years for the legal revolution to wind its way from the academy to the bench, just
about the time it took for its proponents to teach enough of their own students (who
later became judges) that the bench is daily concerned with the compromise of social
interests. 212
Once the theoretical foundations were laid in the first half of the century, building
commenced in the second. But few could have expected the boom, the jurisprudential
Levittown, that followed. There were good reasons for reticence, good reasons for a
judge to balk at explicitly balancing interests. For example, even if I agree with Duncan
Kennedy that my major function as a law professor is to indoctrinate my students into
2°8 See generally M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1,860 (1977)
(arguing that instrumentalism was also the order of an earlier day).
2'" I W. 1laCkStO0C, COMMENTARIES *69.
121 " Dean Pound's article, A Su:my of Social Interests, 57 HARV, L. Rev, 1 (1943), is an unofficial
handbook [Or balancing analysis.
2" See 011110re, supra note 205, at 1934,
212 1 borrow rather heavily, and rather obviously, in this explanation from the ideas or Thomas
Kuhn. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 144-59 (2d ed. enlarged 1970),
Professor Kuhn explains scientific revolutions, what he calls "paradigm changes," in part as the
result of shilling professional alliances:
At the start a new candidate for paradigm may have few supporters, and on occasions
the supporters' motives may be suspect. Nevertheless, if they are competent, they will
improve it, explore its possibilities, and show what it would be like to belong to the
community guided by it. And as that goes on, if the paradigm is one destined to win
its fight, the number and strength of the persuasive arguments in its favor will increase.
More scientists will then be converted, and the exploration of the new paradigm will
go on. Gradually the number of experiments, instruments, articles, and books based
upon the paradigm will multiply. Still more men, convinced of the new view's fruit-
fulness, will adopt the new mode of practicing normal science, until at last only a few
elderly hold-outs remain,
Id. at 159. The lesson for us is pretty clear, The social interest view of law over time has captured
the majority of legal thinkers. Only a few fuddy-duddy theorists remain.
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a particular way of thinking about the world, to socialize them in a way that will permit
them to operate efficiently and quietly in a corporate legal practice,2 " and even if I
support that goal, I might still believe that the indoctrination would be less effective if
made explicit, my performance less successful if its purpose were exposed. For tactical
reasons I might choose indirection. Similarly, even a judge who is convinced that her
work "really" involves the compromise of competing social claims might still believe that
in the doing, in deciding cases that conic before her, the better approach is to handle
them on traditional, doctrinal terms. She might fear, for example, that a direct appli-
cation of balancing would expose her to criticism as an "activist" judge, one who seeks
to make law rather than simply to apply it, thereby usurping the legislative prerogative. 214
What seems to have brought balancing out of the closet and into the hard light of
day was the judicial desire for candor, the simple drive to tell the truth about judging,
regardless of cost. The juridical revolution of the early twentieth century upset a lot of
assumptions. One was the notion that rule-based opinions accurately reported how judges
decided cases. Some of the most serious attacks were fueled by the work of psychologists,
who appeared to demonstrate that deep and intransigent psychological forces determine
an individual's actions. There appeared to be no reason to exempt judges from this
observation. 2 " If the opinions of judges did not report these forces, they hid part of the
truth. About the same time, political scientists began to show that a judge's social status,
and, more generally, her social values, shaped her decisions. 216
 If her opinions did not
report these factors, they hid part of the truth. Even sitting judges began to admit that
decisions were sometimes affected by the judge's world view. 217 If the opinion did not
report that influence, it hid part of the truth. The twentieth century had driven a wedge
between making the decision and writing the opinion, and the scholars were content to
drive it deeper. By mid-century, opinions had become something of a jurisprudential
2 ' 3 Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982)
(especially at 602-08).
214
 Balancing interests, as we noted before, has a legislative cast, and its public appearance in a
judicial opinion is often thought inappropriate. Mark Tushnet brings the point out nicely in a
recent article:
A ritual is enacted whenever a nominee for a federal judgeship appears before the
Senate Judiciary Committee as part of the confirmation procesS. One Senator will ask,
"Do you intend to apply the law rather than make it?" • Nominees, sonic or whom
ought to know better, play their part in the ritual by answering "Yes".
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Inierpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv.
L. REv. 781, 781 (1983). They do so, in part, as Professor Tushnet points out, to pay homage to
the notion of' "neutral principles," to the idea that judicial decisions should be grounded on broad
principles rather than on a particular judge's view of a particular case. Id. at 782.
216 See J. FRANK, COURTS ON -FRIAL 157-64 (1963).
216 See Schubert, From Public Law to judicial Behavior, in ,JUDICIAL DEcisioN-MAKING 1-8 (G.
Schubert ed., 1963) (describing the new approaches of political scientists); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
Of THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174-75 (1921) ("The spirit of the age, as it is revealed to each of us, is
too often only the spirit of the group in which the accidents of birth or education or occupation or
fellowship have given us a place. No effort or revolution of the mind will overthrow utterly and at
all times the empire of these subconscious loyalties.").
s17
	 e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE or THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 171 (1921). Justice Cardozo
quoted, as "nearer the truth" regarding the importance of world views in judicial decision making,
the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt: "The decision of the courts on economic and social




laughing-stock: clumsy, ex-post-facto rationalizations of decisions made on quite differ-
ent, and perhaps disreputable, grounds. 219
Reactions varied. The practical response was simply to ignore the phenomenon.
Most lawyers and judges continued to argue cases and write opinions as if none of these
issues had been raised, and rightly or wrongly the studied ignorance continues to this
day. 219 Scholars, however, who had happily relieved themselves from the pressure of
clients and cases, took the new learning more seriously. If opinions were in fact distorted
reports of the decision, what could be clone about the practice of opinion-writing? One
canny group of thinkers tried to salvage the traditional forms of opinion-writing with
the following argument: the opinion's .purpose never had been to report the decisional
process, but rather to justify the decision rendered. Thus, although the opinion may fail
as a report of the decision making process, it succeeds well enough as a justification for
the decision. The act of writing an opinion should be preserved because it serves as a
check on judicial discretion by forcing judges to cast their decisions, however taken, in
logical form. 22° By shifting the function of opinion-writing from report to justification,
its legitimacy can be saved; we simply judge it on different grounds.
Others have been less optimistic. Once it is granted that the opinion is only tangen-
tially related to the decision it reports, the opinion becomes a pretense, and worse than
nothing because it misleads. Better that the judge simply give the decision and fall silent,
rather than speak further and become involved in lies. 221
One can view the balancing test as another attempt to restore the alignment between
the reported opinion and the decision making process. If the rule-based opinion distorts
the real decision process, one must change how the opinion is written. Although one can
never describe with certainty the psychological and sociological imponderables that de-
termine the judicial decision, perhaps it is close enough to the truth to confess that
judges balance the interests of the parties before them. And if they do so openly, on the
face of the opinion, one has restored, at least in part, the reportorial inte grity of opinion-
writing. Justice Holmes, for one, thought this sort of candor a matter of duty: "I think
that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing
considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often
proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply in leave the very
218 See F. COHEN, (r;micALSvs-ruis AND LEGAL IDEALS '237 (1959) C"Realistic jurisprudence' has
sprung in great measure from the recognition that principles enunciated by courts as grounds of
decision often represent nothing more objective than a resolution to use sanctifiei words wherever
specified results are dictated by undisclosed determinants.").
Cf. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HAEv. L. REV. 561, 565 (1983) ("The
modern lawyer may wish to keep his formalism while avoiding objectivist assumptions, Ile may feel
happy to switch from talk about interest group politics in a legislative setting to invocations of
impersonal purpose, policy, and principle in an adjudicative or professional one.").
229 R. WASSERSTRONI, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 12-38 (1961). Whether this is a meaningful
check, that is, whether the requirement of writing a rule-based opinion actually precludes any
decision based on Other grounds is, of course, open to debate. See Lasky, supra note 20, at 834 ("It
is a poor judge indeed who cannot write an opinion persuasive on its face; he need merely stand
mute about principles that lead to an undesired conclusion and invoke a body of law that logically
leads to a different one.").
221 CI Lasky, supra note 20, at 844 (discussing growing trend of opinions that breed "suspicion
that judicial opinions are masks to hide rather than lamps to disclose the operation of the judicial
mind.").
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ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate. "222 Judge Jerome Frank, for another,
saw this candor as a matter of emotional maturity: "Cardozo [who let the cat out of the
bag in The Nature of the Judicial Process], it would seem, has reached adult emotional
stature. Unlike some of the other thinkers we have discussed, he is able to contemplate
without fear a public which shall know what he knows." 225 More and more judges, it
appears, have matured sufficiently to heed the moral call.
I have, of course, dramatized the story of jurisprudential angst. But it is clear from
the cases that many courts use the balancing test in a confessional spirit. One finds in
these opinions a sense of relief that finally the truth of judicial decision making can be
told. 224
 Arid this drive for candor, along with the doctrine of stare decisis,.has spread the
balancing test from area to area with remarkable speed. 225
III. EVALUATING THE TEST
A. The Virtues of Balancing
There are several reasons to suppose that the balancing test represents an advance
in American jurisprudence. We will examine those reasons with some care before ex-
amining the contrary arguments. Although I conclude that the test is pernicious, that
conclusion requires a careful defense in light of the test's virtues. It might be said, with
some justification, that the balancing test is simple, descriptive, and just.
I. The Test is Simple
There is much to be said in praise of parsimony. It is a valuable sentiment to prefer
the simple over the complex, and the sentiment has special virtue in the practice of
judging. A simple opinion is clearer and more accessible to its readers. A simple opinion
may be less prone to error: a court is forced to clear away the clutter of extraneous
detail that might lead it and others astray. Reducing the whole of legal argument to a
222 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HA'. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897).
224 1 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 237 (1930).
224 E.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Regarding dormant commerce
clause cases, the Court observed, "(olccasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing
approach in resolving these issues, but more frequently it has spoken in terms of 'direct' and
'indirect' effects and burdens." Id. (citations omitted).
225
 Professor Aleinikoff tells a similar story in Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 952-63 (1987). We agree that the appearance of interest balancing in judicial opinions
depended upon significant changes in legal philosophy, roughly characterized as the change from
formalistic/natural law premises to instrumental premises, There are, however, two major points of
departure in our analyses.
In part because I date the onslaught of explicit balancing language later than Professor
Aleinikoff (he finds that balancing first appeared in the late 1930s and early 1940s, id. at 948, and
I believe it did nut become a force in judicial decision making until the late 1950s and early 1960s),
1 ant under a special obligation to explain the delay, and in this I believe an institutional explanation
is in order: it takes time for ideas to move from place to place. See supra note 212.
I am also especially concerned with the actual transition from theory to practice: why it was
that judges began to translate legal philosophy into the daily work of opinion-writing. It is important
to note (as Professor Aleinikoff does) the several calls, political and academic, for a pragmatic,
instrumental jurisprudence. But this does not seem to explain enough — a judge might agree that
"all judging is balancing" and still resist writing opinions in balancing form. Here, it seems to me,
the drive for candor forms the crucial link in understanding the transition from theory to practice.
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single variable (in this case, the interests involved) is an attractive masterstroke of syn-
thesis. 226
 It' the balancing test is simpler than traditional legal reasoning, it might for that
reason be preferred.
As we have seen, the balancing test involves only three steps — setting the balance,
discussing the elements to be weighed, and declaring the winner. 227 Traditional legal
reasoning, in contrast, can involve a Byzantine series of interrelated syllogisms. From
this perspective, the balancing lest looks simple. In practice, however, the test does not
simplify those opinions in which it appears, because the balancing test does not replace
the whole legal argument, but rather only one part: the resolution of the dispositive
issue. The rest of the opinion — the court's judgment of what the dispositive issue is,
and the judgment that the issue should be settled by balancing — follows traditional
reasoning. For example, when a court balances to determine whether a particular police
practice is "unreasonable," it has also determined that (1) the defendant's conviction in
the court below can be sustained only if the evidence against him was properly admitted
to trial; (2) the evidence was properly admitted to trial only if' it was the fruit of a
reasonable search and seizure; and (3) whether the search was reasonable is properly
determined by balancing. Each step requires resort to traditional legal reasoning. The
test's ability to simplify decision making and opinion-writing is limited by the extent to
which it replaces traditional legal reasoning, and normally it replaces only a small part.
One may suggest that this still represents at least a small gain in simplicity, but even
the hope of a small gain is questionable. We should compare the complexity of the
balancing test with the complexity of that part of the argument it commonly replaces.
As I noted in Part I, traditional legal reasoning tends to make legal argument turn on
definitional questions — whether a document is a "valid will" or whether a sale of stock
was "fraudulent" — and the judge's task is to determine whether a particular document
or action qualifies as a member of that legally relevant classification. 22" It is not clear that
the work involved in balancing interests is any simpler than the definitional or classifi-
catory work it seeks to replace. To pick up on the example from the last. paragraph, it
is helpful to compare the use of the balancing test to determine whether a particular
police practice is "unreasonable" — balancing the state's interest in its citizens' security
against the individual's right to privacy — with the work of determining reasonableness
in more traditional terms — asking, for example, whether the police had a warrant, and
if not, whether any recognized exception to the warrant requirement was available. It
should be clear that the rule/exception analysis need be no more complex than the work
of balancing. Indeed, some balances can-become quite complicated because they require
the court to consider a long list of factors, as in forum non conveniens cases. The test's
claim for simplicity can be sustained in only limited circumstances: when the balancing
test constitutes the entire legal argument (or most of it), and when the test itself requires
the balance of only a few interests.
In addition, the simple structure of the balancing test hides some very real difficulties
in its application. This is especially apparent when the elements to be balanced are
interests. Interest balancing requires that the judge decide which interests to balance,
and the judge has several options. A first choice turns on the generality of the interests
to be weighed. A judge might be concerned, for example, about the particular interests
226 See Luizzi, .copra note 2, at 376.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 27-57.
22" See supra text accompanying note 25.
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of the parties before the court. Will the plaintiff or the defendant be hurt most by the
decision? Is one party more sympathetic than the other? 229 In contrast, the judge might
generalize the interests of the parties, and thus weigh the social interests the parties are
deemed to represent. A judge in a negotiable instruments case, for example, might
worry about whether the interests of storekeepers outweigh the interests of bankers,
rather than whether this storekeeper's interests outweigh this banker's. At a higher level
of abstraction, the judge may be concerned with systemic or societal interests, asking,
for example, whether all citizens' interests in the free flow of commerce outweigh the
need for security in the banking system. 23° It is at this level of abstraction that a court
can weigh the state's interests in the health and safety of its citizens against their collective
interest in personal privacy, or weigh the state's interest in having its questions answered
against the collective interest in freedom of speech and the right of association.
Once the appropriate level of generality is settled, the court must choose which
interests at that level should be recognized and valued, and which should not. 231 In
isolating these interests, it is still maddeningly easy to mistake levels of generality — to
weigh, for example, a litigant's personal interests in the outcome of the case against
broader social interests — with predictable results in favor of the broader social inter-
es is.232 Once a court has determined all the "right" interests, the problem of weighing
them against each other presents its own set of theoretical and practical difficulties. 293
Yale Kamisar has summarized sonic of these concerns regarding the use of balancing in
certain fourth amendment cases:
If one is supposed to "balance" the "competing interests" before deciding
whether to apply the exclusionary rule, how does one do so without mea-
suring imponderables or comparing incommensurables? How does one bal-
ance "privacy" (or "individual liberty" or "personal dignity," or call it what
you will) against the interest in suppressing crime (or "law and order" or the
"general welfare," or call it what you will)?
How does one "balance" the interests in furthering an important gov-
ernmental objective "against a constitutional statement that the government
may not employ a certain means for the attainment of any of its objectives"?
Inasmuch as "privacy" (or "individual liberty") and "efficiency" in the
suppression of crime are different kinds of interests, how can they be compared
22" Although considerations of this sort might he thought inappropriate to the judicial office,
the consideration of relative harm to the interests of the actual litigants themselves constitutes the
accepted mode of analysis in settling many legal questions, such as whether a temporary restraining
order should issue. See FED, R. Civ. P. 65(b).
23"See generally Pound, supra note 210.
231 Aleinikolf, supra note 12, at 977-79; Luizzi, supra note 2, at 391-92; Henkin, supra note 12,
at 1048; Benditt, Law and the Balancing of Interesis,3 Soc. THEORY & Plow. 331-34 (1975); Llewellyn,
A Realistic Jurisprudence — The Next Step, 30 CoLuss. L. REv. 431 (1930).
232
 It is this sort of mistake that might be attributed to the Supreme Court in Barenblatt, 360
U.S. 109 (Court arguably weighed interest in Congressional investigations against defendant's
personal interest in not responding to questions). Cf. Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alter-
natives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAit L. REv. 309,391-44 (in free exercise clause litigation,
"(tjhe level of generality at which interests are defined often determines the outcome").
493 See Aleinikoll, supra note 12, at 972-76; Luizzi, supra note 2, at 391; Benditt, supra note
231, at 334-39; Patterson, Pound's Theory of Social Interests, in MERPRETATtoris or MODERN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHIES 558,570 (P. Sayre cd. 1947).
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quantitatively unless the judge has "some standard independent of both to
which they can he referred"? 251
Both proponents and opponents of balancing have worried about these problems.
Whether they render the test unworkable, or less desirable than rule-based reasoning
(which has its own set of theoretical and practical difficulties), it is clear that these
problems keep the application of balancing tests from being a simple procedure.
Does the balancing test, then, have no claim to increased simplicity? It does in at
least one respect. If one believes that courts really balance interests when they decide
cases, regardless of whether their opinions acknowledge the fact, the balancing test is
simple in its directness: a court which Uses the test reports directly what it has done
rather than engage in the complication, and perhaps duplicity, of "translating" its real
decisional grounds — interest balancing — into other grounds — the rule-based syllog-
ism. This argument assumes that. the balancing test is a inure accurate description of
judging than the description suggested by the rule-based syllogism. It is to this assump-
tion that we turn next.
2. The Test is Descriptive
In Part II of this Article I argued that the desire for candor, along with stare decisis,
do much to explain why judges have adopted the test with such enthusiasm. Candor,
however, is a good reason to adopt the balancing test only if (1) balancing is a good
description of judging; and (2) candor is appropriate. We will examine these subsidiary
claims in order.
a. Is Balancing a Good Description of judging?
i. The Nature of the Inquiry
Do judges really balance interests when they decide cases? There is some evidence
that they do: judges themselves have admitted it both in extrajudicial writings and in
the balancing test cases themselves. 235 But this is not enough. This evidence shows (at
most) that judges balance interests in some cases (and perhaps that some judges balance
more often than others), but not that the practice is universal. The creation of the
balancing test requires the stronger claim that judges always balance interests, whether
they say it or not, and whether they know it or not. It is this stronger claim that justifies
a court in recharacterizing a line of decisions as one that "really" involves balancing,
even though the prior courts did not cast their decisions in those terms. If balancing
were "really" only sporadic, the balancing test introduce.s: a new method of reasoning
rather than exposing the method actually used all along. This would be harmful to the
2 :14 Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an
"Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREAcarroN L. Rev. 565, 646 (1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
235 See e.g., 13. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 120 (1921). Justice Cardozo
stated: "I will not hesitate in the silence or inadequacy of formal sources, to indicate as the general
line of direction for the judge the following: that he ought to shape his judgment of the law in
obedience to the same aims which could be those of a legislator who was proposing to himself to
regulate the question," by which Cardrizo seems to mean weighing social interests.
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test, because it takes a great deal of its force from its supposed congruence with the
reality of judging. 2S 6
Obviously, the claim that balancing is a universal practice cannot be grounded in
the case reports. if so, we would be forced to conclude that judges balance interests only
when they report it in balancing test cases, and not otherwise. Nor can we ground the
claim on judges' off-the-bench remarks. Judges have responded in all sorts of ways to
the question of what it is they do when they judge. Some claim they are balancing, 2"
while others claim they are hunching 255 or applying the rigors of logic, 2" and most think
they are doing some things at one time and other things at another. 24° Furthermore,
one need not believe any of it: all "first-hand" reports of balancing might be wrong.
Judges have no monopoly on speculating about the nature of judging. Legal philoso-
phers, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists all have addressed the question
and given answers of dazzling variety,24 ' many of them distinctly at odds with judges'
accounts of judging. In short, judges who report that they are balancing may actually
be doing something quite different, and simply misunderstand the nature of their
work.242 If this seems unlikely, it is no more unlikely than the claim that sustains the
balancing test: that balancing in fact goes on all the time and judges mistakenly believe
they are doing something else, like applying syllogistic reasoning.
There is obviously something odd about the claim that 'judges really balance inter-
ests." It looks like a statement of empirical fact, on the same order as the claim that
judges eat pastrami sandwiches. But clearly it is not. If it were, we could settle the matter
with a straightforward examination of how judges decide cases, or with a survey of how
judges report that they decide cases. But proponents of balancing need not be dissuaded
by the relatively small number of cases in which the process is actually reported, and
critics of balancing need not be convinced that balancing occurs even in those cases that
report it. Although the claim that "judges really balance interests" takes the form of a
statement whose truth can be determined by empirical investigation, it is no such claim
at all. Rather, the claim that "judges really balance interests" is philosophical, and must
be defended or attacked by philosophical argument.
Labeling the claim "philosophical," or better yet, "conceptual," obviously changes
our way of thinking about it. It is important at the outset, however, to see what this label
"a We might decide to use the test, of course, even if it were exposed as an innovation in
judging rather than simply the product of judicial self-awareness. In that case, however, we would
need other grounds to justify the innovation. Some of these grounds are suggested and discussed
infra in the text accompanying notes 270-74.
2]7 E.g., B. CARoozo, THE NA'T'URE	 "IllE JUDICIAL PnocEss 162 (1921); Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 Hanv, L. REV. 457,467 (1897).
"8 E.g., Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14
L.Q. 274 (1929).
2• 111..CAnuozo, supra note 237. at 31-38 (1921).
' 4,1 Id. at 30-31.
24 I See generally C. SHELDON, Tits: AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS: MODELS AND APPROACHES (1974)
(surveying some recent social scientific approaches to the understanding of judging).
'142 See F. COHEN, ETHICAL. SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 238 (1959) ("A profound scepticism
towards the adequacy of judicial introspection demands a reformulation of principles of judicial
conduct, and in this work of refortuvlation a systematic analysis of the economic and social back-
ground, the moral presuppositions, and the psychological habits of thought of judges and other
legal officials must play a governing role.").
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does trot entail. To call the claim "conceptual" is not to belittle it. On the contrary, the
notion that judges balance interests has had an important influence in American juris-
prudence, and, as this Article has attempted to establish, a decisive influence in the way
judges actually handle a great many legal cases." 3 Furthermore, to call the claim "con-
ceptual" is not to assert that it is beyond proof, that we can never "know" whether judges
balance interests; concepts and conceptual argument can be right or wrong, and settled
opinion may exist in conceptual argument as it does in any other field of inquiry. Finally,
to call the claim "conceptual" does not mean that we eschew "the real world" in deter-
mining whether the claim is true or false. The truth of a conceptual claim depends, at
least in part, on how that claim squares with observable facts about the world. In our
case, for example, it would make a difference whether judges bitterly deny that they
balance interests or unanimously agree to the proposition.
Whether judges "actually balance interests" depends on other related concepts: our
belief's about the general nature of judging, and even more broadly, the general nature
of law. To put it bluntly, our willingness to believe that judges balance interests depends
on our believing that the law is a process aimed at compromising competing social
interests. If so, the statement that judges balance interests follows naturally. If not, the
claim begins to look a little odd. It is very difficult, for example, to get from natural law
postulates to a description of judging that involves the individual balance of social
interests.
In general, therefore, our willingness to accept certain postulates about the true
nature of law affects our willingness to accept a balancing account of judging. The
former entails, or at least tends to prove, the latter. 244 The claim that 'judges really
balance interests" forms a part of a broader system of legal thought; it both supports
and is supported by other concepts regarding the nature of law. In this, the claim that
'judges really balance interests" is like a statement from a catechism, a catechism asso-
ciated with a particular sect of jurisprudence.
I do not propose to settle the question of which general views of law are right and
which are wrong. I do not propose to resolve issues that have occupied philosophers for
at least two thousand years, and which continue to split scholars into competing camps
in the twentieth century. Some views are congenial to balancing, and others are equally
uncongenial. For every Pound 215 there is a Fuller; 245 for every Stone."2 there is a Black. 2 '' 8
And if we do not settle the broader issues once and for all, at least we can understand
their relation to the more specific claim of balancing. When a court, in creating a
balancing test, claims that prior courts have actually balanced interests even though they
do not report having done so, we must understand the claim as involving a statement.
of faith, the taking of a jurisprudential position.
23 Ser supra Part II.
211 Sometimes, however, the relation is reversed. That is, one may believe that law concerns the
compromise of' competing social interests based on one's belief, otherwise established, that judges
balance interests when they decide cases. The order in which the beliefs are accepted is unimportant.
What is important is the relation hetween the ideas.
213 Ser Pound, supra note 210,
2111
	 frut.talt, THE MORALITY or LAW (1964).
2.17 Sre,	 Southern Pac. R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
248 See, e,g., Communist. Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137-69 (1961)
(Black, J„ dissenting).
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ii. The Balance as Metaphor
I have suggested that the claim that judges always balance interests turns on broader
jurisprudential issues, and that those broader issues cannot be settled here. This does
not mean, however, that we are left with no grounds at all upon which to judge the
claim's validity. The validity of the balancing claim depends only in part on broader
jurisprudential issues. It also depends on the extent to which we can square the picture
of balancing with what we do know goes on in deciding cases. In other words, we can
ask whether balancing is a good description of judging without having to settle the
broader issues.
The picture of balancing does not describe judging as accurately as it first appears.
The language of balancing takes many of its cues from the balancing scale, and although
it may be natural to suppose that this venerable symbol of justice can be an effective
metaphor for judging, our natural supposition is wrong. It is not clear that judges do
anything so simple as to set one group of concerns against another, and if they do, it is
not clear that they balance those concerns.
First, the balancing account of judging is too simple. Sitting judges have provided
us with accounts of what they do when they judge. 249 None of them report a process so
simple as setting one group of concerns against another. Indeed, most judges speak of
a process so complex that it remains even for them something of a mystery; even Cardozo
was bafIled. 25" Out of the inquiries of philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, psy-
chologists, and even physiologists, a new learning has emerged about judging that ranges
from traditional jurisprudence to the physiology of the brain. In light of these devel-
opments, it is surely a mistake to believe that judging is so crude a process as placing
one set of factors on one side of a balance and a competing set of factors on the other.
Even if one is skeptical of the new learning, its very existence suggests a richness in the
judging process that the simple picture of balancing fails utterly to capture.
One might reply that this objection to balancing misses the point. Balancing is a
metaphor for judging, and like all metaphors, it has limits: it is meant to suggest a fruitful
way of thinking about judging, not to establish a comprehensive description of judging
that takes into account the variegated learning of sociology, psychology, and political
science. The relevant choice is not between the metaphor of balancing and a full-blown
account of judging, but rather between the picture of judging suggested by the balancing
metaphor and the picture of judging suggested by traditional legal reasoning. As between
these two pictures, the argument goes, balancing is superior.
The reply has a good deal of force, but it also undermines most of the balancing
test's claim to descriptive accuracy. It concedes that balancing may be a poor description
of judging; it just maintains that this description is better than another. But why should
we settle for yet another inadequate account of judging, and, even if we accept it, why
should we transform it into a method of deciding cases?
It turns out that balancing is not just a bad description of judging. It is abysmal,
and we may rightly wonder whether it could be better than anything else. One way to
evaluate the aptness of any metaphor is to check for correspondences between the
metaphorical subject — here, judging — and the metaphorical predicate — here, bal-
245 See Supra notes 237-40.
250 B. CARUOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166-67 (1921).
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ancing. The more numerous or profound the correspondences, the better the metaphor.
Judged on these terms, balancing is a very bad metaphor for judging.
We first examine the metaphorical predicate. There are many sorts of scales, but
the one here relevant is the scale constructed with beam arms of equal length, with
balance pans suspended from each end of the beam. 2" Though a bit outdated as a
method of measurement, the balance scale is used primarily to determine the weight of
an object (not, by the way, to determine which of two objects or groups of objects is
heavier). The item to be weighed is placed on one of the balance pans and a series of
known weights is placed on the other. By trial and error the known weights are added
and removed until the beam comes to rest in the horizontal, a determination often aided
by a pointer. The weight of the object in question is then ascertained by adding together
the values of the known weights in the opposite pan. 252 All of this is obvious, but it is
useful to remind ourselves at the outset that the work of weighing an object on such a
balance is quite different from the court's work when it hears the arguments of the
litigants before it, reads the briefs, decides the outcome of the case and writes an
opinion
How does this correspond with our metaphorical subject? Of course the use of a
balance and the process of judging arc similar in many ways. Using the balance and
deciding a case both involve juxtaposing competing elements: the two objects on the
scale and the two litigants in the courtroom. The balance also captures the dichotomous
nature of legal judgment. As Professor Daube has pointed out, "[the] symbolism of the
scales expresses a deep-rooted tendency to see no shades between black and white, to
admit no degrees of right and wrong, to allow no distribution of loss and gain among
several litigants, to send a party away either victorious or deleated." 251 In addition, the
equal length of the beams of the balance and its rest position in the horizontal suggest
equal treatment. They suggest that determining which object is heavier, or which litigant
has made the better case, will depend solely on the attributes of the objects or the litigants
themselves.
There the Similarities end. At the most simplistic level, there are no judging ana-
logues to the balance pans, the pointer, the razor edge, and the balance beam — nothing
in the work of judging, or in the minds of judges, that corresponds with the physical
features of the balance scale. This is not a trivial point. If we are to select a metaphor
for the judging process, and especially if we intend to transform that metaphor into an
operative rule of law, we should be careful about what we choose. 255
731 A lengthy but valuable treatment or the scales appears in B. Kisco, Scatixs Am) WERArrs
26-78 (1965). Some of its history can be found in F. SKINNER, WEactrrs AND MEASURES (1967).
732 See Kiscit, supra note 251, at 26.
7" Seel WHITE, THE LEGAL. IMAGINATION 57-64 (1973).
731 Daube, The Scales of 'Justice, 63 ,JURID. REV. 109,109 (1951).
" 5 We might have chosen better. Let me suggest, in this regard, an alternative to the balancing
test. It is called the "Soup Test." To apply the test, a court proceeds as follows. Each factor that the
court considers in resolving the case is an "ingredient." Ingredients that point to judgment for the
plaintiff are sweet. Ingredients that point to judgment for the defendant are bitter. The court them
places all of the ingredients in the case, one by one, into a pot of boiling water. The pot is then
simmered for three hours and the soup tasted: if it is sweet, judgment will be for the plaintiff; if
it is bitter, judgment will be for the defendant.
The Soup Test is a better description . of judging than the balancing test. In cooking soup the
ingredients are mixed. This is a good rcllection of judging, where the elements that go into a
decision react with each other in coniplex ways. The balancing test, on the other hand, arbitrarily
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There are more serious failures of correspondence between judging and balancing.
The balancing scales operate mechanically; judging does not. The operator of the balance
is relegated to the largely administrative tasks of placing the objects on the pans and
noting the position of the beam; she has no say in the outcome of the balance. Once the
beam has come to rest, very little room exists for rational disagreement over the cor-
rectness of the results. 256 The metaphor of the balancing scale thus suggests that the
judge's duties are essentially administrative; she has no real say in the outcome of the
case; the law is as it is, the facts are as they are, and judgment is given accordingly —
mechanically and automatically. Once the judgment is rendered, there is little ground
for rational disagreement about the outcome.
Although we may debate whether this forms a suitable ideal for judging, it fails
miserably as an accurate description of judging. There is first no mechanical inevitability
to the outcome of a case. Quite to the contrary, the decision is contingent. The decision
is, in the relevant sense, solely within the discretion of the judge: as she decides the case,
so it is decided. The judge is not at all like the balance operator. And once the case is
decided, there is room for rational disagreement about whether the outcome was correct.
The metaphor of the balance seriously misrepresents the nature of judging.
There is a general way to account for these differences between balancing and
judging. What gives the balance scales its mechanical magic, what makes its operation
automatic and its results immune from rational disagreement, is gravity. The results of
the physical balance are deemed to be reliable (i.e., beyond rational dispute) only because
we believe gravity to be constant, unchanging from place to place and from time to time.
Without that belief' we have no assurance that the balance will be true. Indeed, we are
hard-pressed even to understand the scales' operation without some underlying concep-
tions about the nature of gravity and how it works. In judging there is no gravity, no
constant force that acts on the "mass" of the litigants' arguments to determine which is
more weighty or more deserving of victory, no force that we believe is changeless from
place to place and from time to time. Consequently, judicial decisions are contingent,
they can "go either way," and rational disagreement is possible about the correctness of
any decision.
The problem is serious. The concept of gravity is crucial to the concept of balancing.
Without it, we cannot make sense of the physical balance: we cannot understand why it
works or why it is reliable. Unless an analogue to gravity can be found in the practice
of judging, we cannot make sense of the claim that judges "balance" anything at all.
We might attempt to save the metaphor by constructing a judicial analogue to gravity.
We call it the judge's "world view," her ordering of values both social and legal, her
segregates pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant elements, and does nut account for the fact that these
elements may have a bearing on one another. Second, in cooking soup, the ingredients are allowed
to simmer. This represents the time the court "mulls over" the case. The balancing test, if it really
does work like a balance, works too quickly: the items are placed on the scales and the answer is
known immediately. Real judgments rarely come so fast; in fact, judges sometimes speak of "stewing"
over their decisions. As for physical correspondences, 1 suggest that a bubbling caldron of soup is
closer to the picture we have of the brain than the picture represented by the scales.
256 It is of course possible to question the integrity of the mechanism, but this sort of complaint
can be settled by reference to standard procedures for assuring that the balance is true. (If it could
not, then the whole procedure of weighing objects on a balancing scale becomes nonsense.) There
may also be close cases in which it is hard to determine which way the beam is tilting. But the
existence of close cases does not undercut the general observation that the results are unassailable.
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beliefs about what is important and what is not. This is the force, we might say, that
"acts upon" the arguments and interests in the case at hand and gives them different
weights. This is the force that determines which arguments or interests are the weightier
and determines the outcome of the case. But even this is not quite right. Unlike gravity,
a judge's world view is personal; it can change from time to time and certainly from
judge to judge." 7
Although the scales are an ancient symbol for justice, using the scales is not at all
like the practice of judging. The metaphor is not apt; it misleads us in important ways
about the nature of the judicial process: If we were to evaluate the symbol of the scales
by its usefulness as a metaphor for the judicial process, we would be forced to contiude
that justicia's carriage of the scales is an unfortunate accident of history. 25 A
This obviously weakens the claim that judges really balance interests when they
decide cases. It is not clear that they "balance" anything at al1. 259 It appears that we can
salvage this way of speaking about judging only if we refuse to take the metaphor
seriously, only if we retreat to the position that the word "balance" serves merely as a
synonym for "consider" or "take into account." When we say that judges "really balance
interests," we mean only that judges consider or take into account the various Interests
of the parties and make their judgments accordingly.
Even this claim is problematic. It still implies universal practice. Indeed it must, or
else a judge is not justified, at least for reasons of candor, in recharacterizing an old line
of cases as one that "really" involves the consideration of competing social interests.
It is true that judges sometimes consider the social interest claims of the parties before
them, 2 ' 0 but it is also true that they report considering other matters as well. Without
putting too fine a point on it, many judges report that they consider the strength of the
parties' legal arguments: whether the litigants have stated rules which the cases or the
statute books support, and whether they have applied those rules in a logical way.2'n If
we take these reports at face value, judges clearly do more than consider social interest
claims, and the proposition that they actually do nothing but balance substantially distorts
the work of judging.
A proponent of balancing might handle this contrary evidence in one of two ways.
First, he or she may claim that judges are simply deluded when they report anything
other than the consideration of social interests. There is some precedent for this attitude.
Some commentators, especially from the social sciences, seem to take the position that
judges in fact know almost nothing about what they are doing when they judge, and
257 The soup-making metaphor, on the other hand, avoids these disturbing failures of corre-
spondence. Just as the judge in a law case plays an active role in the final judgment, so the cook
plays an active role in the final ,judgment of' whether the soup is sweet or bitter. just as a legal
judgment is subject to rational disagreement about whether it is right, a cook's determination on
the taste of the soup is subject to rational disagreement. The general superiority oftilt! soup cooking
metaphor, of course, lies in this: we recognize that "tastes" vary; they are personal to the cook and
can vary from time to time 5111(1 From cook to cook. "Taste," in this sense, is much more like the
judge's world view, which also can vary from time to time and from judge to judge. Gravity, upon
which the balancing metaphor relies, does not vary, and so leads us to the wrong conclusions about
the nature of judging.
258 We might have been better advised (and certainly better served) to have imagined her with
a spoon in one hand a kettle of soup in the other.
252 It is much more likely, in fact, that they're cooking soup.
26.°See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TIIE JUDICIAL. PROCESS (1921).
261 That is what occurs in almost every reported opinion.
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that their introspective reports should be handled with something like paternal conde-
scension. 262
 No serious proponent of balancing, however, seems to have taken this ap-
proach. Proponents more commonly claim that the consideration of interests does go
on, but at a highly abstract level: in essence, judges balance these interests, no matter
what form of mechanical reasoning they employ. The claim is thus derived from prop-
ositions about the general nature of law: because the law itself involves the compromise
of competing social interests, the judge (who applies the law) must be involved in that
same process of compromise. 263
We now take stock of the original claim that -judges really balance interests." The
claim is true, or at least defensible, only if we confine its meaning to the proposition that
at some abstract level of analysis, judges consider social interests in making their deci-
sions. Step by step we have had to weaken the claim because very little empirical evidence
exists to support it. Although there are some similarities between judging and balanc-
ing,264
 the metaphor simply does not square very well with what we do know, and what
judges report, about the process of judicial decision making. 265
So weakened, the claim that -judges really balance interests" does not justify the
creation of balancing tests. To see why, we recall that candor drives this part of the
argument: judges, the proponent of balancing asserts, are really balancing social interests
when they decide cases, and candor requires that they report openly what they are doing.
The argument has a great deal of force if judges in fact consciously balance interests and
report something else. That would be duplicitous. But if judges "balance interests" only
in an abstract sense, by virtue of their general role in the scheme of lawmaking, there is
no duplicity when they report the consideration of traditional legal arguments. Duplicity
can exist only when there are inconsistent explanations for an actor's behavior: that which
the actor reports, on the one hand, and that which the Critic claims is the true explanation,
on the other; candor may then be urged to support the report of the true explanation.
But here, the balancing claim is so abstract that it is no longer inconsistent with the
description of judging provided by the judges themselves. It can be true both that judges
balance interests (in the abstract sense) and that they consider the strength of the parties'
legal arguments (in an operational sense). If both can be true; then candor furnishes no
reason to support one explanation over the other. In short, there is nothing for candor
to correct.
b. Is Candor Appropriate?
Even if there were something to be "candid" about, candor may not be appropriate.
Suppose that a proponent of balancing could show that judges sometimes balance inter-
ests in the stronger, operational sense of the phrase. That is, suppose the balancing
proponent could show that judges sometimes consciously consider the social interest
262 See C. SHELDON, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS: MODELS AND APPROACHES (1974); F.
COVEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 238 (1959).
263 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897).
264 See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
265
 This means that support for the claim does in fact lie almost wholly in the philosophy of
law. Its truth will depend on the truth of related philosophical concepts about the nature ()nudging
and the nature of law. This observation does not necessarily discredit the claim that "judges balance
interests — it may he a true statement in the philosophy of law — but it does destroy the claim's
usefulness as a reason for creating a balancing test. See the following text.
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claims of the parties, but fail to report it. These are at least the sorts of cases in which
candor could be urged as a reason for different reporting. But candor is not necessarily
a good reason. On the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that judges should not
"tell the truth" in writing opinions.
Judges may write their opinions for many audiences: the parties themselves, their
lawyers, the bar, law students, and sometimes even for the readers of the New York
Times. 200 The opinion performs many functions: to settle the issues between the parties
at hand, to justify the decision to the parties and to the other members of the audience,
and to provide sonic guidance to others in the future. 207 It is not clear that any of these
functions is well served by a report of what actually went on in the judge's mind.
Imagine an opinion in which the judge strives to report exactly what went on in her
mind as she made her decision. An excerpt from a contracts case might look something
like this:
First I thought about the plaintiff's arguments. They seemed pretty good to
me, especially the one about the failure of consideration. Boy, he's got the
defendant there. And did you see the defendant's haircut? He looked like
Moe from The Three Stooges. Anyway, it's been a long time since this court
has struck down a contract for failure of consideration. I've seen George do
it a couple times, but he's a neanderthal, for heaven's sake, so I' ►
 a little
reticent. On the other hand, I'm not a big fan of promissory estoppel. It's
such a spongy doctrine and I'm no fan of Skelly Wright either. But 1 would
like to get to Washington this year. Are there any conferences coining up?
I've got to remember to ask my secretary when he gets back from lunch....
Historians might. occasionally find such an opinion of value, but most lawyers, even those
who represent the litigants, would lose patience.
What is so odd about an opinion filled with accurate reportage? The answer is fairly
clear: opinions are not read, literally, for a report of the decision, but rather for a
demonstration of reasons for the decision. 2" We thus return to those scholars who have
argued that a written opinion's function is to justify the decision, not literally to report
the judge's mental processes while making the decision. 269
 Exactly what was going on in
the judge's mind is generally unimportant.
This point undercuts the usefulness of arguing that balancing actually goes on when
judges decide cases. Even if it does, that is no reason (necessarily) for judges to use a
balancing test. Candor is a virtue, but candor alone, in the sense of describing more
accurately the actual thinking behind the decision, does not serve as a suitable basis for
determining whether one method of opinion-writing is better than another. Reportorial
accuracy is not the right criterion.
It might be helpful to summarize thi e points in this section. Many courts appear to
have adopted the balancing test because of its claim to descriptive accuracy; that is, the
courts have been persuaded (i) that judges "really" balance interests when they decide
cases, and (ii) that candor requires that they report the procedures when they write their
266 See Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REv, 810, 813-14
(1961).
267 1d. at 810-12.
2" A candid opinion, of the kind just parodied, may provide reasons, but only haphazardly as
they come to the mind of the decision maker. 11 may provide no reasons at all.
•	 269 See K. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DEcisioN 12-38 (1961).
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opinions. But both claims are highly problematic. The "descriptive" claim — that judges
really balance interests — is primarily philosophical, and consequently its truth depends
on our related beliefs regarding the true nature of law. If one does not adhere to.the
"right" jurisprudential view (i.e., that the law itself is the compromise of competing social
interests), the claim that 'judges really balance interests" is hard to sustain. Furthermore,
even if One adheres to the "right" jurisprudential view, one is forced to acknowledge the
striking inconsistencies between the concept of balancing and the work of the judge.
Judicial decision making is much more complicated, and its results far less mechanical,
than the metaphor of the balance suggests. It is not clear that judges "balance" anything
at all.
The "descriptive" claim can be salvaged only by returning to philosophy — by
asserting that judges necessarily consider competing social interests because they make
law, and the law itself is concerned with that project. This, however, destroys the claim
as a reason for changing the way opinions are written. If "balancing" is thought to occur
only at an abstract level, by virtue of the judge's role in the law-making process, it can
be true both that judges balance social interests and that they consider traditional legal
arguments. Thus, when a court reports only the latter, it has engaged in no duplicity,
and there is nothing for candor to correct.
Finally, we turned to the "prescriptive" claim — that candor is the appropriate
criterion in deciding how one should write an opinion. This, too, is problematic. Judicial
opinions filled with precise accounts of what the court was thinking as it reached its
decision are of little value to us. Opinions are meant to justify, not literally to report,
the decision rendered. If candor is not the right criterion, then even if we knew that
our judges were balancing (in the strong, operational sense of the word), we would not
necessarily demand that their opinions be cast in those terms.
The problems I have addressed in this section arise in the course of slipping too
easily from an essentially jurisprudential proposition — that judges balance interests —
to an operational one — that they should cast their opinions in the form of a balancing
test. It is what I characterized in Part II as shifting between statements about a process
to statements in a .process, the shift from metalogic to logic, from metalanguage to
language. The move is fraught with peril, In making such a move, the proponent of
balancing is like the person who garners our assent (no doubt rightly) to the abstract
proposition that "all men are brothers," but then suggests the operational or prescriptive
proposition that intestate succession laws be modified so as to distribute a decedent's
property to all inhabitants of the earth, per stirpes. The second proposition cannot
folloW from the first, because the claims are of a different logical order. They belong to
different parts of discourse; they are from different language games. Nevertheless, it.
still might be a good idea to change our laws of intestate distribution, even if that reform
does not follow logically from the proposition that all human beings are related spiri-
tually. Likewise, the balancing test may be a good idea, even if its creation does not
follow from the philosophical proposition that all judges balance.
3. The Test is Just
The balancing test gives judges the ability to consider all of the factors potentially
relevant to a decision. The test's simple structure permits a freedom in adding or
subtracting factors on each side of the balance as the cases demand. Although a balancing
test can also become wooden — a single formulation of the test repeated so often that
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the doctrine of precedent begins to preclude the addition or subtraction of new elements
— the test's very structure makes it more supple than traditional legal reasoning. As
Professor Louis Henkin has noted, II*lancing is highly appealing .... It refines the
process of judicial review. It softens the rigors of absolutes, makes room for judgment
and for sensitivity to differences of degree .... The flexibility it provides may have been
an important ingredient in making judicial review work and rendering it acceptable." 2"
One can demonstrate the suppleness of balancing by considering a judge's options
when faced with a hard case, a case in which the particular facts lead the judge to believe
, that a just decision requires a .departure from precedent fairly construed. 271 In a field
dominated by the balancing test, it is fairly simple to add more elements to the balance
to account for the peculiar facts of the case at hand. Balancing tests often combine quite
disparate factors in one formula, and the range of permissible elements is limited only
by the informal logic of what could reasonably be considered as relevant. Once the new
element or elements are added, the balance may legitimately be struck differently from
prior balancing cases.
Even if a particular version of the balancing test has been repeated so often alai
stare decisis precludes the addition of entirely new elements, the test still provides flexibility
because each application is limited to the facts of the case. 272 It is enough, for purposes
of the test, to list the salient facts and interests on each side of the balance and to declare
a winner; no single fact or interest need be isolated as decisive. Consequently, any factual
difference between the old cases and the new one can, in theory, become a legitimate
ground for striking the balance differently and lead legitimately to a different legal
result.
The peculiar case with which judges can distinguish away past balancing test cases,
along with their ability to add new categories of interests when the need arises, makes it
especially easy for balancing judges to handle the unusual case. 2" A court's options in a
field dominated by doctrine and constrained by traditional legal reasoning, however, are
less attractive. Faced with a situation that appears to require a departure from older
rules, the court might attempt to create an exception, but this may not be easy. First,
there is a presumption against the creation of exceptions: a rule too easily excepted is
no rule at all. Second, the facts of the case may be peculiar enough that the exception
the court recognizes patently covers only the case at hand. The court will then be
criticized for deciding the case in an unprincipled manner. The court's other options, if
it is to decide the case as it thinks right, are either disingenuous — by distinguishing
away past cases on very narrow grounds — or dishonest — by concealing the real basis
2/c Henkin, .supra !tote 12, at 1047; see also M. NIMMKR, NIMMKR ON FREKUOM OF SPEKGH § 2.03
(1984) (conceding that ad hoc balancing may allow for greater justice in individual cases).
271 To avoid possible confusion, I should point out here that my use of the phrase "hard case"
differs from what Ronald Dworkin has called "hard cases." See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 81-1'30 (1977). Dworkin means cases in which "a particular lawsuit cannot be brought
under a clear rule of law." Id. at 81. I mean cases where there is a clear rule of law, but where the
judge wishes to find ways to avoid it.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
2" This feature of .
 balancing test analysis is not an unencumbered virtue, It means that balancing
test cases have almost no precedential value. This means, in turn, that in areas dominated by the
test citizens (and their lawyers) have fewer grounds upon which to plan future behavior. This
negative aspect of the balancing test will be explored in inure detail shortly. See infra text accom-
panying notes 316-23.
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for the decision. In either event, critics will be quick to.pounce. Now hemmed in on all
sides, the court may very well decide the case as precedent "reasonably" dictates, and
against its own judgment.274
Doctrinal reasoning has its costs. Principled exceptions cannot always be found in
the cases that call for them. Some litigants are treated badly, and it is disingenuous to
claim otherwise, This, one might believe, represents a loss in justice. A balancing test, in
contrast, will seldom become so wooden in its application that it cannot legitimately take
into account the special circumstances of the case at hand. Whether this is reason enough
to adopt the test will depend on the test's disadvantages.
B. The Vices of Balancing
The balancing test has not escaped the critical attentions of scholars and judges. As
the test has moved into area after area of the law, commentators have addressed them-
selves variously to its alleged defects. Certain lines of attack tend to be repeated, and
this repetition suggests the existence of general problems with the test, problems that
cut across the subject matter areas to which the test has been introduced.
Some of the problems we have already discussed. In the course of evaluating the
test's claim to simplicity, we reviewed several practical problems in its use: the difficulties
of finding the right interests, finding all of them, and balancing quite different types of
interests. 275
 In discussing the test's claim to descriptive accuracy, we reviewed several
problems associated with turning a description of judging into a method of deciding
cases. I hope I have generated grave doubts about whether judges in fact balance, and
even if they do, whether that is a good reason to adopt the balancing test. 276 The next
set of problems concerns the relationship between balancing methodology and other
principles of our legal society — our fundamental liberties, our division of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches, and our concepts of law and lawfulness.
1. A Political Critique: The Test and Fundamental Liberties
Commentators have sometimes criticized the balancing test because it endangers the
central values of our liberal democratic political system. In the context of American law,
this objection is almost always constitutional: the test, it is claimed, eviscerates the sub-
stantive protections provided by the constitutional provisions it comes CO dominate. Over
twenty-five years ago, Laurent Frantz put the point quite bluntly. "The balancing test,"
he stated, "assures us little, if any, more freedom of speech than we should have had if
the first amendment had never been adopted." 277
 Similar concerns have arisen in con-
nection with other areas of constitutional law in which the balancing test has taken
274
	 reporters are filled with opinions of this sort. They are not terribly easy to spot among
majority opinions, for majorities often feel constrained to employ language intended to make the
judgment appear inevitable. Concurring judges, on the other hand, are often a little more confes-
sional in tone, making it clear that they would have liked to have held differently if statute or
precedent had been a bit inure yielding. See, e.g., McLain v. Johnson, 129 Ariz. 307, 311-12, 630
P.2c1 1039, 1043-44 (1981) (Contreras, J., specially concurring) (concurring in judgment striking
down a purported. will for failure to adhere to will formalities, but deeming the result "illogical"
and calling for a "reappraisal' of the statutory requirements for will-making).
27 '" See supra text accompanying notes 229-34.
276 See supra text accompanying notes '235-69.




hold. 278 If this is true, courts might be well-advised to abandon the test, at least as a
method of constitutional interpretation.
First amendment balancing has generated a great deal of commentary on this point,
perhaps because the potentially harmful effects of the lest are clearest there. 2 '° The first
amendment speaks in forceful, uncompromising terms: "Congress shall make no law . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The words
leave little room for interpretive maneuver; "no law" means no law."") The Supreme
Court in fact used the balancing test in the late 1950s and early 1960s to soften the
absolute proscription, to permit governmental activity that contravened the literal mean-
ing of the amendment."' It did so, critics argued, by considering the amendment merely
as a statement of a particular interest (the Freedom of speech), which could be overcome
by a sufficiently strong showing of countervailing interests, such as national security or
the integrity of Congress's investigative powers. 282
 One scholar suggested that the test
destroyed any "hard core" of meaning in the amendment, and thus diminished the scope
of fundamental liberties secured by the constitution. 2 "s
This use of the test, however, is an historical accident. Although the test arguably
has been harmful to liberty, other harmful interpretive devices might just as easily have
been employed. A literal reading of the first amendment is untenable, or at least has
2" See, e.g., Redish & Marshall, .supra note 11, at 472-74 (1986) (fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments; in deciding what process is due, the Supreme Court's balancing test likely will find in favor
of the governmental interest); Jacobs & Sirosscn, Mass Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion:
A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 595, 631 (1985)
(fourth amendment; methodology of balancing "markedly diminishes" fourth amendment protec-
dons); Elson, Balancing Costs in Constitutional Construction: The Burger Court's Expansive New Approach,
17 Ana. Oust. L. REV. 160, 161-62 (1979) (sixth amendment; citing with apparent approval but not
adopting the claim that balancing confers on the Supreme Court the discretion to render consti-
tutional rights a nullity); Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to fury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 516-17 (1976) (seventh amendment; application
of balancing approach to determine whether a litigant has a right to jury trial constitutes "an
effective judicial repeal of the seventh amendment").
2" See, e.g., the colloquy between Frantz and Mendelson: Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1062); Frantz, supra note 10; Frantz, Is
the First Amendment Law? — A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963); Mendelson,
supra note 10. See also T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL TIIEORV OF FIRST AMENDMENT 53-56 (1967)
(highly critical of ad hoc balancing in first amendment. jurisprudence). Compare Baker, Unreasoned
Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place. and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REV.
937 (1983) and Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV.
810 (1980) (critical of' balancing) with Shirfrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away
from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1212 (1983) and Shiffrin, Defamatory
Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1978) (supportive of
balancing).
See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, j., concurring) ("1 read 'no law ...
abridging' to mean no law abridging") (emphasis in original). Justice Black was to make the point
again and again: "[t]he First Amendment says in no equivocal language that Congress shall pass no
law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly or petition." Barenblall, 360 U.S. at 140-41 (Black,
J., dissenting). See also Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 441 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
Konigsberg v. State Bat: of California, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); In re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
"' See, e.g., cases cited at note 4, supra,
2°2 See, e.g., Frantz, supra note 10, at 1438.
2°5'1' EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 54 (1967).
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been made untenable by a string of Supreme Court decisions upholding legislation
curtailing some types of speech and associations. 2" Unless those cases are to be reversed,
the Court must draw lines between permissible and impermissible government action.
Any line it draws, upon any ground it wishes to draw it, will diminish fundamental
liberties if the "proper" measure of liberty is "no law" at all infringing the freedom of
speech. The real debate concerns the extent of permissible legislation, not the proper
method of constitutional interpretation.
Seen in this light, the balancing test is merely the bearer of bad tidings, not their
source. A court that believes itself constrained by precedent to depart from a literal or
absolutist reading of the first amendment will inevitably create some limiting principle or
principles. It thus might decide that "reasonable" restrictions are permissible, and then
go on to define what is "reasonable." 2" Or it might, as the Supreme Court has done, set
out certain classes of language that the first amendment does not protect, such as
language that creates a "clear and present danger"286 or language that constitutes "ob-
scenity."2" Abandoning the test will not stop the courts from fiddling with constitutional
language apparently clear on its face.
Furthermore, it is not clear that a balancing approach will always weaken the law's
protection of fundamental liberties. Balancing courts might value freedom of speech so
highly, for example, that the free speech interest will almost never be outweighed by
countervailing interests. In contrast, a constitutional proscription cast in rule form but
shot through with carefully defined exceptions might provide less protection. Although,
as a theoretical matter, the balancing test may destroy the "hard core" of meaning in the
first amendment, as a practical matter the protection actually afforded citizens may not
be diminished. We might be served as well by an army of balancing judges who value
highly the freedom of speech. 2"
The claim that the balancing test drains constitutional protections of substantive
content is strongest when, as in the first amendment, the protecting language appears
to have readily ascertainable content in the first place. In such cases the test most
obviously creates a chink in the armor of plain words. If the protective language is itself
vague, however, the test becomes less objectionable on these grounds — no "plain words"
set the "real" standard which the test can "balance away." In the case of vague protective
language, the test threatens liberty only if the alternative methods of constitutional
interpretation provide more protection than the test. The alternatives may or may not.
For example, the Supreme Court has used the test in fourth amendment cases to
determine which searches and seizures are "unreasonable," 2" in sixth amendment cases
to determine which trials are "speedy,"29° and in fourteenth amendment cases to deter-
284 E.g., Chaptinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("fighting words" not protected by
first amendment); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (time, place, and manner restric-
tions); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ("clear arid present danger" exception).
285 See Baker, supra note 279.
286 E.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frobwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
287
	
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Stator', 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
288 But see M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.02 (1984) ("overwhelming majority"




Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); New Jersey v. T.1-.0., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
E.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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mine what process is "due." 2i In these contexts, the test's relative harmfulness depends
on the nature of the alternative methods for determining what is "unreasonable,"
"speedy," or "due." A court that determines whether a particular governmental intrusion
is "unreasonable" by balancing the state's interests against the defendant's interests, might
well strike a balance more favorable to the defendant than one guided by a purely
historical analysis of what practices had in the past been accepted as reasonable. 292
Similarly, a court that determines whether a particular type of process is due in a criminal
proceeding by balancing the state's interests against the defendant's interests, might well
strike a balance more favorable to the defendant than one guided by a purely historical
analysis of what sorts of process were commonly afforded defendants. 2" If the alternative
to balancing test analysis in fourth and fourteenth amendment cases is historicism, the
balancing test begins to look like a vanguard of modern liberty.
Of course, historical analysis is not the only interpretive method available to judges
faced with questions concerning fundamental liberties, but the point is that the substan-
tive effect of the test — whether it augments or diminishes individual liberties in a
particular area of law — depends on whether the alternative analytical methods are
relatively more progressive or regressive. As that factor changes, so too will our evalu-
ation of the test's potential for harm. 291 There is nothing in the nature of the test,
however, that requires it to threaten human liberty.
It is true, however, that the balancing test moves substantive law in a predictable
direction. It has a modernizing effect. When the test is introduced into an area of law, it
works a change in that law, and that change will likely reflect contemporary values. The
older the law, the more dramatic the effect. Thus, when courts apply the test to the
federal constitution, a product (largely) of the eighteenth century, it obviously tends to
supplant the values of an earlier age with those of our own. Similarly, but less dramati-
cally, when applied to statutes of more recent vintage, the balancing test will tend to
replace the values of the age when the legislation was enacted with the latest views on
Z" E.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976).
cf.. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), In Camara, the Supreme Court made
historical analysis an element in a balancing procedure, and held the challenged housing inspection
scheme constitutional, in part because "such programs have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance." ld. at 537. But this very element of historical acceptance has been questioned on
theoretical and practical grounds. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 384 n.2 (1959) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (history of acceptance may be "history of acquiescence"); W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 188-89 (1985) (because court has in fact overturned long-used procedures,
this element in the balancing analysis "is deserving of little if any weight").
2" See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968);
Gideon v, Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (all declaring historically accepted procedures uncon-
stitutional, though not necessarily pursuant to a balancing test). Balancing was made the test for
what process is due in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319. Explicit balancing has in fact been used
to provide procedures that were not traditionally available. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68
(1985); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. I (1978). In other cases, however,
Mathews balancing has been used to sustain the constitutionality of procedures afforded individuals.
See, e.g„ Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S I (1979); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
294 In fourteenth amendment due process litigation, for example, the balancing test is arguably
more protective of due process rights than historicist analysis, but less protective than other con-
ceivable methods. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 11, at 468-75.
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good social policy. In this narrow sense, then, the balancing test has political content; it
is more solicitous of current political views than of older views.
But this general trend to modernization tells very little about where, exactly, the test
will move an area of law. The exact direction, in political terms, will depend upon the
thinking of those who produced the law and its relation to current political thought.
The winds of political thought change from age to age and from decade to decade.
Thus, the effect of the test could be "liberal" if the law were born of a conservative age
and modern thought on the issue were more liberal, or "conservative" if the law were
born of a liberal age and current thought is conservative.
As a general matter, one could argue that the balancing test threatens fundamental
liberties only if, on the whole, political thinking is more statist or authoritarian than in the
days of the founders. This may or may not be true, but certainly the proposition is
debatable. 295
 And even if true, abandoning the balancing test would not go very far
toward stemming the tide of governmental encroachment on individual liberties. Courts
disposed to move the law in this direction can carry on the work with more traditional
methods of constitutional interpretation.
There is a further difficulty in ascertaining the "political" content of the balancing
test because the weight of the elements balanced in the test are affected by the world
view of the judges who employ it. 296
 Even if we could determine the values of an earlier
age and compare them with our own, we have no assurance that the judges who actually
employ the test today will share the values of the current age, and thus the balance
actually struck and the decisions actually taken may be much different from the ones
predicted on the basis of "current thought." 297
 Balancing decisions out of step with the
times, especially if they occur at the Supreme Court level, may move the law in directions
we could not have anticipated merely by checking the Zeitgeist.
Because the test's substantive effects are almost impossible to predict ahead of time,
it might be better to examine what has actually occurred. Such an investigation yields a
mixed bag: sometimes the test has arguably respected individual liberty, and sometimes
not. 296
 A claim that the test necessarily results in diminished liberties, or in more conser-
vative social policies, simply has not been established. Accordingly, it would be a mistake
to accept or reject the test solely on the basis of its political ramifications.
',"" See, e.g., P. JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES (1983) (tracing the rise of collectivism in the twentieth
century).
2%
 See supra text accompanying note 257.
1B1
	 justice Black stated, "[t]he application of [a balancing test] is necessarily tied to the
emphasis particular judges give to competing societal values. Judges, like everyone else, vary
tremendously in their choice of values. This is perfectly natural and, indeed, unavoidable." Kon-
igsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 75 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
298
 Commentators disagree about whether balancing threatens freedom of speech. Compare M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.02 (1984) (arguing that most balancing cases hold
against the speaker) with Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1212 (1983) (arguing generally that an "eclectic" or
balancing approach can protect free speech interests). Courts have used balancing both to sustain
and deny due process claims under the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 293. Similarly,
balancing has both increased and decreased fourth amendment protection. Compare Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (balancing used to permit warrantless, less-than-probable-
cause administrative searches) with Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (balancing used to find
intrusive surgical procedure unreasonable under fourth amendment).
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2. An Institutional Critique: The Test and the Division of Lawmaking Powers
The test does have political ramifications of another sort. It appears to transfer to
the judicial branch a method of decision making more properly reserved for the legis-
lative branch. Balancing test opponents have often asserted that it is the legislator's task
to balance the interests of social groups, and from that balance establish a rule of law to
govern future behavior; judges are to take those rules and apply them as written, the
balance already having been struck. 299
It is risky to raise this matter to the level of constitutional law, to argue that a judge
who balances interests violates the separation of powers between the coordinate branches
of government. Our jurisprudence on the separation of powers has taken us beyond the
analysis of an earlier age, when the Supreme Court appeared to ascertain, a priori, the
proper scope of the coordinate brancheS of government, and guarded those boundaries
against shifts in authority."" In such an age, one might have been able to argue that
because the weighing of interests is "in its nature" legislative, or because it is a type of
analysis historically the province of the legislative branch, courts should be prohibited
from engaging in that method of deciding cases. But this way of thinking about sepa-
ration of powers issues "hits since been widely dismissed as indefensibly extreme and
largely beside the point," and has been replaced by a more flexible analysis."' The
concern that each branch stick to its own turf is still alive," however, and even if modern
courts are less likely to strike down an arrangement on separation of powers grounds,
it is still useful to ask whether a court's use of the balancing test usurps prerogatives
better left to the legislature.
There is, in fact, good reason to suspect that legislatures are better equipped to
balance interests. Social interests are better balanced in a forum in which the participants
represent social groups and speak to the issue in a representative capacity. The propo-
nents and opponents may still prevaricate and exaggerate, but at least they do so on
behalf of groups pledged to support them.
The legislature is a more natural forum for this sort of participation. The chairman
of the AFL-CIO, by virtue of his chairmanship, speaks with some authority when he
399 This line of attack has been suggested by both judges and commentators. A small sampling:
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 62t1, 634 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Ultimately, I fear, this
all hoc approach to [questions about applying] the exclusionary rule obscures the difference between
judicial decision making and legislative or administrative policy making'); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 206-07 (1970) (Harlan,,]., concurring and dissenting) ("Where the balance is to be struck
depends ultimately on the values and perspectives of the decisionmaker I fully agree that
judgments of the sort involved here are beyond the institutional competence and constitutional
authority of the judiciary They are pre-eminently matters for legislative discretion ....");
Elson, supra note 278, at 198 ("When the Court employs an expansive balancing approach, it
substitutes its judgment of relative social value for that of the legislature. Principles of democratic
government, however, require the Court to accept the value choice selected by lawmakers .. .");
Henkin, supra note 12, at 1048 ("In some contexts, lad hoc balancing] sets the court to doing ...
what. would seem emphatically to be the province or competence of the political branches — the
weighing of competing societal interests and values.").
30" See, e.g., Kilhourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192 (1881) (holding that the House of
Representatives did not have the power to punish an individual for contempt because that power
"was in its nature clearly judicial") (emphasis added).
3° ' L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16 (1978).
3" See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (striking down portion or Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act because execution of law was vested in officer answerable only to Congress, in violation
of separation of powers doctrine).
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testifies before Congress that a particular policy is good or bad for the interests of
"labor." The duly appointed representatives of the American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, by virtue of their position, speak with some authority when they claim that a
particular proposal is good or bad for the interests of the textile industry. The very act
of representation tends to confirm the representative's right to speak of social interests and
to confirm the truth of the social interest claims that he or she makes.
Trial and appellate courts, in contrast, are less well suited places for representational
argument. Generally speaking, individuals, not representatives of social groups, appear
before courts.so And they do not normally purport to represent broader social concerns,
only their own. Although it is not surprising that litigants faced with a balancing court
become eager to show that their individual interests "really" implicate broader social
interests, the question is whether the courtroom is the best forum for such claims. A
courtroom is inappropriate precisely because those who appear there do not appear
primarily in a representative capacity. There is no practical check on their claims, as
there is on the claims of duly appointed or elected officials of defined social groups, the
sorts of persons who appear in the legislative process. 3D4
The consideration of social interests historically has been the province of the legis-
latures, and a simple analysis of the respective fora reveals the wisdom of this division.
Whether the mismatch between the process and the forum is strong enough to claim
that interest balancing in the courtroom violates the separation of powers doctrine, the
mismatch is strong enough to suggest that balancing is less well suited to the courthouse
than it is to the statehouse.
3. A Jurisprudential Critique: The Test and the Nature of Law
• The most troubling aspects of the balancing test are jurisprudential. We are not
concerned now with the test's substantive, political effects — whether it moves doctrine
to the right or the left — nor with its institutional effects — whether it moves power
from the legislature to the judiciary — but with its effects on law generally. Here the
balancing test reveals its most profound weaknesses. Simply stated, the balancing test (1)
does not ensure, even in theory, that like cases will be treated alike, and (2) so muddies
the areas of the law it comes to dominate that those governed by it are left without clear
'guidance about what behavior is permitted and what is not. For shorthand, we will call
these critiques the problems of consistency and clarity, respectively.
The success of these critiques depends on the validity of two principles that underlie
them: (I) that the law should treat like cases alike; and (2) that the law should be as clear
as possible about what it permits and what it does not. These propositions are perhaps
self-evident; certainly the contrary propositions, that the law should treat like cases
differently, and that the law should not be as clear as possible, are a little absurd.
If a more subtle defense is required, we could begin by stating that the very idea of
"law," the very idea of governance by rules, involves other related ideas about rule-
making and rule-following. For example, it is hard to understand what "rules" are unless
313 Sometimes, of course, litigants appear in a representative capacity on behalf of larger groups.
Stn we have special provisions for such actions, class actions, with special safeguards to ensure that
the named litigant is indeed representative. FED. R. CR% P. 23.
1"4 q.. Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 984-86 (reviewing and criticizing possible defenses to the
court's engaging hi the legislative function of weighing social values).
May INS]	 BALANCING TEST	 643
we suppose that they are applied in certain ways (i.e., "consistently" and "equally"). If
someone states that he is in charge of administering a "rule" (or law), but that sometimes
he applies it and sometimes he does not, or that sometimes he applies it quite differently
in different situations — and could not explain when he applied it or why he applied it differently
in different situations — we would rightly suppose that either he does not understand the
meaning of the word "rule" (or law), or that he was not applying a rule (or law) at all,
but rather cluing something else, such as expressing a personal preference or following
a guideline. In short, bound up with the notion of "law" is the notion that laws be applied
"equally" or "consistently"; like situations should be treated alike.305
Similarly, bound up with the notion of "law" is the notion that the rules laid down
should be understandable. An unintelligible rule is no rule at all because an actor can
"follow a rule" only if she understands its requirements. 30D If intelligibility is a virtue, it
is a small step to the proposition that the clearer the law, the better. 3°
a. The Problem of Consistency
This first concern takes its cue from the observation that balancing test results are
peculiarly subject to the world view of the judge who employs it. When the judge weighs
the elements to be balanced, the weights will be assigned in accordance with the judge's
view of what is important. Whether one interest or set of interests "outweighs" another
quite straightforwardly depends on which of them the judge values more highly. 308
In one sense, it is a bit hypocritical to object to this state of affairs. One can argue
cogently that decisions based on the rule-based syllogism also are affected by the judge's
world view. Logic does not determine how an issue will be framed, or what will count
as the major and minor premises of the syllogistic arguments the court finally adopts.
These decisions will be affected, at least in part, by what the judge believes to be the
strongest legal argument, and that in turn will be affected by something we would call
the judge's world view. All judging methods are so affected. The balancing test is unique
in this regard, however, because of the strength of that influence. The judge's world
view is central to the balancing test, in a way not true of the rule-based syllogism.
This point becomes clearest in the context of criticizing a balancing test opinion.
When a judge has weighed the elements and declared a winner on the basis of which
"5
 In this paragraph I have moved cavalierly between talk of "rules," "laws," and "the law."
This suggests a philosophy of law that begins with the proposition that law is a system of rules. On
such an assumption, it makes sense to argue that the notion of "law" implicates certain understand-
ings about rules and what they entail. But there is a great deal of debate, of course, about whether
the law is a system of rules, ur rather something else, like "what officials do about disputes," K.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1960), or what the courts propound, GRAY, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OF LAW (1921). But even under different assumptions about "what the law is," the points
in the text can be sustained. First, to the extent that the law, under any definition, involves the
application of rules, the point still holds that consistency and clarity are desirable. Second, these
points about consistency and clarity cart be translated into the discourse of other philosophies of
law. If, for example, the law is what officials do about disputes, one can still argue that officials
should be consistent in what they do, and as dear as possible about what they intend to do.
5°6
 Lon Fuller has noted that "Mlle desideratum of clarity represents one of the most essential
ingredients of legality." L. FULLER, THE Moam,rry OF LAW 63 (1964).
3°7 See id. at 63-65; J. BENI:11AM, THE LIMITS or JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 195 (Everett CCI. 1945)
(types of unclarity).
308
 See supra note 297.
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interests were weightier, a criticism of that opinion can proceed on only two grounds:
first, that using a balancing test was inappropriate in the first place (which, because it
begs the question, will be put aside for the moment), or that the balance was struck
wrong.
But how can a balance be struck wrong? There seem to be only two conceivable
sources of error: either the judge had the correct ordering of values, the "right" world
view, and simply Made a mistake in its application, or the judge had the "wrong" world
view in the first place. Either is difficult to establish because judges seldom make explicit
the underlying hierarchy of values (legal and social) which form the basis of their
balancing test decisions. They do not, in short, make their world view known, and so it
is impossible to judge whether it is "right" — and the problem is one of application —
or "wrong" — and the problem is more deeply embedded.
The first line of criticism — right views, wrong application — can sometimes be
sustained. In those unusual cases in which the court both states and successfully defends
its hierarchy of values, one might discover a technical error: an admitted interest that
the court overlooked in its analysis. The critic could then justifiably claim that the court
got the application wrong (and the court, in such a case, might well agree).
The second line of criticism — wrong views — is alMost impossible to establish, even
if the court is absolutely clear about the values that informed its decision. A successful attack on
the decision depends on the critic's ability to demonstrate that some other world view is
better than the judge's. If she fails in such a demonstration, then her critique devolves
into the claim that the judge's world view is simply different. In this work the critic is
hampered by two related characteristics of world views: (1) they are regarded as highly
personal; and (2) within a wide range, differences in world views among right thinking
men and women are acceptable. Grounds on which to distinguish world views as more
or less correct are hard to come by." Consequently, a balancing test opinion can be
subjected to cogent criticism only rarely, when the judge's world view departs radically
from the accepted range of opinion about how values should be ordered.
It is easier to criticize an opinion that uses traditional legal reasoning. First, although
many of the decisions a judge makes in setting up the legal syllogism are not determined
by formal logic, the syllogism itself requires it. Consequently, one may examine and
,criticize the opinion on the basis of logical coherence. Unlike arguments about world
views, logic is not regarded as highly personal, and differences among right thinking
909 When the issue is constitutional, it is sometimes possible to argue that the structure or history
of the constitution demands a certain ordering of values. For example, because the first amendment
is cast in such emphatic (or absolutist) terms, this means that the values of free speech should be
"high" in any ordering of values. The project is to conscribe the range of acceptable world views
more narrowly than would normally be the case. But there are real limits to this approach. The
value of free speech may be high, but that still leaves much room for argument about how high,
and about which values are higher. Because the courts have upheld statutes and governmental
actions that infringe free speech, we must assume that sonic values are higher, at least sometimes.
Which values, and when? There is thus a fuzziness in this form of argument even when the range
of acceptable world views is circumscribed by constitutional structure or history. Cf. Aleinikoff,
supra note 12, at 972-75 (describing the need for and the attempts to derive a common scale of
values from some source other than the judge's personal preferences); Murphy, An Ordering of
Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL L. Rev. 703 (1980) (describing the need for and attempting to develop
"a mutually consistent set of jurisprudential values and principles, ranked in importance, that fit
the developing political system").
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men and women are not acceptable. A criticism based on logic is much easier to sustain
than one based on alternative world views.
Second, traditional legal reasoning often concerns problems of classification:
whether a document is a "valid will" or whether a statement about a security constitutes
"fraud."'" It turns on the meanings of words, Consequently, a decision cast in traditional
terms may be criticized for distorting those meanings. Not just any document constitutes
a "will"; not just any action constitutes a "fraud." Words have limits and those limits
form the basis of rational critique. Although word meanings are not absolutely rigid
(and some are less rigid than others) they, unlike world views, are not personal and
substantial differences among right thinking men and women are not acceptable. A
criticism based on word meaning is easier to sustain than one based on alternative world
views.
This argument is not motivated by a desire to make the critic's life easier, although
as professional critic I am always interested in advancements of this sort. Rather, the
possibility of cogent criticism acts as a check on the judge's range of permissible action.
We properly seek to constrain judges with logic and word meanings, not out of some
gratuitous urge to shackle those in positions of authority, but precisely because these
constraints help to ensure that like cases are treated alike. If the same case were brought
before different judges, the constraints of logic and word meaning help to ensure its
similar treatment,
This is not to say that the same case, or two very similar cases, would not in fact be
decided differently by two judges who employ traditional syllogistic reasoning. Our case
law abounds with examples of this phenomenon. But in the world of traditional legal
reasoning, we recognize this as a problem. 3 " In contrast, because it is not only possible
but acceptable for two judges to maintain different world views, it is also possible and
acceptable for two balancing judges to reach different results in the same case. And if
different judges, on principle, can decide the same case differently, there can be no
assurances whatsoever that like cases will be treated alike. 312
We now reach a remarkable point. If we take balancing seriously, as a legitimate
means of deciding cases, we not only invite the possibility that different judges may treat
the same case differently, we abandon the grounds upon which to'consider this situation
problematic. The internal logic of balancing is not offended by this state of affairs;
different judges mean different world views, and different world views are acceptable. 5 's
51" See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
311
 One source of the problem is that aspects of traditional reasoning — selecting the relevant
premises and finding particular facts — are riot constrained by logic and the meanings of words.
3 ' 2
 This objection might also be expressed by calling the working of the test unfair, to the extent
that our concept of fairness in judicial decision making involves the notion that like cases be decided
alike. Occasionally objections to the test have been cast in this language. I have avoided this approach
because the word "fair" comprehends several related concepts in addition to (and perhaps not even
including) the principle that like cases be treated alike. But however we may characterize the
objection, the lesson is the same. We are wise to repudiate a method of judicial decision that, on
principle, allows for different results in like cases.
535
 We could be assured of like results in like cases only if we could ensure that all judges
maintained the same world view. This, of course, is impossible and undesirable as a practical matter,
arid efforts to enforce homogeneity would, no doubt, raise objections from the bench. Traditional
legal reasoning does not require judicial unanimity of social outlook, and does not depend on it
for the like treatment of like cases. It relies (albeit with only partial success) on the injunctions that
judges operate within the constraints of logic and the meanings of words.
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As a practical matter, we are warranted in eschewing any method of judicial decision
making that permits, on principle, the different treatment of like cases. As a philosophical
matter, we are warranted in questioning whether any such method constitutes the making
of law.
b. The Problem of Clarity
The second jurisprudential concern has more obvious practical consequences. The
balancing test so muddies the areas of law it comes to dominate that those governed by
it are left without clear guidance about what behavior is permitted. Such a charge, if
true, makes those laws difficult to obey, and difficult (and perhaps expensive) to take
into account in planning.
One of the functions of a written opinion is to justify the decision to the litigants.
A balancing test opinion, we assume, serves this function as well as other opinions. The
interests are reviewed and weighed, the balance is struck, and one party is declared the
winner: the litigants have their reason. 3 " But an opinion also serves the function of
providing guidance for future action. The opinion is not written solely for the parties
to the case, but for a more general audience: the legal community and the public at
large. 3 I 3 It is in this guiding function that balancing test decisions are particularly defi-
cient. 31 G
The test's failure to guide future behavior can be illustrated in the following way.
Assume that a manufacturer plans to produce a new line of breakfast cereals and goes
to her lawyer for advice on how to advertise them. The lawyer, based on an analysis of
past cases, may give different sorts of advice. The first piece of advice is based on a
traditional rule, along these lines: "Fraud in the description of a consumer good is
prohibited." The second piece of advice is based on another rule, typical of balancing
test analysis, along these lines: "Statements about a product are prohibited when the
individual's interest in freedom of commercial speech is outweighed by society's interest
in maintaining the integrity of the marketplace." The advice the lawyer generates from
each type of rule might look something like this:
3L4 But this, of course, may not be "reason" of the type we normally expect in opinions, i.e., a
justification. See supra text accompanying notes 266-69. It is a "reason" in the same way that
"because I told you so" is a reason.
sus Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 Cows. L. Rev. 810,810-11 (1961).
Whether the opinion should be used to guide the future actions of persons not parties to the case
is a matter of some jurisprudential dispute. Some suggest that a case is decided only for the parties,
and that its use by others, for other purposes, is inappropriate. This view could certainly find
theoretical support in civil law adjudication. But it is a raw fact of the Anglo-American legal system
that opinions are used by non-parties for guiding future behavior. To call this practice illegitimate
is to make an interesting point, but one divorced from the working of the world.
•	 3" This criticism applies only to the test in its result-balancing form. Even if it is true that a
judge has balanced to find facts, facts are themselves "good" for only the case at hand; that they
offer no "guidance" for the future is beside the point, because we do not expect of a case that its
facts will provide such guidance. When a judge has balanced to create a rule, that rule will provide
the same level of guidance for the future as a rule created in the course of traditional legal reasoning.
But see Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 979-81 (the "false promise" of rule-balancing). It is only when
the judge balances to get a result, when the "rule of the case" is to balance, that the problem of
indeterminate guidance arises. Because result-balancing is the most popular version of the test,
however, the critique applies to the test in its most important and ubiquitous form.
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1) "Whatever you do, make sure to avoid fraudulent claims;" and
2) "Whatever you do, make sure, with respect to the claims you make for
the product, that your right to describe the product in any way you please
outweighs society's interest in the integrity of the marketplace."
Though each piece of advice is based on an apt description of the law, it is clear which
piece of advice is more useful to the client. It is worth exploring the reason for this
difference.
The first piece of advice is based on the concept of "fraud." It is based on a word
that is part of the linguistic currency. That is, the word "fraud" appears frequently in
spoken and written English, both in and out of the law. We can look it up in a dictionary.
Thus, even if only one case had ever been decided in the area of product advertising —
based on the analysis of whether "fraud" had occurred — or even if there were no cases
at all and the rule was derived from a relevant statute, we would already know a great
deal about which activities were prohibited in product advertising.
The second piece of advice, in contrast, rests on a determination that has no life
outside of the law, and indeed, no life outside of' the specific area of law it inhabits.
There is no dictionary to consult, no sources of' guidance other than the case (or perhaps
statute) that gave it birth, along with other cases, if any, that have applied the test
subsequently. Unlike a word, even a vague word like "fraud," the operative principle
conies to us without a history, and thus without a predictable future.
That future, of course, can become clearer as more balancing cases are decided. At
the beginning, with only one case decided, our guidance is limited to a general statement
of the balance and the knowledge of how one court struck the balance. This is better
than nothing because the one balance, as struck, will tell us what was important to one
court on at least one occasion. Because of the nature of the test, however, we have no
assurance that another court would find the same elements important, or that the
addition or subtraction of any fact in the case will not cause the balance to be struck
another way. As more cases are decided, as a series of balances are struck, the law will
obviously become clearer: we will be able to make predictions about what elements will
be weighed, and how important each element is with respect to the others. Lawyers and
non-lawyers alike will be better able to anticipate how future balances will come out, and
thus will be able to state with more confidence the status of the law.
Even so, the outcome of future balances will always be less predictable than the
results from a rule-based system. A rule in traditional form starts out with an advantage.
It is expressed in words that have a history of prior usage, both inside and outside the
law. A balance begins at ground zero, and contains no similar clues to its future devel-
op/TR ► IL If we assume that subsequent case law equally clarifies both types of approaches,
it is clear that the balancing test will seldom, if ever, make up its initial deficit in clarity.
It is enlightening, in this connection, to examine how lawyers, and judges themselves,
analyze a line of cases dominated by a balancing test. We take fo r an example sixth
amendment speedy trial decisions. The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo" 7 announced
that in order to determine whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial, a balance
should be struck by weighing the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, whether
and how the defendant asserted the speedy trial right, and the amount of prejudice that
the defendant suffered. 319
 As more cases were decided, it soon became clear how dif-
"
17
 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
" hi. at 530.
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ferent lengths of delay are "weighed" against the government." 9 As more cases were
decided, it became clear what reasons would excuse delay. 32° The judges considered
prior cases in making their decisions and both prosecutors and defense attorneys became
aware of the variables that determine speedy trial violations. In reviewing past cases,
judges, attorneys, and commentators began to develop rules: seven month's delay is not
generally prejudicia1; 321
 delay caused by defendants will weigh against them. 322 In short,
courts began to transform the balancing test into a series of tentative rules or guidelines.
These rules, however, cannot become official, because as a formal matter the balance is
the only accepted decision making method. The rules remain unreliable because no one
is bound by them: no judge can set them out in a way that makes them precedents and
still maintain fidelity to the balancing test procedure. 3" Repeated balances invite this
process of rule formation, but neither judges nor lawyers can give them the status of
law.
The situation nicely demonstrates a natural inclination to derive something useful
for guidance and prediction (the tentative, unofficial rules), out of something that is
virtually useless for those purposes (the statement of the balance and the raw data of its
results in later cases). The irony, of course, is that lawyers and judges attempt to
formulate the very rules that the creators of the balancing test so carefully avoided. It
is worth asking whether we might not be better off if judges took the bold step of
formulating rules in the first place, rather than force future judges and practitioners to
hobble along with unofficial and unreliable guidelines about what may be determinative
in future cases, Certainly the ideal of clarity would be better served.
This does not mean that statements of law in standard rule form are free from
doubt, Most reported cases are based on rule analysis rather than balancing analysis,
and the growth in reported cases is evidence enough that rules in standard form do not
end all legitimate doubt about what is permitted. Under both systems of reasoning there
are close cases. The point, however, is that when cast in a traditional form, a rule's scope
is generally clearer than when it is cast in balancing form.
319 Id. (five years "presumptively prejudicial"); United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred
and Fifty Dollars ($8,850), 461 U.S. 555 (1983) (eighteen-month delay "quite significant"); United
States v. Loud Hawk, 106 S. Ct. 648 (1986) (ninety-month delay "presumptively prejudicial"); United
States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1984) (thirty-one-month delay presumptively prejudi-
cial); Fitzgerald v. Jordan, 747 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1984) (ten-month delay prejudicial); United
States v. Garcia, 741 F.2d 363 (11th Cir. 1984) (three-and-a-half-month delay not presumptively
prejudicial).
32 ') Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (intentional delays weigh more heavily against gov-
ernment than unintentional delays); United States v. Loud Hawk, 106 S. Ct. 648 (1986) (delay
because of interlocutory appeal, without bad faith, not weighed heavily against government);
Mitchell v. Fairman, 750 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1984) (delay because of' motion to suppress does not
weigh against government unless unreasonable); United States v. Greene, 737 F.2d 572 (6th Cir.
1984) (delay because of defendant's fugitive status does not weigh against government).
321
 United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1350 n.16 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing cases); United States
v. Greer, 655 F.2d 51, 52-53 (5th Cir. 1981).
322 See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 737 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1984) (defendant's fugitive status
undercuts delay claim).
3" United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850), .461 U.S. 555,
565 (1983) ("Little can be said on when a delay becomes presumptively improper, for the deter-
mination necessarily depends on the facts of the particular case ... we arc not establishing a statute
of limitations"); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1350 0.16 (8th Cir. 1985) ("we decline to
specify a precise point at which delay becomes presumptively prejudicial").
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In summary, the jurisprudential objections to the balancing test are based on the
concerns of consistency and clarity. In any area of laW the test dominates, there is less
assurance that like cases will be treated alike, and the general scope of permissible action
is less determinate, than would be the case if the law were created and applied in
traditional fashion. This is bad for litigants, and bad for citizens who seek to conform
their behavior to the rules of law. What is had for litigants and citizens generally is bad
for the law.
c. When Consistency and Clarity Don't Matter
Even if one agrees that balancing renders legal issues less certain in outcome, and
provides little guidance regarding future conduct, not all areas of law are equally disabled
by these vices. In some areas balancing's virtue, its particular sensitivity to the facts of
the case at hand, might outweigh its vices. Criminal sentencing might serve as a useful
example of this argument. In the federal system, Congress has established a system that
calls for balancing, and in which courts regularly consider a disparate array of factors
in deciding whether, and for how long, a convicted criminal will be incarcerated . 324
Arguably no aspect of a judge's duties is more appropriate For individualized decision
making than the question of how long a particular defendant should be incarcerated for
a particular crime.
Here the vices of balancing appear less debilitating. Although balancing makes it
difficult. lo predict the precise dimensions of a criminal's sentence, the criminal is hardly
in a position to complain about this state of affairs, and we are less likely, as a matter of'
public interest, to worry about the personal difficulties caused by this uncertainty. Like-
wise, the problem of too little guidance for future action is hardly an issue for the
convicted criminal, and it is arguable that the amorphous guidance of balancing does
no real disservice to the public interest either. Once it is certain that some punishment is
due, some legal disability imposed, uncertainty in the actual terms of the imposition does
little damage to the public interest that certain actions be punished, or that persons be
deterred from engaging in those actions in the future. Intuitively this strikes us as true
because the precise dimensions of a particular criminal sentence are not normally (or
properly) taken into account in any legitimate planning activity.
I realize that in making this argument for the balancer I have made assertions, or
implicitly made assertions, about proper theories of punishment and the nature of the
public interest in criminal sentencing. It is not my project here to defend these assertions,
but only to show that, given certain assumptions about crime and punishment, one can
make out a reasonable case that balancing's virtues are particularly helpful and its vices
particularly inconsequential. Generally, such a case might be made with respect to any
area of law in which I) predictability of outcome in particular cases is not of paramount
importance, and 2) the subject matter involved is riot an element in any legitimate
planning activity.
The first problem for the balancer is that very few areas of law can be so described.
It is almost always important for us to have some predictive ability regarding individual
cases and almost always true that the subject matter involved is a proper element in
somebody's planning. Criminal sentencing, given certain assumptions about crime and
punishment, seems to meet both these criteria best, along, perhaps, with the process of
"418	 § 3553(a) (1982).
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imposing civil fines. One might also suggest areas in which at least the second criterion
seems to hold, such as property division and child custody disputes between divorcing
spouses. An assessment of one's prospects for "victory" in such cases does not, or should
not, play a role in any legitimate planning activity.
The second problem for the balancer, however, is more profound, and it involves
the problem of consistency. With respect to certain areas like criminal sentencing or
property division between divorcing spouses, we may be willing to sacrifice some level
of predictability in individual cases, but the balancing test asks for more than that. It
requires a tolerance for general or systemic unpredictability, a willingness to adopt a
method of judicial decision making in which each case turns on the world view of the
judge before whom the cause is heard, a decision that legitimately may vary from judge
to judge and from clay to day.
Even in areas like criminal sentencing or property division between divorcing
spouses, we cannot sanguinely accept the proposition that like treatment of like cases is
unimportant. 25 Indeed, in no area of law should we fail to demand, at least on principle,
that like cases be treated alike, and thus in no area of law should we willingly adopt the
balancing test. Tied up with the very concept of law is the notion that like cases be
treated alike; the balancing test is simply lawless.
It may be urged, in response, that this objection hardly represents a "profound"
difficulty for balancers. It is, rather, the height of academic folly to deprecate a method
of decision making simply because it transgresses some philosophical notion about what
the "law" entails. It is more misguided still to elevate that philosophical objection to such
heights that it forecloses the adoption of the test even in those areas of law least harmed
by its vices.
But this response undervalues the concept of law and the search for what that
concept entails. The claim of "lawlessness" is a serious one, and it is made no less so
because it depends on a lot of talk about what the law is or what the law ought to be.
When vigilantes hang a guilty man, and we complain of "lawlessness," to what do we
turn in defense of this claim but certain conceptions about lawful process and what it
entails? (The guilty man has been hung; what other complaint could there be?) Some
will scoff at these objections, of course, and will ride into the sunset to hang others.
Naturally, arguments about the concept of law and what it entails will not ride with them.
But those arguments will not disappear. They will stay back in town, there to haunt the
homes and businesses that mark the frontiers of civilized life.
Our respondent, not wishing to play the part of the vigilante, might still argue that
the balancing test has unimpeachable virtues; "lawless" or not, it is more supple than
traditional reasoning in its ability to take account of the special case, and in its ability to
respond openly to peculiar facts that may lead a court to believe that a proper decision
requires a departure from prior law. In contrast, a court may not always be able to find
a principled exception to accepted rules, and the constraints of traditional analysis may
force the court into a disingenuous view of prior law, or perhaps worse, into holding
against a party it rightly believes should prevail.
Here lies the heart of the argument on balancing, and how it is settled will depend
largely on one's concept of justice. If justice depends on no single litigant being treated
725 Ironically, the relevant federal sentencing statute itself includes "the need to avoid unwar-
ranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct" as one of the factors to balance. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(6) (1982).
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unjustly, traditional legal reasoning exacts too high a price. 	 however, justice depends
on like cases being treated alike, and on laws setting out as clearly as possible what is
permitted and what is not, then it is the balancing test that demands too much. Perhaps
it contravenes the spirit of our age to suggest that justice can exist in the face of individual
injustices, but it is exactly that conviction that sustains the case against the balancing test:
it does too much harm to too many people to be justified on the ground that a few
individuals may be harmed by its traditional rival.
IV. WitAT is To BE DONE
Despite its weaknesses, the balancing test has become an important part of American
legal process. Courts use it to find facts, to create rules, and to determine results, as well
as to interpret constitutions, to construe statutes, and to resolve common law disputes.
It has been created by judges both on their own initiative and at the direction of state
and federal legislatures. The test has been growing in popularity, and its rate of growth
appears to increase every year. It is no juridical flash in the pan.
It will be hard to control, and even harder to eradicate. Indeed, the test has become
so important a feature of American law that a call for its removal sounds quixotic."fi
The test, however, did not spring up, full-grown and popular, overnight. It grew slowly,
case by case and law by law. It can be eliminated in the same methodical way.
A. The Prescription
I have sought to evaluate the test solely in the context of judicial decision making.
Whether the test is a good decision making method for executives and administrators,
or for legislators, is another question. The normative part of this Article has sought to
establish only that the test is, on the whole, a bad thing for judging. And not every form
of the test is equally objectionable. Fact-balancing has escaped unscathed, and rule-
balancing, while subject to many of the same objections as result-balancing, is frankly
less important because it appears less often, and its subsequent history in the cases is less
pernicious. I therefore address my prescriptions primarily to judges, for it is their use
of the test that warrants caution, and specifically to their treatment of result-balancing,
the most provocative version of the test."" The prescriptions are predictable, and can
be stated simply:
(I) We should refrain from introducing the balancing test to new areas of law; and
(2) We should remove the balancing test from those areas of law it currently dom-
inates.
The first prescription looks easy. It calls for restraint; it requires the judge to do
nothing special at all. It is the introduction of the test that requires an affirmative act, the
transformation of a particular description of past cases into a method of deciding future
ones. Adherence to the status quo will result in the replication of traditional doctrine. A
judge need only resist the urge to deviate from settled law.
3 '" Describing a colleague's work, Professor Shiffrin says, "[Professor Baker's] first canon is that
balancing is to be either entirely avoided or pursued only at the highest levels of abstraction,
Meanwhile, judges have been balancing in every significant area of human rights. To ask them now
to change all that ... is to abandon practice for theory." Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic
Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1212, 1248 (1983).
3" My prescriptions also apply to legislators to the extent that the contemplated legislation
directs judges to balance.
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Ironically, however, such resistance will often take courage. First, the test will be
especially attractive in the coming decades. It is still new enough to retain its claim as
the latest, and presumably most sophisticated, development in the art of judging, yet it
is old enough, and popular enough, to offer respectability and the safety of the herd.
Second, the test will be urged in hard cases, those very cases in which the judge faces
the unhappy prospect of deciding against a litigant with obvious claims to justice in
order to preserve the integrity of a rule for which no principled exception can be devised.
The balancing test is then most alluring, and its rejection requires a steady sense of its
infirmities.
The difficulties in implementing the second prescription are more obvious. To
remove the balancing test From an area it already occupies necessarily involves a depar-
ture from precedent. Somewhere in the history of the cases lies an opinion stating that
the rule of law is to balance. The older the case, and the more often it has been cited,
the more intransigent it will have become. 328 But that which is created by analysis may
be removed in the same way.
One begins by reviewing the past balancing cases with an eye toward the unofficial
rules and guidelines they have generated. We saw earlier that a line of balancing test
cases leaves in its wake the several attempts of judges, lawyers, and commentators to
create rules helpful in predicting and deciding future cases. 329 The jurisprudential trick
is to raise these rules to an official status. The move might look like this:
Although the courts have in the past addressed this issue as a matter of
balancing, see, e.g., [the original case and any subsequent appearances of the
test], it is also clear that when [the determinative elements of past cases] are
present, the courts have uniformly held [the results of past cases, in general
form]. Thus the rule really seems to be [the new statement of doctrine in
traditional rule form].
Courts can support the move back into doctrine by reviewing the balancing test's dis-
advantages — that it cannot assure that like cases will be treated alike, and that it has
left the area of law at issue muddied and unclear — and citing to the literature. 330
No court, so far as I can determine, has explicitly adopted this method of recon-
structing balancing test cases, but judicial reticence is not hard to understand. Those of
us who are suspicious of the test have not provided judges with an alternative. It is not
enough simply to deprecate balancing. A judge may agree that balancing is ill-advised,
and yet see no way to switch the method of analysis. It is riot enough simply to call for
a return to the status quo ante, to the rules as they existed before the test entered the
3 R 8 Sometimes the switch back to traditional doctrine can be accomplished without explicitly
overruling prior cases. 'Whether this is possible will depend on how firmly the balancing test has
been stated as a rule. Early in the Article I noted that the creation of a balancing test involves two
steps, at least conceptually: describing the actions of past judges as the work of balancing, and
transforming that description into a working rule of decision for future cases, But the strength of
the second step varies from area to area. Sometimes the courts seem to have stopped at the
descriptive phase, noting that past cases have involved a balance or interests, and determining that
a like balance of interests will be used only in the case at hand. At other times, the courts seem to
have taken the second step explicitly, announcing that in that case, and in all future cases, the rule
of law is to balance interests. Once hardened into an explicit rule of law, a retreat to doctrine will
require overturning the prior cases.
949 See supra text accompanying notes 317-23.
33U See, e.g., the sources cited supra notes 231-34,278,299.
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area of law under review. The law will have changed after years of balancing, and a bald
return to earlier rules would require a court to reject outright an entire line of its most
recent jurisprudence — surely an unreasonable request given our common understand-
ing about the importance of precedent.
The method of reconstruction that I suggest is meant to address both problems.
First, it is meant to demonstrate the basic mechanism — indeed, the very words —
involved in returning to rule-based reasoning an area of law dominated by the balancing
test. Once the mechanics are committed to paper, the switch back to rule-based reasoning
looks much less subversive (as a jurisprudential matter) than we might otherwise have
supposed.
Second, it should also be obvious that the method I suggest does not call for a return
to the status quo ante. To the extent that there is wisdom in balancing, that wisdom can
be captured when the law is transformed in the way 1 have suggested above, The method
does not turn its back on the work of balancing, but rather incorporates it. Out of the
balancing comes the new rules, and the new rules .thus devised need not, (though they
may) look like the rules that existed before balancing took hold of the field. This aspect
of the method should also alleviate some of our worries about adherence to precedent.
If the method here suggested does involve overturning precedent ("we used to balance;
we no longer balance"), it is of the most modest sort. The principles at. work in that area
of law are preserved and only the form in which they are stated has changed."'
All of this makes the judge's path easier, but perhaps not easy enough. Even with a
model of how the deed is done, much work remains. As to each area of law dominated
by balancing, someone must sift. through past cases in search of underlying principles,
common elements the presence or absence of which fairly can be said to have controlled
the outcome in previous balancing cases. This is easier said than done. Faced with such
a project on the one hand, and with simply rehearsing a balance on the other, it is no
wonder that courts are inclined to the latter course. Even if a court were generally
convinced, as a matter of good judging and good law, that balancing tests should be
replaced by systems of rules, it might fairly believe that in the present case it can reach the
same results by balancing as it would have reached by reconstructing the law on rule-
based principles. By adhering to the balancing technique it saves itself from a time-
consuming task filled with the potential for analytical errors and of little practical sig-
nificance for the case at hand.
Here again, it rightly falls to those who question the wisdom of balancing to suggest
the new lines, the rule-based lines, upon which the area can be reconstructed. When
that groundwork is laid, judges might well show an increased interest in making the
switch from balancing to rules.
I am supported (though not conclusively) in this prediction by sonic recent conver-
sation between the United States Supreme Court and the law journals. Since the 1970
decision of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 3" the Supreme Court's work in dormant commerce
clause cases has been sprinkled with talk of balancing. Pike is often cited for the prop-
osition that a court reviewing the constitutionality of a state statute affecting interstate
commerce must balance "the burden imposed on such commerce" against its "putative
" 1 There is, of course, a little more to it than that. The act of authenticating the "unofficial"
rules will require placing some order on those rules, and in establishing Iltat order, some substantive
change will have taken place.
" 2 397 U.S. 137 (1970),
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local benelits." 3" Although this "balancing test" does not form the exclusive means by
which dormant commerce clause cases have been decided, it forms a basic item in the
agenda for such analysis. As such, a majority of' the Supreme Court applied it recently
in CTS Corp. a. Dynamics Corp. of America, 3 S 4 holding that an Indiana corporate anti-
takeover statute did not violate the commerce clause. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Scalia rejected the use of Pike-inspired balancing, and did so in accord with an earlier
analysis of dormant commerce clause cases by Donald H. Regan.'" Professor Regan had
argued forcefully that in this class of cases the Supreme Court "has been concerned
exclusively with preventing states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism.
Not only is this what the Court has been doing, it is just what the Court should do. This
and no more." Professor Regan thus isolated an underlying principle in the Supreme
Court's treatment of dormant commerce clause cases, even in the face of decisions that
spoke of balancing. At least one Supreme Court Justice was willing to accept the recon-
struction, and to dispense with the balancing test in this class of cases." 6
"' Id. at 142. There the Court said:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public inter-
est., and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. Occasionally the Court has candidly
undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues, but more frequently it has
spoken in terms of "direct" and "indirect" effects and burdens.
Id. (citations omitted).
3" 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
"' Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
84 Mien. L REV. 1091 (1986).
333 Professor Regan's analysis goes a step or two further than the kind of analysis required to
implement the reconstructive project 1 have outlined in this Article. My proposal requires only that
a judge or commentator isolate the principles or unofficial rules that have developed in the course
of balancing. The judge, under my proposal, then elevates those principles to a rule on the authority
of better decision making. In contrast, Professor Regan, after isolating the operative principle —
the prevention of purposeful economic protectionism — proceeds to make important descriptive
and normative claims: 1) that judges have really been applying this principle when they say they
are balancing; and 2) judges should apply just this principle rather than engage in balancing. He
bases the second claim on standard constitutional grounds — by exegesis of the constitutional text.
These claims, if true, mean that: I) a judge, following Professor Regan, can elevate the principle
to the status of law as a matter of candor, ironically the reverse trick of balancing's creation in the
first place: we said we were balancing, but what we were really doing was applying a principle"; 2)
a judge may further justify adopting the principle, not only on the authority of better decision
making, but also on the requirements of' the constitutional text itself. He thus provides two additional
reasons for adopting the principle that would not have been available had he merely isolated the
principle as one that seems to be decisive in past balancing test cases.
But, just as I am leery of the balancer's claim that despite opinions cast in rule form the courts
really have been balancing, I ant likewise leery of Professor Regan's descriptive claim that despite
balancing language the courts have really been applying a principle. Likewise, Professor Regan's
project of demonstrating that the constitutional text mandates using the principle and eschewing
balancing is debatable. Perhaps justice Scalia harbored the same doubts when he said of Professor
Regan's work, "tiff he is not correct, he ought to be." CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Whether Professor Regan is right in his descriptive and normative claims, the additional reasons
he thereby generates for disposing of the balancing test and adopting the principle are not strictly
required. The move away from balancing and back to rules is sufficiently justified on the grounds
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It is not my purpose to defend or refute the substantive content. of Professor Regan's
analysis, to analyze whether the underlying principle that he stated fully captures the
Supreme Court's past decisions in dormant commerce clause litigation. I intend, rather,
to highlight the point of Professor Regan's project — to isolate a principle that informs
an area of law governed in the past by balancing analysis — and the willingness of a
Justice to reconstruct the law so that it will be governed in the future by that principle.
In short, once the groundwork of isolating principles has been laid, the switch back to
rules becomes much more likely.
B. The Balancing Test as Half- Way  House
My second prescription — that we should remove the balancing test from those
areas it currently dominates — relies on the malleability, or perhaps dynamism, of legal
doctrine. The terms upon which cases are decided can change over time. An area of law
can be moved from standard rule analysis to balancing test analysis and back again. A
doctrine's passage through balancing test analysis can thus be viewed as one chapter in
a longer history of development.
This developmental process raises an intriguing possibility for the balancing test. if
its use is temporary, its advantages might be utilized and its disadvantages minimized in
the following way. In areas of law so novel or complex that principled sets of rules are
especially difficult to fashion, a court Might introduce the test in order to encourage
experimentation on a case-by-case basis. As this experience is accumulated, it is then
appropriate to transform that experience into a set of rules, using a method like that
suggested in my second prescription. We might suspect that this procedure will result
in better rules than those concocted without the benefit of the balancing experience.
The losses to systemic justice associated with the balancing test — inconsistency in
application and muddied doctrinal waters — are confined to the short run; and in the
long run, systemic justice is better served by creating better rules.
The temporary use of balancing test analysis arguably serves as an attractive alter-
native to the creation of an unwise rule. But this use of the test, of course, is only
theoretical. Except for occasional judicial rumblings of the sort. I described in the CTS
case, no area of law, to my knowledge, has in fact been returned from balancing test
analysis to standard doctrine. Unless a method of reconstructing balancing test analysis
becomes accepted judicial practice, we must assume that an area's entry into the balancing
test field is irrevocable.
Even if the process of reclaiming areas of law from balancing test analysis were to
become more acceptable, there is still good cause to hesitate in adopting the balancing
approach. Better methods of avoiding unwise rules are available. Perhaps the most
common is to confine the worrisome decision strictly to its facts, or to a very narrow
category of facts: if the rule is wise, future judges can adopt it in the name of precedent;
if unwise, future judges can distinguish it away, and the case will have done little damage.
Another method is to state a rule that turns on one of the venerable but generally
vacuous coinages of jurisprudence: "fair" or "reasonable" or "good faith." A rule based
on one of' the broad terms gives courts a wide range of latitude in deciding future cases.
The reader may now rightly wonder how these methods could possibly represent
an improvement over balancing test analysis. I argued that the test is fundamentally
of better law and better decision making generally. What is important is to isolate as Professor
Regan has done) the underlying principle or principles that have informed past balances. Once
that is done, the requisites of good law and decision making justify the move back to rules.
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flawed because it gives less assurance that like cases will be treated alike and because it
gives too little guidance for future conduct. An area of law, however, littered with
opinions confined to their specific facts or stating principles based on "fairness" and
"reasonableness" are likely to give no more assurance that like cases will be treated alike
and no better guidance for future conduct. These sorts of rules are "rules" in name
only. Because of their extreme narrowness, or extreme breadth, they offer few of the
advantages of rule-based reasoning constrained by logic and the meanings of words.
The main reason for preferring a nominally rule-centered approach over a balancing
test approach is that the former method permits a natural evolution of official subsidiary
rules and balancing does not. Over time, decisions turning on "fairness," for example,
wilt throw off a set of subsidiary rules about what counts as "fair" in certain factual
circumstances. A court may determine that "fairness" in a particular context requires
that defendants act toward plaintiffs in ways x, y, and z. A later court, faced with different
sets of factual circumstances, may determine that conduct x may be replaced by conduct
a and b. Later courts may refine the circumstances in which a and b are legitimate
substitutes. At any one time in the developing doctrine of "fairness," however, it will be
possible for a court (and lawyers) to summarize the work of past cases in rule form: the
conduct required in this context is x, y, and z, with a and b standing as substitutes for x
under certain (identifiable) circumstances. Furthermore, the statement of this rule does
not require overturning earlier cases that have spoken more broadly, or more narrowly,
of "fairness." Balancing test adjudication also throws off subsidiary guidelines and rules,
but they can be turned into authoritative rules only by rejecting the explicit holdings of
prior cases, i.e., the cases establishing that the rule of law is to balance. In addition, the
analysis required in divining the underlying principles of prior balances is more difficult
than traditional case analysis precisely because the prior balancing decisions were unfet-
tered by rules and the limits of logic. For both of these reasons it is less likely, as a matter
of fact, that balancing test analysis will be transformed to generate authoritative rules.
The attractiveness of using the balancing test as a temporary way station in the devel-
opment of doctrinal rules depends upon our ability to ensure that the test's use will in
fact be temporary, but unless a method of reconstructing balancing test analysis becomes
widely accepted, we do not have that assurance.
C. A Final Word
The prognosis for the balancing test is good. It is already a part of our law in dozens
of substantive areas. Stare decisis will help to ensure that it stays there. If a reconstructive
principle, along the lines of my second prescription, fails to attain wide acceptance, we
can only expect its reign to continue in those areas it already dominates.
The test, in fact, is growing in popularity. The trend is to expand its influence, and
reversing that trend will require judicial fortitude. The test's advantages are immediate
—
a promise of increased candor in the judging process and greater sensitivity to the
difficulties of the individual case. The test's disadvantages are more distant and intangible
—
a reduced possibility of like cases being treated alike and poorer guidance for the
future conduct of the citizenry at large. These are important concerns, but they tend to
fall away in the crucible of having to decide the present case, a case that affects the flesh
and blood litigants appearing before the court. The balancing test may well disserve the
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